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## I.—THE DEFINITION OF WILL.

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## No. III.

IN some preceding articles I have defined will as 'the self-realisation of an idea with which the self is identified,' and I have endeavoured to explain and to justify this account. I have hitherto assumed the fact of what is called 'ideomotor action,' and I have still to show that the assumption is warranted. But before I proceed to this last part of my subject, I must attempt to deal with several remaining difficulties.

The first of these is the question as to a plurality of volitional types.<sup>1</sup> There is a variety, it has been urged, of unique typical volitions, and each of these cases in the end is said to be irreducible and ultimate. Will may be negative, or imperative, or hypothetical, or disjunctive; and such types, it is added, will not conform to the general account which we have given. Our best reply to this objection will be to exhibit briefly the true nature of these different types. We shall in this way reach the conclusion that in every case our definition is confirmed. Certainly these types are irreducible in the sense that, before they were experienced, you could not in advance have anticipated their character. But everywhere, so far as they are volitions, they consist in the self-

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Shand, in MIND, N.S., No. 23, has written a very instructive article on this subject.

realisation of an idea, and the main question is as to the exact nature of the idea in each case. The types of will differ in short because in each type I will to do something different. The difference in other words lies in the diversity of the various ends, and this diversity will in each case be found to consist in the varying content of the idea which realises itself.

(a) We may begin with a short account of Imperative volition. In a true imperative I will the production of a certain act by another, not simply but in and through the manifestation of this my will to the other. In a true imperative the other's act must not come merely because I have willed it. It must come because I have also shown this my volition to the other, and, if the latter element disappears, there is no genuine order.<sup>1</sup> Since however this element has a constant tendency to be obscured or to vanish, it is often difficult in practice to decide if an imperative really is present. I will go on to illustrate this statement by several examples.

If, in walking with another man, I see him about to tread on some small living creature, I may will at once the prevention of this result. And I may execute my will in a number of ways. I may pull or push the person, or I may point to the object, or I may cry out 'There is something there,' or 'look,' or 'stop'. Now in any of these cases an imperative may be present or absent. If the manifestation of my will is included as a means in the idea of my end, we have in each of these cases a genuine imperative, and otherwise we have in no case an imperative volition. This is the principle, and all the rest is a question of fact to be decided in each case by a special observation. We may illustrate this again by what happens among some of the lower animals, where the mother is engaged in teaching her young. The tap, the push or the pull, the call or the warning sound, or the action set as an example, cannot in most cases, I presume, be regarded as orders.<sup>2</sup> They are not, in the proper sense, orders where they are done merely to produce the action of the other; for the idea of showing what is required seems essential to an imperative proper.

<sup>1</sup> I have of course always rejected the doctrine that a command must imply a threat. This fiction is as contrary to sound psychology as it is to plain fact.

<sup>2</sup> Whether the lower animals can use imperatives in the strict sense I do not here discuss. It is certain that they can behave in an imperative manner, and that this may be some evidence of their use of ideas I have long ago pointed out (*Principles of Logic*, p. 33).

The instance of the sudden and instinctive imperative, adduced by Mr. Shand (p. 317), does not present us, I think, with any special difficulty. If we are to decide whether an instinctive act is in any case a volition, we have to inquire first if it is the result of a foregoing idea. And in the second place, if that idea is found and the action therefore is will, we have next to ask what precisely is contained in the idea. And, according to the answer which we give to this question, we shall have to pronounce that a genuine imperative is present or absent. If I suddenly rise and ring the bell on the appearance of some danger or some want, such an "instinctive imperative" (p. 317) may perhaps be my willed order to a servant. But the act very probably is a volition which falls far short of this, and is no more an imperative than would be, for example, a movement to the door. And the act may possibly not even be the result of any volition at all. The whole question here is as to the presence and as to the nature of the idea, and, viewed in this way, the difficulty is reduced to a mere question about the particular fact.

In an ordinary imperative I will the real production of the act by the other, but it may be doubted if this feature belongs to the essence. The imperative consists merely, it may be said, in a willed manifestation on my part, and what lies beneath this appearance is not essential. But this is a subordinate point which we are not concerned to discuss, and, however it is decided, our main doctrine remains unaffected. And I do not think that we need dwell further here on the subject of imperative volition.<sup>1</sup>

(b) I must deal very rapidly with the alleged Hypothetical and Disjunctive types of will (Mr. Shand, *loc. cit.*, pp. 296-300). I cannot admit the existence of a conditional or an imaginary volition. We have to do in such cases, I should say, with an intention or a mere resolve, and how far this is will we have discussed in a previous article (MIND, N.S., No. 44). So far as the idea really is taken as conditional or as imaginary, it is so far not willed; but it may at the same time be willed in another character. And for an explanation of this I must refer the reader to our former discussion. The alleged 'dis-

<sup>1</sup> The reader should recall in this connexion that in one sense my will is limited to my inner self, and in another sense it extends into the outer world. See MIND, N.S., No. 44. We may in passing notice how the use of an internal imperative to myself is possible only where I have two selves which are taken as alien to each other. To make the whole of morality coexistent with the actual use of an imperative is therefore a most serious exaggeration.

junctive will' presents us with greater difficulties, but they are difficulties which do not seem to affect our account of volition. A disjunctive will, so far as it exists, must consist in the willing of a disjunctive idea, and the main question is about the real meaning of that idea. The question is difficult, and it is not possible to enter into it here, but I will very briefly set down what to my mind seems true. In determining (to use an instance given by Mr. Shand) to go to Paris by way of Calais or Boulogne, my state of mind is a compound of actual will and of mere resolve. I will unconditionally to go to Paris, and to go by a way which falls inside the space which is covered by both routes, a way which neither falls outside of them nor again falls within both at once. And so much as this I take to be unconditional and to be actually willed. But, to complete the disjunction of 'Either-or,' a further meaning is required, and this meaning cannot be reduced to anything which is called categorical. It remains conditional, and it cannot therefore be actually willed, but, at least in its proper sense, it is but the object of a mere intention or resolve. In my opinion therefore a disjunctive will is not fully disjunctive, or on the other hand the object is not in the full sense willed throughout. But, if such a will exists, it is the self-realisation of a disjunctive idea, and it falls under our general definition of will.<sup>1</sup>

(c) Negative volition must be discussed at greater length. The whole subject of negative states and of negative functions in psychology has, so far as I know, been treated unsatisfactorily. We had to enter this field in our inquiry into mental conflict, and with regard to some points I must refer the reader to that article (MIND, N.S., No. 43). But I should like to reprint here a passage from a paper published many years ago.<sup>2</sup> The doctrine contained in it has not, I believe, so far been noticed, but I must hope that in its present context it may have better fortune.

"I will now glance briefly at a point far too negligently handled. What is the nature of *aversion*? First the object of aversion, like the object of desire, is always an idea. We may indeed *seem* to desire the sensations that we have, but our object is really their continuance or their increase, and these are ideas. And so it is with aversion. The mere

<sup>1</sup>The nature of Choice has been discussed in the preceding article.

<sup>2</sup>MIND, O.S., No. 49, pp. 21-22. In this passage more stress should have been laid on avoidance and removal, as well as on destruction, as a form of negation. And again it might perhaps have been made clearer that I do not deny the existence of negative desire, but only of desire which is barely negative.



incoming of the painful is not aversion, nor is even the fear of it, if fear is confined to mere contraction or again to aimless shrinking back. To me aversion seems positive, what we call 'active dislike'. It implies a desire for negation, for avoidance or destruction. And hence its object, to speak strictly, cannot be reality, since it implies negation, and that is an idea. But desire for negation is still not aversion, until painfulness is added. The object to be negated must be felt to be painful and may also be so thought of. Aversion then is the desire for the negation of something painful. It is not a negative kind of desire over against a positive kind, and I myself could attach no meaning to a negative desire. Aversion is positive, but its true object is the negation of that which is commonly called its object—a confusion which has arisen from taking dislike to be mere negative liking. Aversion has a positive character, or it would not be desire; but its positive side is variable. There may be a definite position whose maintenance we want, as when we are averse to the injury of something we love; or again, the positive may be left blank—something, anything is what we want if it will serve to rid us of the painful. But again we may positively desire the act of destruction, with the agencies of its process, and so depend for the pleasures of life on our aversions. I hope this brief sketch may throw light on an obscure corner of our subject, and I will, in passing, advert to another mistake. Desire and aversion have been taken to be aspects of desire, since that is tension,<sup>1</sup> and (we may add) is to that extent painful. This is mere confusion, for all aversion has an ideal object. Now the (painful) tension of desire is not an object at all. It may be made one, and so may give rise to an aversion. But this will clearly not be an aspect of the original desire, but will be a new desire supervening."

What is negative will? It is a will to remove, to avoid or to destroy. The idea which realises itself in negative will is the idea of such a result. And negative will has a character of its own which in one sense is irreducible and unique, but on the other hand most emphatically it is not co-ordinate with positive volition. It is subordinate, and is a specification of the main positive type. The idea which it realises is never simple, but always implies, and always must imply, a positive basis and aspect. Thus the process of destruction or avoidance has an affirmative side, and without such an aspect of positive assertion all negation is meaningless. I

<sup>1</sup> Volkman, § 140; Lipps, p. 604.

will explain this doctrine by a defence of it against some objections.

"Your doctrine," I shall first be told, "is contrary to fact. It would imply that with the negation of a particular A we have always a positive idea B, an idea which itself is particular and is co-ordinate with A. In other words there would be no denying except on the basis of an explicit alternative between particulars. And any assumption of this kind would be contrary to fact." But no such assumption, I reply, is involved in our doctrine. For the positive side of destruction or escape may remain unspecified and general, and certainly need not take the shape of a co-ordinate particular. In negative will, we may say, the affirmative is usually not specified. And to argue, 'Either no idea at all or an idea that is particular,' would surely everywhere, and not only here, conduct us to ruin. On the contrary I in fact may deny this or that without the actual assertion of any particular opposite. On the one hand that which is to be removed must be specified always; but the positive aspect of the removal, although necessary, may be utterly vague. The thing in short is understood to be done somehow, but the positive 'how' is left blank.<sup>1</sup>

We may pass from this to an objection of a different kind. "We can have negative will," it may be said, "where no idea at all is present; and this happens where we reject an offered suggestion and again where we disapprove." But I find in these cases no special difficulty, except in discovering the precise fact which is offered. If on its appearance a suggestion is banished either because somehow it is incompatible, or again because it is incompatible with some known mental group, it seems absurd to offer such a fact as a case of volition. If the exclusion is simple we have surely so far no semblance of will.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand if the suggestion,

<sup>1</sup> It is in my opinion a mistake to hold that every positive term without exception must have a co-ordinate negative, and in the end this mistake would have a ruinous result. As to negative will Mr. Shand (pp. 292, foll.) appears to me to assume without inquiry that the alternative, 'Either a particular positive idea or none,' is a sound one. He does not state whether he everywhere rejects unspecified ideas, and he does not explain how we are able to do without them, and how, for instance, we are to understand, say, the idea of an absence. I cannot agree with Mr. Shand that the psychology of negation has been injured by the transference from logic of ideas which there are true, but are inapplicable in psychology. I should say on the contrary that it is neglect of logic and mistakes in logic which have here injured psychology.

<sup>2</sup> There is here, we may say, no experience of agency proper, though there may be perhaps in a lower sense an experience of activity. See MIND, N.S., No. 46.

not being banished at once, is recognised as incompatible with a certain principle, and if the idea of the suggestion's banishment is excited and qualifies the principle—then I agree that the ensuing result may be a negative volition. But the nature of this volition now completely agrees with our definition of will. And the further instance of disapproval will certainly not shake us. For on the one side a disapproval is not in itself a volition, and on the other side it in no case is present without an idea. I will venture first to call attention to this latter point. The mere fact of a suggestion being in painful conflict with something either unspecified or again definite, even if this conflict results in the suggestion's banishment, does not by itself constitute a genuine disapproval. For, in order to disapprove, you must judge and must not simply eject, and you cannot judge unless you qualify your object by an idea. There must be a principle or standard, however vague, with which the self feels itself one, and that of which you disapprove must be qualified by the idea of discrepancy with this standard.<sup>1</sup> Thus a simple inhibition or rejection may be a higher thing morally than the most explicit disapproval, but, considered psychically, it will stand always at a lower level. But in any case, to return to this, a disapproval is in itself no volition. I may have the idea of a principle in myself and its rejection of something which is offered, and I may feel myself one with this whole idea and may judge accordingly and so disapprove. But unless I have the idea of a change in immediate existence, and unless that idea carries itself out into the facts, however much I have disapproved I have not actually willed.

An alleged negative volition, we have seen, is either not genuine will, and, when scrutinised, at once ceases to appear in that character, or else, if real, it does but specify our general account. It is a type which falls under and which confirms our definition of will. And we need, I think, consider no further these alleged types of independent volition. We have found that in every case, so far as it is a case of real will, we have an idea which carries itself out into fact. And the inability to verify the presence of this idea has, we saw, been due mainly to a failure to apprehend it in its proper character.

I will add some further remarks on aversion in its relation

<sup>1</sup> We saw in *MIND*, N.S., No. 41, p. 25, that for this reason your disapproval may serve to retain the suggestion.

to positive desire. The extract given above contains, I believe, the main truth on this subject, but I will endeavour in certain points to confirm and to illustrate its doctrine. Aversion and positive desire certainly are not co-ordinate, any more than are denial and assertion in logic. And it is not difficult to show how the mistaken view about aversion has arisen; but I will first endeavour to remove some misunderstandings.

"All desire," it may be said, "is and must be for change, and therefore all desire is negative; and on one side it must therefore consist in aversion." But the premiss from which this conclusion seems to follow is ambiguous. Desire is certainly for something which is not present, and it is a desire therefore for something else, and this naturally implies an alteration, and so in some respect a negation, of that which is. But in desire this negation is incidental, or at the very most is subordinate, while in aversion it constitutes the main and principal end. And 'change,' we must remember, is a more or less equivocal phrase. A thing is changed by a subtraction which removes its positive character, but it is changed also by the mere addition to it of something positive; for the thing so loses the character which it had before, while it was not yet increased. If, for instance, I possess two sixpences, my condition is changed if you take away one, and my condition also is changed if on the other hand you give me a third. And if, having already two sixpences, I desire a sixpence, my desire implies incidentally the negation of the first two as two only. But you can hardly take this negation to be in all cases an actual constituent of my positive desire, and, even where it is present, you can hardly make it co-ordinate with my positive end. For I may have desired the third sixpence without any thought of or any reference to the first two, and, even if I desire to add to these, I obviously do not desire to remove them. Their change, so far as it is negative, cannot in short be regarded as my main object. It is an incidental result which is either not present in my end, or, if present there, has clearly a subordinate character. But in aversion the mere negation of what I change is my principal end, and any positive aspect of this main end is subordinate or even quite unconsidered. Positive desire, we may say, is for a specified something, and this implies the negation of some aspect of the world; but the aspect thus to be destroyed need not in desire be either specified or considered. But the aversion to something contains essentially and explicitly a destructive change of that something, at least in some aspect, while on the other

hand the positive attendant or result of this negation need not be specified or even in any way considered.

Without refinements we may perhaps put the matter as follows. The negation in positive desire need be no more than indirect and incidental, and, even where it appears in the main end, it appears as subordinate. And in positive desire the negation need be neither specified nor considered. But in aversion it is the positive side which need be neither considered nor specified, and in any case that positive side is secondary and is not the main object. We shall realise this if we consider some instance of aversion such as the game-keeper's pursuit and destruction of vermin. This process of course has its positive side, and in this positive side the man may take pride and delight, and it is possible even that he may wish for no better employment. But with this we are concerned no longer with a simple aversion. We have a mixed state in which the aversion more and more is out-balanced. And by an increase of emphasis on the positive side, and by a subordination to that of the mere negative aspect, the aversion in the end might even become transformed wholly and lost. Once find a pleasure in the pursuit of an animal, however noxious, and more or less, according to the conditions, it tends to lose its character as an object of aversion.

We can now dispose of a difficulty which may seem to arise from the difference in the relations of aversion and desire to existence. The object of aversion, we may be told, must exist, while the object never exists in the case of desire. You cannot in other words desire that which is actual, while you can be averse to it. But there is a dangerous confusion here as to the meaning of 'object'. The object may mean either the existing not-self which is before me, or it may mean on the other hand my ideal end. Now in no case can my idea itself be something which actually exists; and on the other side, both in desire and in aversion alike, there is opposed to my idea something which I represent to myself as actually existing. This opposition of idea to fact holds even where the fact is imaginary. I can thus be averse to a calamity though I do not really expect it,<sup>1</sup> and I cannot desire to eat an imaginary apple unless for the moment, and as against the idea of eating, I regard it as actual. And there is no difference so far in principle between desire and aversion. They differ in principle through the diversity of

<sup>1</sup> I am forced in this and some other points to dissent from Waitz, *Lehrbuch*, p. 444, by whose remarks I have however profited.

that relation to existence which is not external, but is contained within their respective ideal ends. And it is contained, we must remember, in one case explicitly, and in the other case more or less by way of implication. Thus the negation of something taken to exist is the main end of aversion, while the appearance in existence of something positive is the main end of desire. And the further alteration of existence by this positive addition may be a result which in desire, we have seen, is not even considered. In any case however, where negation is contemplated in desire, that negation is subordinate to the positive aspect. But it would hardly repay us, I think, to enlarge further on this head.<sup>1</sup>

The mistaken co-ordination of aversion with desire has arisen, I presume, in several ways. It has been helped perhaps by the confusion which we have just briefly noticed, and it is connected certainly with logical errors as to predication. But the mistake has come perhaps mainly from a natural but misleading parallel, and by a transference to aversion and desire of the opposition between pleasure and pain. Unless we separate pain from unpleasantness, pleasure and pain are on one level. They stand to each other, we may say, as co-ordinate opposites. And since doubtless aversion has more to do with pain, and desire more to do with pleasure, one is led to assume that the relation between each pair is the same. And since from this there follows a variety of mistaken results, I must state briefly the connexion of pleasure and pain with desire and aversion.

In both desire and aversion, if we do not distinguish between pain and unpleasantness, we must to some extent have the presence of both pleasure and pain. The idea of the end must in positive desire be felt to be pleasant, and the same thing to a less degree will hold good in aversion. In

<sup>1</sup> Since this article was written I have made acquaintance with Dr. Pfänder's thoughtful essay, *Phänomenologie des Wollens*. Dr. Pfänder there (p. 71) criticises the doctrine that aversion has a negatively determined end. He has however, I do not know why, understood negation here as bare privation or absence; and certainly, so understood, the doctrine he criticises becomes untenable. In the presence of a painful noise, *e.g.*, I may desire its absence, but that desire is not, as such, an aversion. It is not the mere absence, but it is the positive suppression or avoidance of what annoys me, that is really desired in aversion. Dr. Pfänder appears to me to be confused on this head, or to be dealing with some confused statement to which he does not refer. Again, pp. 109-111, he objects that a negative will may be a will for a bare not-doing. But unless my idea changes something which otherwise would be and is therefore taken to exist, I must insist that we have not a real case of volition at all. See MIND, N.S., No. 44, p. 440. And, again, the will to produce a state of privation is, as such, a positive and not a negative volition.

both alike the whole state may according to the conditions be either pleasant or painful, though the latter case will more often be found to exist in aversion. But, since both are complex, we may have in each a preponderance of either pleasure or pain. In aversion the felt hostility of existence to the idea will be painful, but this same feature must appear also in positive desire. In both the felt tension of idea against existence will not fail to produce uneasiness, however slight that may be and on the whole outweighed. And thus the distinction, so far, may be said to consist merely in degree; but we must from this go on to take account of a further difference. In positive desire the idea of pleasure does not always qualify the object. In desire, that is, I must indeed always feel pleasure in the idea, but pleasure may either enter or not enter into the content of the end, and its entrance, where it enters, does not belong to the essence of desire. But in aversion, while in the same way to some extent I must with my idea feel some pleasure, on the other hand the internal content of my idea must be qualified by pain. Unless the painfulness of the object, upon which the process of negation is to fall, enters itself beforehand as an idea into my idea of this process, I cannot think that in the proper sense we have an aversion. We may again contrast here the desire to kill an animal for sport with the desire by any means to destroy noxious vermin. In the first of these cases we have plainly no aversion. You cannot desire the mere negation of a thing unless that thing comes before your mind as injurious and painful. For the positive side of such a mere negation is not specified except as the removal of that object to which we are averse. And, unless the object were painful, its blank removal could not, so far as I see, be desired. On the other hand if the special process of negation is itself directly desired, we are to that extent not concerned with a pure aversion. Thus in all aversion the positive aspect of removal must be desired; while on the other side no aversion is pure unless the means of removal are desired, not in their own character but merely as means.

Aversion and positive desire are thus in principle distinct. But in each the complication of pain and pleasure may be great, and there is a tendency in each to transform itself and to pass into the other. In many cases we find them existing side by side in a mixed state, while in other cases co-existence gives way to more or less complete subordination. But a desire or an aversion, where completely subordinate, has ceased, we must remember, to exist as an actual aversion or desire.



This last remark has a wide and important bearing (MIND, N.S., No. 43), and it leads us here to the discussion of a well-known question. Can I will that to which, while willing it, I have an actual aversion? If the doctrine laid down in the article just referred to is sound, a volition of this kind will be clearly impossible. Given an actual aversion, you would have an idea which conflicts with the idea implied in your will, and you would as a result have no action or, if an action, no will. If on the other hand your positive idea has prevailed over your aversion, the aversion has been banished or else made subordinate. But in the latter case it has been modified and has ceased to be an actual aversion. The will to do what I hate, although I hate it, must imply that in some sense my hatred is changed. The negation has been turned into an element within a complex positive idea. The aversion has lost its independence, and, however painful, it is no longer an actual aversion. I am still 'averse' in this sense that a mass of hostile feeling remains, and this mass struggles perhaps violently against the realisation of my positive idea, and it tends constantly to restore the independence of its own idea. But, so long as its idea does not break loose but is held as subordinate, there cannot in fact be an actual aversion. And in the same way, though desirous, I may fail to have an actual desire.

I shall soon return to this distinction between an aversion and a mere condition of averseness, but at present must remark further on the co-existence of aversion and will. The statement that I cannot desire and will that to which I am at the same time averse is seen, when compared with facts, to be clearly erroneous. The mistake arises partly from neglect of the distinction which we have just made, but it is mainly due perhaps to a failure in observation. The great complexity of aspects contained in aversion and desire, and the presence in each of elements, pleasurable and painful, which come from a variety of sources, is often not noticed. We have seen that a desire, when considered as a whole, may be painful, just as an aversion, when it is taken on the whole, may be pleasant. We may instance the desire of a mother to save her child when she fears that she cannot, and again the pleasure of destroying what we hate where there is not too much trouble or danger. And hence, though I can will that to which I am averse without also desiring it, I certainly on the other hand may desire it and desire it eagerly. The alternative which by itself excites our repulsion may, as an escape from the intolerable, be desired and may even be regarded with complacency. And we may be



aware of this pleasure, or again, because the pleasure is outweighed by pain, we may, despite the actual fact, deny its existence. But I cannot here enter further into the detail of these complicated states.<sup>1</sup>

I will now return to the distinction which we noted in passing. We may be desirous or averse although we have not an actual desire or aversion, and in the same way we can have a standing or permanent will to do something when the corresponding volition is plainly absent. I have had to refer to this point in a former article (*MIND*, N.S., No. 41, p. 26), and a very brief statement here will, I think, be sufficient.

A state of desire or aversion, where the actual aversion or desire is not present, has two meanings, and these different senses may be conjoined or used separately. In the first sense I have a group of feelings, perceptions, and perhaps movements, such as belong to the actual aversion or desire, but, when taken by themselves, are incomplete and stop short of it. This group continually tends to produce the complete and actual state, and it may therefore be called its conditional presence. But even in the absence of such a group we may be said still to desire or dislike, if it is understood that, given the object, we should certainly assume that attitude towards it. And we may speak in the same sense of a will which is standing or permanent. We may mean by this the constant presence of actual feelings and ideas, such as go to make, let us say, a volition to injure, and such as, given the occasion, would actually produce the volition. And we have so far an habitual mood of a certain character. But again by a standing will we may signify no more than a general disposition to injure. Whatever may be in fact my present mood, and whatever may be the ideas and feelings which are now actually in my mind, I should, without regard

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *MIND*, N.S., No. 43, and O.S., No. 49, p. 17. Mr. Shand (pp. 324-325) rejects the view stated in the text, but I must be allowed to doubt his having apprehended it rightly. He apparently fails generally to see how in desire pain and pleasure are mixed. An example of desire for a painful alternative is found in Claudio's mood of "flowery tenderness" for death. And in De Goncourt's *Germinie*, p. 15, we hear of "une attente de la mort qui devenait à la fin une impatience de mourir". The defect in Mr. Shand's account becomes visible from another side when he fails to see that an act done from mere principle tends naturally to become an act done from desire (pp. 323-324). The pain caused by injury to the principle must tend to produce a desire for relief. I think that if Mr. Shand generally had done more justice to the actual facts, he would have felt less need to betake himself to something inexplicable behind them. But, however that may be, his articles have not failed to throw light on the subject.

to this, under certain conditions have a volition to injure. And since these conditions may be expected to occur in fact, my will to injure is taken already in some sense to exist. We noticed formerly the same use in the case of attention (*ibid.*). I may be 'attending' to a business although no actual attention is present. I am or I have something which on the occasion would turn to attention. And so, since I have all the attention which is at present required for my purpose, you may say that I attend really although no attention is there. In these cases we use a licence which not unfrequently degenerates into error, where the standing desire or will is assumed to be really an actual will or conation. But, when a man is reposing placidly with no idea or feeling except of tranquil enjoyment, to say of him that at this moment he has an actual conation or will to take revenge on his enemy would be surely mistaken. To assert this would be at least to take an undue liberty with language.

If you ask for the ultimate nature of a permanent disposition to act, I should myself decline in psychology even to entertain such a problem. But how the standing will passes into an actual volition is a question which on the whole is not difficult to answer. Apart from the oscillations of an habitual mood, which is a matter not here to be discussed, the actual volition in the main is produced by Redintegration. Something that occurs to us has a character which falls under the law of our disposition. The character may fall under that law directly, or again indirectly and through a further principle, and the connexion again may be positive or negative. In any case the disposition in this way becomes active, and brings into fact the further element which it ideally contains. But this is a point to which we shall very soon be compelled to return.

There are a number of questions about desire which I must here leave untouched,<sup>1</sup> but I will briefly notice the relation between desire and conation. Does all desire contain, or is it all identical with, conation and striving? An affirmative answer is common, but, I think, cannot be sustained if conation is to stand for the experienced striving of my self. But conation may be used besides in two different senses (MIND, N.S., No. 40). It may signify a striving which is not as such experienced at all, or is at any rate not so experienced within myself. Or, again, it may mean a striving which is actually experienced as such within me, and yet is

<sup>1</sup> For some of these see MIND, O.S., No. 49.

the striving only of some psychical element, such as a fixed idea, and is not the striving of my self. I do not however propose to take further account here of either of these senses.

If then conation is understood as the experienced striving of my self, I cannot perceive that everywhere conation is involved in desire. It may be argued that without conation desire would not have begun to exist. Want and need, however urgently experienced, are not yet desire, since they lack the idea of an object which is opposed as an end to existence. And the argument would urge that, apart from movements which in fact realise the end, the end as an idea in desire would not have come into being. And the idea of these movements will therefore, it is said, qualify the end and object of desire. And apart from these movements, if the satisfaction could ever be gained, at least the idea of it could not possibly be retained by the mind. But the presence of these movements in idea will most certainly involve a conation. And this active attitude remains, it will be further urged, through all our mental development, and everywhere will qualify the object of desire, even in a longing, say, for warmth. Thus the desired object must contain always to some extent the idea of my actively getting it, and every desire therefore will essentially involve a conation. Now I admit the force of this argument, and I agree that, speaking broadly, desire will not be separate in its origin from conation. I could not maintain that without conation it in no possible case arises; but such an origin of desire, I admit, would certainly be in fact exceptional. On the other hand I cannot argue that, if in its beginning desire depends on conation, it therefore now must involve a conation in its essence. I do not see why the ideal element of my acting for some end should not in certain cases fall out of my idea of that end. And, since in many cases I cannot discover that such an element now exists, I must reject the conclusion that in all desire a conation is involved.

And there is a counter-argument which to my mind has considerable weight. An intense desire for relief may be followed by an actual relief, and by a perception and a sense of complete satisfaction. But certainly in some cases the relief is not experienced as having been attained by my action, and, if all desire is conation, such a result seems to me hardly explicable. You may indeed contend that the experience required escapes my notice, although present in the result, just as, before the result, the conation was actual though I failed to observe it. But I prefer in each case to accept the evidence of the fact which I observe, and I must

therefore deny that in all desire without exception a conation is implied. If it is to be always present it will be the conation of some psychical element not my self, or it will be the striving of something which itself does not enter into my experienced world.

I must go on from this to point out the distinctive character of Wish. Desire and wish tend naturally in fact to pass one into the other, and the distinction in language between them is at times not maintained. But this distinction exists, and it corresponds to a difference in principle, and on this point it is well to be on our guard against error.

In the first place a wish is not a striving or conation. It is, again, not the general head under which all desire falls,<sup>1</sup> nor can a desire be defined as a wish the realisation of which is judged possible. For no such judgment, we saw, is really involved in desire, nor in accordance with language can desire be taken to fall under wish. We shall find on the contrary that wish is a specialised development from desire. Further a wish is not distinguished from a desire by its weakness. A wish, it is true, generally is inclined to be weak; and, for a reason we shall point out, a wish cannot intensify itself beyond a certain degree without passing from a mere wish to become a desire. But, since desires are of all strengths, the essential difference could not lie in this point. Thus when Prof. Sully tells us (*Human Mind*, ii., 208) that wish "marks off the *nascent* desires which are only momentary, being instantly dismissed as *futile*," I am myself unable to verify his assertion. For it seems in the first place obvious that wishes are not all momentary and instantly dismissed. And again, if wishes are taken to involve a "nascent" desire, it is hard to see how that feature by itself is to serve as their differential character. To suppose that, wherever you have a "nascent" and momentary desire, you have in the proper sense a wish, seems contrary to fact. And in short I do not see how Prof. Sully would justify his assertions, unless through that virtue which evidently to his mind resides in such phrases as "nascent" (see below p. 20). To pass to another point, the difference of wish from desire does not lie in this, that in desire it is my action to which the real world is opposed, while in wish this world is contrary to something else. Desire we have seen does not in all cases coincide with conation, and again my desire

<sup>1</sup> This untenable view is advocated by Prof. Ehrenfels in his interesting study *Fühlen und Wollen*, and again in his *Werttheorie*.

for an end which is to be accomplished by another cannot possibly in all cases be termed a mere wish. The shipwrecked crew surely can be said to desire that the life-boat may reach them.

Wish is a desire which in a certain way has been specialised and limited. The idea of satisfaction has in a wish been broken from its connexion with my actual reality. The idea is disconnected but at the same time it is retained, and its realisation has been imagined in a world which is not the world of my reality. This world may according to the circumstances be more or less defined or indefinite, but it never ceases in a genuine wish to appear as imaginary. And hence the collision of the idea with fact can to a greater or less extent be suppressed. Wish is desire for an imaginary end which, because it is imaginary, can be regarded as attained. And hence a wish, so far as it is a desire which is imagined as satisfied, has in this respect passed beyond a simple desire. But in another respect a wish remains less than desire, since the imaginary object and its fruition are recognised as out of our reach. Our wish is therefore a *mere* wish, and it is an idea which is sundered from the real order. But since this absence of relation tends to come to us in experience as a relation which is negative, a wish entails logically, and it continually in fact tends to pass into, an actual desire.

The idea in wish is separated from our world by the perceived failure of means to its realisation. And the failure may come to us as general, or again as conditioned by a special obstacle either negative or positive. This obstacle may consist merely in my fear or my scruple, but, so long as it qualifies the real world, it prevents the presence of my simple desire. If then I place my desire in an imagined world where this obstacle does not hold, I have a wish. And because this other world is recognised as not actually present, my wish does not lead me to an act or an attempt.<sup>1</sup> Being in a sense satisfied beyond the reality, it is so far removed from collision with fact. But, as we have seen, in so far as it is not actually satisfied, a wish tends to collide with the world and to become a desire.

Wish arises from the retention of the idea despite our inability to give it reality. The idea is retained by the persistence of the want which remains unsatisfied and compressed. And this want, we have seen, frees itself and

<sup>1</sup> 'I wish you to do this' is less peremptory than a simple imperative, because it is hardly unconditional. But 'I wish that you would' is of course the correct expression of a wish.

expands into a heaven of its own. We have in wish a sense that fruition is at once more than possible and yet less so, according as we look first on one world and then on the other. A wish is innocent, because disconnected from the actual world. It is enervating, so far as it rests in enjoyment divorced from action. It is insidious, because its idea, being actually unrealised, tends to pass into simple desire.

The passage of mere wish into desire calls for little remark. The obstacle that bars our desired end may for a moment be hidden from our sight, or it may pass from our mind in a moment's forgetfulness. Or on the other hand some unlooked-for means of realisation may show itself. In either case a tension between my idea and the actual world is set up, and the old unsatisfied want now breaks out into an actual desire. And, if wish becomes intense beyond a certain point, this result is inevitable. For the ideal satisfaction becomes too shadowy, while on the other side the idea, growing dominant, suggests forcibly its own realisation, even against the knowledge that this cannot be attained. When thirsty beyond a certain point a man cannot confine himself to a mere wish for water, and the unfortunate lover is condemned not to rest in mere wishes. This is the truth perverted into the doctrine that wish consists in a weak desire. But because a mere wish, if you intensify it, is transformed into a desire, you cannot conclude that a desire, if you weaken it, will through its weakness become a mere wish. For in one sense a wish, we have seen, is more special and is more complex than desire.<sup>1</sup>

We now approach a part of our inquiry which perhaps

It will be instructive to note here the difference between wish and resolve. In the first place a wish is for a mere result and does not essentially imply agency on my part. In the second place my resolve is directed upon the real world. In resolve this real world is not the world perceived as immediately present, and in this point, we have seen, resolve is distinguished from will. On the other hand the world of resolve is not discontinuous with my world as it exists here and now. There is no breach between the two; for the present world is regarded as extending itself into the future, and the present world is contemplated as itself actually there before me in resolve, notwithstanding an interval and even perhaps a condition. And it is only because it is directed upon the real world, as in this sense actually present, that my resolve is a volition, so far as it is one. On the other side in wish we have a world which we are aware is imaginary. This world is therefore not contemplated as the prolongation of reality, but is estranged from the real, and is sundered from it by a breach in nature. And to throw a volition across such a breach does not even suggest itself as possible. The subject of resolve has been discussed in *MIND*, N.S., No. 44.

has been too long deferred, and must ask how it is that in volition the idea realises itself. That the idea does realise itself is at least an apparent fact. And, if this fact is mere appearance, then will assuredly has become an illusion. And the illusion remains an illusion however great our success in explaining its origin. But on the other hand the belief in the existence of such an illusion rests, so far as I see, on misunderstanding and prejudice. I will here discuss this no further than once more briefly to point out what is meant generally by the action of the idea in volition. The idea is a cause of the result in which its content is realised, but it is not the sole and whole cause of that result. And if cause is to mean complete cause, you may maintain with us the reality of will, and yet may deny that your mere psychical state of the moment is the cause of what follows, or is even the cause of what follows merely on the psychical side. And still less can the idea, being psychically a mere element in your state, usurp the position of a complete cause. But the causality of the idea in will need involve no such meaning as this. The idea is a positive condition which is a genuine element in the actual cause, and it is a condition of such importance that we may fairly claim that its presence makes the difference to what happens.<sup>1</sup> And, with anything less than this, I must repeat that will becomes an illusion. Even if the idea were necessary as an effect which is collateral with and so united to the result, that mere necessity would still turn will into a false appearance. For you seem once more to have denied that the idea actually goes to produce the result. And, if you cannot affirm this, you cannot assert in any proper sense the existence of will.

Let us then proceed to ask in what way the idea realises itself. We provisionally assumed the validity of *ideo-motor* action, but that assumption must now be allowed to drop. We must inquire therefore under what law or under what laws in psychology this fact of the idea's self-realisation will fall. And I will begin by dismissing a view which is equally common and erroneous. A desire and a conation on this view are essential to will, and the presence of these together with the idea explains the further result.<sup>2</sup> But if we look without prejudice at the facts no such doctrine can stand.

<sup>1</sup> I cannot of course here enter into an inquiry into the exact nature of cause and condition positive and negative. I have already had to touch on the necessity for the idea's action in *MIND*, N.S., No. 44.

<sup>2</sup> This matter is discussed further in *MIND*, O.S., No. 49. I do not propose to do more than mention the old mistake that the object of all desire is pleasure. We may fairly, I think, call this doctrine exploded.



It is not the fact that desire and conation are to be found in all cases of will. Acts done at once from imitation or in obedience to an order, and generally acts which at once ensue from the suggestion of an idea, furnish instances which on this point seem really conclusive. No one, apart from theory, could fairly deny that of these actions at least some are volitions, or reasonably assert that in every case a desire or conation in any proper sense is present. When the sequence is delayed I admit that there is some ground for doubt. You may argue here that delay must cause necessarily a tension between the idea and existence, and that this tension must amount to conation and desire. But for myself I cannot accept even this modified conclusion. Where after delay volition follows from an unpleasant fixed idea, I cannot allow that in all such cases there is a desire or a conation of my self, and yet on the other side no one here, except to save a theory, would deny everywhere, where desire is absent, the presence of will. And where there is no delay, and where the result follows at once from the idea, the above contention, it appears to me, wholly breaks down. The existence need not be perceived in such a case as resisting the idea. On the contrary all that is implied in such a case of volition is that the existing not-self should be felt as opposite to such an extent that its change is perceived as an alteration made by me. But this opposition need not amount to the tension involved in desire and conation. And again that felt pleasure in the idea which is certainly necessary for desire (MIND, O.S., No. 49, pp. 15-16) may be absent, it seems to me, in some cases of will. We must conclude therefore that conation and desire, even if usual in volition, cannot, if we respect the facts, be taken as essential and necessary.<sup>1</sup> There are actions—to

<sup>1</sup> I cannot verify the presence of felt pleasure in the idea in all cases of volition, but this pleasure on the other hand (MIND, O.S., No. 49) seems essential to desire. It must be understood (I will repeat) that, in speaking here of desire and conation, I am excluding the desire or conation of any mere element in my self, or again any desire or conation which is not experienced as such. On the alleged necessity for the presence of desire in volition the reader may find it instructive, and perhaps entertaining, to consult Prof. Sully (*Human Mind*, ii., 214 foll.). Prof. Sully in my opinion neither states fully nor indeed understands the case which it is incumbent on him to meet, and even then, in his attempt to show the presence of desire in all will, he begins even himself dimly to discover his collision with fact. He is forced to substitute for "desire" such phrases as "analogue of desire," "nascent desire," and "rudiment of desire," and he is driven to speak of an action as "half-volitional". But the seeking refuge in such unexplained, if not meaningless, phrases is, I would submit, an unconscious admission of failure. The only thing



repeat my argument—which cannot be shown in fact to involve conation or desire, and some of these actions every one apart from theory would call volitions. And according to my definition of will such actions are volitions really. And I urge this agreement of doctrine with usage as some evidence that the definition which I offer is true. Another psychologist may reply that such actions cannot be volitions because they do not conform to his definition of will. And this answer may stand so long as his account is neither questioned nor denied. But afterwards, and when the very point at issue is the truth or falsehood of his account, it is obvious that any such position is fatally unsound.<sup>1</sup> If in other words an objection against the view of will which I adopt is to hold, that objection must be founded upon actual fact.

But even if desire and conation were everywhere present in will, their presence would supply no answer to the question before us. We want to understand how my idea is able in each case to gain its own particular reality. And when you point to conation and desire as that bridge by which the passage is made, your answer, even if it were not contrary to fact, seems absurdly deficient. I may desire and I may strive (let us suppose) to skate or to play on the organ, or I may struggle to recall to memory some half-forgotten name, and yet, with no means of passage beyond a bare effort, my idea surely never would pass into reality. The passage from the idea to inward or to outward fact requires some particular bridge, and such a bridge is not given by the mere presence of a desire or a conation.

You may repeat your old song that the springs of action are pleasure and pain, and that, wherever I will, it is in the end these which produce my volition. But (a) in the first place, I may once more remark, your statement is contrary to fact. There are cases of rapid volition where such a doctrine is even seen plainly to break down. And (b) in the second place, to identify pain and pleasure with aversion and desire is surely to fall into a palpable and gross mistake. And it is not true even that pain and pleasure are always

like an argument to be found in Prof. Sully's pages is the contention that pleasure and pain are of such importance in development that they must be regarded as even now essential to volition. I shall deal with this point hereafter.

<sup>1</sup> This seems an evident truth, but it is too often not recognised in practice. The case of "disinterested actions" in Prof. Bain's psychology may perhaps be cited as a well-known instance of its neglect. But in other forms this neglect is still too prevalent in the psychology of will.

accompanied by aversion and desire. Nor in the case of pleasure do the facts allow us to admit even a tendency always to produce motion rather than rest.<sup>1</sup> But (c) in no case could pleasure and pain explain the particular detail of will. That which has to be explained is the passing, in a given individual case, of this particular idea to its own special reality. And even if against the facts we admit that apart from the influence of pleasure and pain there is in no case volition—even if we allow that everywhere in this sense pleasure and pain produce action—yet with this the essence of the volitional passage remains unexplained. We have not learnt how this idea, in distinction from that other idea, is able to realise its own special existence. The whip may start the horses, but the whip will throw no bridge across the stream. You must (we may put it otherwise) have machinery of a certain kind before you can set it in motion for a particular end. And I cannot see how by any stretch general pleasure and pain can be taken to serve as special machinery.<sup>2</sup>

Let us pass on to ask in what this machinery does really consist. Our answer to this question will traverse ground which is in the main quite familiar, and we may content ourselves therefore with a summary statement. We have in the first place a variety of special 'dispositions,' and we have in the second place the presence of some ideal suggestion which is at the same time the presence of the starting-point of some one disposition. The consequent passage of this special disposition into act is, we may say, the bridge which

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of all these points I must once more refer the reader to *MIND*, O.S., No. 49. The existence of pleasures without want or desire is an old and well-known doctrine which I should have thought could not fairly be ignored, and in this opinion I am not shaken even by the following oracle, "Wollen wir näher beschreiben, wass wir denn bei Lust und Unlust in uns finden, so wissen wir dies nicht anschaulicher zu thun, als indem wir die Lust als ein Streben nach dem Gegenstand hin, die Unlust als ein Widerstreben gegen ihn bezeichnen," Wundt, *Phys. Psych.*, I., 589. I must be excused from any attempt to reproduce this sentence in English. I understand Prof. Külpe to dissent from it (*Lehre von Willen*, pp. 26, 49).

<sup>2</sup> And we must of course say the same thing of Attention. The doctrine that attention is the essence of will was popularised by the late Dr. Carpenter (*Mental Physiology*, 1874), and I am personally indebted to him for having then forced that question into the front. Dr. Carpenter's work in psychology cannot, I imagine, be rated highly, but on one or two points he has not generally gained the credit which he seems really to have deserved. On the subject of Attention I must refer to *MIND*, N.S., No. 41.

carries our idea over into reality.<sup>1</sup> (a) As to the nature of these dispositions I can say very little. They either are simple, or else are complex wholes of more or less systematic detail. And they are native, or otherwise independent, or again on the other hand to a greater or a less extent have been acquired. On their origin I shall have however to say something hereafter. Dispositions again may be merely physical at first, or may later become so, and they may be physical wholly or merely in some part of their subordinate detail.<sup>2</sup> But, to serve in volition proper as a means of transition, a disposition must possess in all cases a psychical aspect. The real essence of a disposition I make no attempt to explain, but in and for psychology it is a standing tendency or an individual law. Given, that is, one of two connected elements, physical or psychical or again possessing both characters, a disposition is the tendency for the other element to appear in consequence. And this second element itself may have a single or a double character. (b) On the other side we have an idea suggested in fact, an idea which is more or less identical in character with the first element of some psychical disposition. And this idea may come direct from a perception, or it may be suggested again in some other way. (c) The disposition in this manner is started into action, and the process which we have described is of course so far what is called Redintegration. (d) And at this point we may seem to encounter a difficulty. In will, as we know, the suggested idea is the idea of the end, and therefore the idea which is required in volition must be the idea of the disposition's result. But on the other side to start the disposition, and so to produce the actual result, what you want is the idea of the disposition's beginning. For dispositions, if they ever work in both directions, do not work thus in general. Let us suppose, for example, that the sight or the smell of a fruit has somehow—let us say through an original disposition<sup>3</sup>—produced the satisfaction of eating it. This experience, we may suppose further, has left behind it its result in a new and acquired disposition which at once is physical and psychical. The sensations and feelings, which accompanied

<sup>1</sup> I will ask lower down if there is any exception to this general law of will.

<sup>2</sup> By "merely physical" I do not mean merely physical absolutely, but simply with reference to the consciousness of the subject. And again, when I speak of an aspect as psychical, I do not mean to deny that it possesses also a physical side.

<sup>3</sup> This original disposition will be physical in part or physical wholly. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to decide between these alternatives.

the beginning of the process of eating will now tend to bring in the actual continuance and end of that process. And there will be a tendency also for any suggested idea of the fruit to qualify itself further by the ideal sweetness of the fruit in my mouth.<sup>1</sup> But, it will be objected, this ideal sweetness, however much present and desired, will not reproduce the actual process of taking and eating. For the sweetness, though identified with the result of the tendency, is not identified with that point from which the tendency starts. In other words that idea of the end, which is essential to will, is useless for will because in short it is not the idea of the beginning.

To this objection I reply that dispositions are not merely successive.<sup>2</sup> The operation of seeing and eating the fruit is, for example, a connected series. It is a whole in which an identical character is maintained and developed. And the various stages of the detailed process, since they all qualify one whole, are connected with this whole; and they are connected, through this whole, with one another throughout. The sensations and feelings, which belong to the beginning of the process of eating, belong also to that same fruit which is connected with the taste of sweetness. And the idea of sweetness therefore, indirectly and by means of this unity, can ideally revive the felt aspect of the beginning. But, when this aspect is present, we have seen that the disposition to eat has now been supplied with the condition of its actual movement. And to object that a suggested idea, being a mere idea, is not the psychical fact required for this beginning would clearly be mistaken.<sup>3</sup> It is enough

<sup>1</sup> I do not deny that, without any ideal modification of perceptions in themselves, there might up to a certain point be a development of diverse reactions corresponding to different perceptions. Objects, that is, not modified themselves ideally so as in this way to have acquired meanings, might become associated through trials, through failures and successes, each externally with a diverse act. The connexions here would be external psychically, because the acquired dispositions would not be psychical. How far such a development is possible in fact I need not discuss, because I am unable to see how upon this line volition would ever be developed. I have found Dr. Stout's teaching on the nature of the 'disposition' left behind by practical experience not easy to understand. It is to my mind deficient in clearness. See *Manual*, bk. i., chap. 2, and bk. iii., chap. 1.

<sup>2</sup> I have already entered somewhat more fully into this very important matter in *MIND*, N.S., No. 30, p. 7, to which I would refer the reader. Cf. also *Appearance*, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> An idea, so far as referred away from my psychical moment to another subject, is certainly so far an abstraction from psychical fact. On the other hand, if confined to this aspect of itself, the idea could not be my

that you have something, whatever it may be, which possesses the right content. And it is an error to imagine in the soul a gulf fixed so that identity cannot traverse it.

The passage in volition from idea to fact, we said, was made by a bridge. And the bridge, we find, is a disposition the latter element of which has through experience become qualified in idea by its starting-point. If in its origin the disposition is but physical, there is so far no will. But through experience of the process, both in its beginning and its result, we have now an acquired disposition which on one side of its working is psychical. The result is qualified in idea by those feelings which made part of the beginning, and there is a tendency for these feelings, when suggested, to pass into the actual result. And the suggested end therefore serves as the ideal beginning, and itself starts the machinery which bridges the passage into fact.

The new result, which in this way has been produced, need not of course reproduce the old result in every feature. The disposition, we must remember, is in itself always general. In our mental development dispositions are specified into subordinate varieties, but no disposition, however individual, can lose the character of a general tendency. And the present idea of the end coincides but generally with that disposition which it excites and which carries it into fact. It is the present situation which, we may say, selects through an idea the special tendency required, and then itself from that basis particularises the actual result in accordance with itself. And there would naturally be room at this point for much discussion and comment. But the difficulty at this point, I would add, does not attach itself specially to volition, but belongs to the doctrine of reproduction in general. Within the limits of the present inquiry it would be difficult to enter further into the subject, and I do not think that here we are called on to do so.

I will now proceed to deal briefly with several objections. (a) "There is a fatal defect," I may be told, "in the account which has been offered; for it starts the disposition from its psychical side, and any such start is impossible. Even if we suppose that a psychical result could conceivably so follow, we must deny the sequence of a physical effect from a psychical cause or condition. You, it is true, do not take the psychical antecedent as bare; but, and this is the vital point, you regard it as active. But the soul and its states, if not

idea at all. The idea in short, to be an idea, must have its own psychical existence, which existence is not referred away as above.

inert altogether, are inert necessarily in relation to the physical series." This objection however denies absolutely the real existence of volition, and when on the other hand we ask for its own foundation and basis, that basis is found to consist in mere prejudice.<sup>1</sup> (b) "Your account," it may be said, "conflicts with the course of fact as ascertained by physiology." This is an objection into which my knowledge does not permit me to enter. But I know that for an outsider to assume the finality of such a physiological result, even if that result for a time had found a general acceptance, would be at least to desert the guidance of probability. I therefore do not think that we are called on to discuss what would follow in the event of such a final conflict.

(c) It may be objected that the above explanation, if correct in itself, is inadequate for its purpose. If no more than this were wanted in order for the idea to carry itself out into act, the idea of an action could never or seldom remain unrealised. But such unrealised ideas upon the other hand are a common experience. From which it follows that the essence of volition must consist in something other than ideomotor action as explained above. But a sufficient reply to this objection is really not difficult. A disposition, even where it is not a practical tendency, is something the result from which is in any case conditional. And we have long ago seen that, for an idea to realise itself, that idea must be dominant. I will however add some remarks here by way of further explanation. (i.) An idea has against it always the general inertia of my present condition (*cf.* James, ii., 526). This, to speak in the abstract, is an obstacle which is opposed to any possible change. Hence, if you take an idea weak in itself and unsupported from without, my mere inertia is enough to prevent that idea's realisation. Where I am resting placidly or again am mechanically employed, the bare irrelevant suggestion of a change, if that is weak,

<sup>1</sup> On the connexion of soul and body see my *Appearance*. The above prejudice of course is widely prevalent. Prof. Titchener for example, in his *Outline of Psych.*, p. 343, instructs the student that to suppose a causal connexion between physical and psychical, if perhaps not forbidden by "metaphysics," is contrary to "logic". For myself I really do not know whether I am even permitted by "logic" to hope that the student does not wholly depend for his information upon Prof. Titchener. Since writing the above I have made acquaintance with Prof. Münsterberg's interesting *Grundzüge der Psych.* No one who can appreciate good work would speak disrespectfully of Prof. Münsterberg. At the same time I do not understand how he can think that those, who on the above point reject his conclusion, would accept the premisses from which he draws it.

will by itself be ineffective.<sup>1</sup> (ii.) Apart from some unusual strength, absolute or relative, an idea of change will not dominate unless it finds support in my present condition. There may be a present group of sensations in harmony with the beginning of the change, together with uneasiness and psychical movement in the direction required. And this may be assisted by the perception of some special object. And again a special disposition, or group of dispositions, connected with the idea may be predominant and explosive. And of course, *mutatis mutandis*, there is the same kind of support from the physical side. We may thus say generally that, apart from exceptional strength, an idea will not dominate except through the favour it receives. And, when it finds the mind engaged specially in an opposite direction, the suggested idea will under ordinary conditions fail to gain control. (iii.) Up to this point we have considered cases where a genuine idea of change has been present, but where that idea has failed to dominate and move me. But the idea may have been qualified, so as itself not to be the idea of a change which is to happen here and now. The way of connexion with my real world may be seen by me to be absent, as where the suggested change is regarded as merely imaginary. Or again the idea of change may have become an element in some wider idea, a whole in which it is taken as subordinated or even negated. We have in none of these cases the dominant idea of a change in my world, and, even if the change were realised, we should not have here a genuine volition (*cf.* MIND, N.S., Nos. 43 and 44).

I will pass from these objections to deal with another kind of difficulty. Your account, it may be said, is based on redintegration, and yet that law, however valid, is certainly not final. The tendency of every idea to realise itself in existence is really more ultimate, and even beyond this we may find a law which is still more fundamental. Every psychical element by itself involves a more or less unnatural mutilation and sundering, and every such element seeks to repair its defect. It therefore tends to reproduce its complement and to restore itself to the full character of the whole. But (however that may be) I see no advantage in discussing such a doctrine here. For if the self-realisation of an idea in will is an instance of this ultimate tendency, that in no way would conflict with our general account. And since an ultimate tendency does not realise itself, I presume, without

<sup>1</sup> I should be inclined to illustrate here by the absence in general of actual movement in dreams. See MIND, N.S., No. 11.



particular machinery, we were right in any case to seek that machinery in dispositions and in redintegration. There is however a further point on which I admit that my account is inadequate. Redintegration works, I believe, in all cases of volition, and in most cases I think that its working suffices. But there are other cases which seem to call for an additional law. An idea has a tendency everywhere to reinforce that existence which possesses its content, and, where existence has a content which partly corresponds to the idea, the idea has a tendency to create in fact a completer agreement. It thus transforms the existence to its own character, and so realises itself. Now redintegration, it may be fairly said, will here not wholly account for the result, and we must therefore admit a further law, say, of Fusion or Blending. This is a difficult point which I am not disposed here to discuss, but the suggested conclusion once more need occasion no difficulty. If we recognise a tendency which in the end falls outside of redintegration, and even if we go on to call that tendency irreducible and ultimate, the doctrine of volition which has been offered remains unshaken. Volition still will consist in the self-realisation of an idea, and redintegration will still be the machinery which for the most part brings about that result. Our account in short must be modified merely so far that we have to admit the working to some extent of a further machinery.<sup>1</sup> There is therefore no room at this point to intrude with a faculty of Apperception or Attention, and to offer this as an explanation of the passage in will. For in any case nothing can anywhere be really explained by a faculty. And if in this case the faculty is offered merely as the compendious statement of a law, it is still objectionable because probably it does not answer to the facts. It is either contrary to the facts, or else idle, or else at least to myself it remains unintelligible.<sup>2</sup> And any

<sup>1</sup> I assume here that redintegration cannot legitimately be reduced to partial fusion. I should certainly myself not agree to speak of the fusion of an idea with a disposition.

<sup>2</sup> It is contrary to fact that the tendency of an idea to realise itself depends on pleasure or pain, and contrary again that it depends on my attention to the idea. The assertion again that in volition the idea must be 'apperceived' may perhaps be admitted if 'apperception' is used in a very wide sense, but such an assertion is useless if offered as an explanation of will. For whether in fact an apperceived idea realises itself or not must depend in each case on *how* the idea is apperceived. If it is apperceived theoretically, that so far tends to prevent the realisation of the idea in fact. But as soon as you inquire about the nature of this *how* and this difference, you are thrown back on the machinery which we have described in the text. Into that which Prof. Wundt calls "apperception" I am unable to enter. The limited time at my disposal



suggestion that in will sometimes there is no idea, or no idea which realises itself, has been disposed of long ago in preceding discussions.

We may thus conclude that will is a psychical process certainly not original or ultimate or self-explanatory. It is everywhere a result from that which by itself is not volition. The passage of an idea into existence, we found, is the essence of will; and that passage, we have now seen, depends on machinery. Thus in psychology the conditions of will come before will itself, and, at least in psychology, these conditions are in every sense more ultimate than their consequence. You may perhaps insist that the tendency of an idea to realise itself after all is original; and you may add that in this tendency you find the real essence of volition. But how and why one idea realises itself in fact while another idea fails—this is the question, I submit, which we are called on to answer. And if the answer to this question falls outside of what you offer as the essence of will, your view, I must conclude, is certainly mistaken or at best defective. With regard to external will that doctrine which fifty years ago was advocated by Lotze<sup>1</sup> has remained, we may say, in principle unshaken and unanswered. And a like conclusion holds also in the case of internal volition. We have seen that in the main this also depends on dispositions and on redintegration, and thus results from machinery which pre-exists and is itself independent of will. There was a partial exception, we agreed, in some cases where the idea reinforces an element which is given in outer or in inner perception. And the exact nature of such cases we were obliged to leave doubtful. But we certainly in these cases should be wrong to assume that the idea works apart from a pre-existing disposition to the result.<sup>2</sup> In any case Fusion depends on the presence of an idea together with a given element which possesses in part the same character. And I do not see that such a fact, even if it had to remain unexplained, would support the doctrine that will is independent and original.

would hardly justify an attempt on my part to ascertain that exact meaning which for so many years Prof. Wundt has been endeavouring to expound or perhaps to discover.

<sup>1</sup> In his *Medizinische Psychologie*, 1852.

<sup>2</sup> To some extent these cases can be reduced to the support and liberation of a disposition previously held in check. And the idea itself, we must remember, may represent a disposition. I do not however (I must repeat) accept such explanations as quite adequate.

I may now proceed to touch very briefly on the development of will, but must first insist further on its connexion with pleasure and pain. I have declined to include either of these in the definition of will, but on the other hand I admit the importance of both. If I were writing a psychological treatise and not a mere defence of a special definition, I should have to lay stress on pleasure and perhaps a still greater stress upon pain. Apart from their influence usually, we may say, an idea fails to carry itself out. It is either banished from the mind or is at least held in check. The unpleasantness of want suggests, and by persisting maintains, the idea of relief. And, in the absence of want, a suggested change is emphasised and supported by felt pleasure, while on the other side felt pain or uneasiness tends to bring about change.<sup>1</sup> And when we consider the origin and growth of dispositions and habits, the selective agency of pain appears as a prominent factor. I am ready to agree that without pain and pleasure the will in fact does not originate, and that without pain and pleasure, to speak in general and in the main, it does not now exist. But on the other hand while I find actions which apart from theory no one would deny to be volitions, but which, so far as I see, do not issue from pain or from pleasure, I cannot admit pain and pleasure into the essence of will. I cannot in these cases find felt pleasure in the idea of the change, or felt pain in the existence which opposes the idea. And further I must insist once more that in pleasure and pain you have not an explanation of the passage of the idea to its reality. They are a means of selection among various ways of bridging the interspace, but I could not possibly admit that either itself serves as a bridge. The bridge in short remains external to them as it is external to the sundered idea. Thus, if pleasure and pain always were present in will and contributed always to its existence, they could be placed in its definition as at most a constant accessory in fact to its main essence. But, since the facts are otherwise, I have no choice but to exclude them wholly. If I am to ignore or to override apparent exceptions to their presence, I can do this only on the strength of a necessary principle. But I have here looked in vain for any principle or for any necessity.

From this I must pass to consider an objection based on the development of will. "Your account," I may be told, "makes will rest upon dispositions. But dispositions in fact

<sup>1</sup> On these points I have enlarged in *MIND*, O.S., No. 49.

are made by and rest upon will. You have therefore turned in a circle and have explained will by itself." An objection of this kind clearly opens a wide field for discussion. But we may perhaps deal with it sufficiently in a limited space if we keep in mind throughout some general considerations.

(i.) It is not permitted in psychology to confuse the questions of origin and of essence. You cannot assert that a psychical fact now possesses a certain aspect, because you judge that at its origin this aspect was present and was even necessary. It is of course legitimate to argue that this aspect has not disappeared, if, that is, you are prepared to state the reason upon which your argument rests. But no man, who believes from observation that in some cases the aspect is absent, can accept your conclusion unless your reasoning in short is conclusive. And the general disposition to believe that what has been is, or that what is usually is always, cannot seriously be offered as a conclusive argument. Now in the present case, though it may well be due to my limited knowledge of the subject, I do not know of any attempt to offer a serious argument. If there is a conclusive reason why pain and pleasure cannot in some cases now be absent in fact from volition, I have not seen so much as an attempt to offer that reason. But I am too familiar with the argument that apart from pain and pleasure there is *never* volition, because the presence of these is *always* implied in will.

(ii.) It is indefensible, we have seen, to confound origin with essence, and there is a further confusion under this head which should be banished from psychology. Let us suppose that in the history of the animal kingdom, or even in the history of the human race, certain dispositions have arisen as the result of pleasure and pain or again as the result even of volition. And let us suppose that you are in a position to establish this origin. But to advance from this basis to an assertion now about the human individual, and to urge that in him these dispositions are to be taken as resulting from will, although you cannot maintain that they have arisen from *his* will,—surely no leap of this kind is allowed in psychology. My will, whatever else I may inherit, is certainly my own, and the will of another that comes to me as a transmitted disposition is most emphatically not a volition of mine. And it is illegitimate to assume that, because a thing has happened in the history of the race, the same thing must repeat itself in the same way in the individual's development.

(iii.) And on another point the reader must allow me to

insist once more on the difference between assumption and proof. Suppose that you have shown (which I am sure you cannot show) that in every case dispositions are the result of pain and pleasure—you cannot, starting from this, affirm that dispositions originate in will, except on the strength of a further logical step. And in the presence of a denial to attempt that step by bare assumption is not permissible. Now I am forced to deny that the working of pleasure and pain is always volitional. When on the presence of a stimulus a reaction takes place, and when that reaction is maintained and intensified because it is pleasant, and in consequence tends now by association to be connected with the stimulus—this to me so far is not in the proper sense volitional. And when at the same level pain prevents the formation of some association, either through a counter-habit or simply by the removal of the painful—to speak of merely so much as being will, I must call indefensible. The doctrine that pleasure and pain imply, or even in all cases coincide with, conation or desire, at least in the sense of a desire or a conation of my self, we had to reject as contrary to irrefragable facts. And I must repeat even once again that the proof, if such a proof were possible, that dispositions originate through pleasure and pain, is not, taken by itself, a proof that they result from will. I am not of course speaking of proofs which seem to consist in mere verbal definition.

Having taken such a position I consider that in the main I am not called on to discuss further the argument from development. But for the sake of clearness I will try briefly to pursue this point further. There is an attempt, as I understand it, to show that will has no origin beyond itself, and that it does not contain and rest on passages which are given to it and which come before it in time. And in answer to the obvious objection that will depends upon given dispositions, an endeavour is made to show that dispositions, if you only go back far enough, themselves are a result which comes from will. Now if will is defined as we have defined it, such a thesis seems hardly to be arguable. And if will is identified with the working of pleasure and pain, the reader may now recall that we have rejected that assumption as contrary to fact. And we found again that, even if it were true that all dispositions are formed under the influence of pleasure and pain, it would hardly follow from this that pain and pleasure have made and produced them. You cannot, in short, to such an extent select and develop your means that you can maintain in the end that no means are presupposed.

There is, it seems to me, but one sense in which will could be really "autogenous," and in which, as will, it would depend on nothing prior to itself. If you take your will to be a man who from the first possesses a certain character, and if you suppose that your development consists in the willed selection by this man of that material which suits with his nature, such a process, I agree, might perhaps be called the 'autogeny' of your will. At any rate your nature, so far as acquired, would have been acquired by your will, and certainly that result would have come from your volition. But no such doctrine, I presume, could be even so much as discussed in psychology. On the other hand, apart from an inadmissible view of this kind, I see no sense in which the will can be really "autogenous".<sup>1</sup>

If however within psychology we seek for a will which is before dispositions, it may repay us to see for ourselves how far a consistent view is possible. We must begin here by enlarging will so as to include the results which in the widest sense are due to pain and pleasure. And we must go on to suppose a being which in its structure has no tendency to any special ways of reaction. From the stimulus of sensation, without regard to the sensation's quality, are to come diverse reactions which vary fortuitously according to the conditions of the moment. Or we may say that these reactions come only when pain and pleasure are added to the stimulus. This connexion of pain and pleasure with the stimulus is itself fortuitous, or else it itself must depend on an original disposition. And if diverse kinds of movement, such as contraction and expansion, follow specially from pain and pleasure, that would evidently once more presuppose a disposition. But, however the variations first arise, they are in some way supported or banished by pleasure and pain. And thus, by a natural selection which is also psychical, certain reactions are favoured and are developed into dispositions and habits.

How far we here have dispensed wholly with dispositions the reader must judge. But when we ask if such an account holds of the development of a human individual, the answer, I presume, must be a decided negative. Even if you add hypotheses with regard to his intra-uterine life, you cannot

<sup>1</sup> I am far from denying that what is found to be true and beautiful and good is in the end so found because it is felt to answer the needs and express the character of the self. But I hardly think that psychology can concern itself even with this. And it would not lead to the conclusion that will is prior to psychical dispositions, or indeed is anything itself but a psychical result.

maintain that the individual to so great an extent is himself the immediate result of conditions and of fortunate survival. And, at least in human psychology, we surely in each case must begin with the individual. If on the other hand we go backwards in the development of our race and of the animal kingdom, we are met at a certain point by difficulties of a further kind. Let us suppose that at a certain point biology is willing to accept our being that has no special structural tendencies, yet at this point we perhaps have gone quite beyond psychology. How much in its psychical aspect can we say about a being such as this? If at such a supposed level it possesses any consciousness of its own, how far does that consciousness contain and depend upon pleasure and pain? I should have thought myself that, at least in the present state of our knowledge, it was not possible even to assert the existence of either pleasure or pain at the beginnings (wherever we place them) of psychical life. That all conscious life has its suffering and its enjoyment, we are prone to believe. We have some reason to think this, and to hope for a greater knowledge in the future. But on the other side to draw a necessary conclusion on this point seems certainly not warranted. And you cannot argue first that the will was such at the beginning because it is such now, and then, in the second place, when a man denies that the will really is so now, reply that it must be so now because it was such at the beginning. Further I may repeat that, even if the will at the beginning had really possessed a certain character, you cannot assume that in every respect this character has been preserved unchanged.

The effort to deny that will depends upon given dispositions, and the attempt to carry these dispositions back to a point where they originate in will must end in failure. The will as an individual, who for private reasons or for no reason breaks out into definite action, seems hardly admissible. And again there is a wrong identification of will with the influence of pain and pleasure. There is a false assumption that such an influence, if original, could not later be dispensed with. And lastly by retiring backward in search of an uncontaminated beginning, you are threatened at a certain point by a formidable dilemma. You will reach a stage where there still are inherited dispositions, but where these dispositions now appear to have become merely physical.<sup>1</sup> And here, without finding what you seek, you will have been

<sup>1</sup> Merely physical, that is, not absolutely, but from the point of view of any special science.

carried beyond psychology. Or on the other hand you will be forced to carry over into biology psychological doctrines which within psychology you cannot establish or justify.

"But no," I shall be answered, "you do not understand the logic of our argument. We take as a fact the actual formation of dispositions in accordance with our doctrine, and the fact therefore depends upon no preconception. For in our actual experience we can observe the production of habits. Dispositions are made, and we ourselves see them made, through the influence of pleasure and pain. And hence we are able to affirm 'This is how they are made,' and we can therefore deny any other origin as unknown or rather as impossible". Before I consider this denial, there are several points which it is desirable to recall. In the first place, unless a disposition has been made by my will, it is, I insist, external to that will in whatever way it has been made. The argument therefore must mean that in my own individual history I have made without exception all my dispositions on one and the same principle. And, if the argument begins to hesitate at this point, it has failed. And I may once more remind the reader that, where variations are selected under pleasure and pain, the selected variations do not cease to be external to these feelings. And at any rate in no case can all such selection be rightly called volitional. Whether in our experience no associations are formed in fact except under the influence of pain and pleasure seems to me a question on which, to say the least, some doubt is possible. For myself, while I here will not go beyond doubt, I certainly cannot accept the above assumption as true. I do not see how to deny, that is, that an association may arise from a mere emphasised or repeated conjunction and without the influence of pain or pleasure.

But it is time we turned to consider the negative side of the above argument. We know, it is contended, how in our experience dispositions are formed, and we therefore may exclude any other mode of origin as impossible. But such an exclusion, I reply, if it is to be logical, must rest upon thorough knowledge. The excluded must be meaningless, or it must be self-contradictory, or it must be in plain collision with something positive which is itself clearly known.<sup>1</sup> Now can we say that the formation of dispositions within our own experience is known clearly? Is the influence of pain and pleasure a thing which we can call really understood? I do not myself see how any one can maintain that this is

<sup>1</sup> I do not here ask how these aspects are connected.



actually the case. How then can the formation of dispositions apart from this influence be taken to contradict our alleged fact of experience? To assert that no physical cause can produce anything like a disposition, and to say the same of any psychical cause other than that which is alleged, seems at least to me little better than an unwarranted and downright assumption. And thus the negative argument has only to be examined to be dismissed as untenable.

If you bring in metaphysics this result, it is possible, might be altered. You might contend that the minimum of reality in the end involves pain and pleasure and involves what you call will. And you might go on to argue that to suppose the contrary even in a special science is not permissible. But, without attempting here to enter into your metaphysics, I must insist that to intrude such speculations into the sciences is not permissible. If a thesis is such that it cannot be justified on psychological grounds, that thesis, however admirable elsewhere, has no place within psychology.

I must conclude then that, even if action under pleasure and pain is wrongly identified with will, we cannot, however far we go back, get rid of external connexions. We must suppose that special dispositions everywhere precede and are the foundation of will. And, even if by retracing the history of the race you could free yourself at some point from given dispositions, yet, when you come to the individual, the difficulty returns. For if the will of the individual presupposes dispositions which by him are unwilled, his will originates in that which to it is external. And even if the origin of the individual will were in accordance with your doctrine, you could make no logical conclusion from the origin to the essence. It is bad psychology, it is no better than prejudice, to assume that a thing must remain all that it was. The fact is that the working of pleasure and pain is not all volitional, and, again, the fact is that some volitions do not involve any such working. And no mere argument from origin, even if it were well-grounded, can alter these facts. Hence pleasure and pain, however influential in general they may be, cannot be given a place in the definition of will.

With this conclusion I may perhaps bring these articles to an end. They have covered, I fear, so much ground as to unfit them each for a separate appearance. On the other hand they have neglected some parts of their subject, while what they have discussed has been treated too unsystematically. But they may serve, I hope, as some defence for that definition which they advocate; and, if they lead the reader



once more to examine doctrines too lightly maintained, they will have satisfied at least the expectation of the writer.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I had hoped to have been able long before this to discuss the doctrine of will which has been put forward by Prof. Royce in his interesting and important work, *The World and the Individual*. I find to my regret that I can do no more than indicate very briefly the general attitude which, at least in psychology, I am forced to take with regard to it. (i.) I could not agree that in psychology everything, which is felt as the satisfaction of my nature, can be taken as the realisation of an idea or as willed. (ii.) I must again dissent from the view that an idea is in itself so far the realisation of a purpose or will. This is the case, I should say, only where there has been a will to have that idea, and in this case an idea of the idea must have preceded. (iii.) I cannot make our intellectual and æsthetic self-realisation subordinate to practice except in a sense and within limits far narrower than those assigned by Prof. Royce. (iv.) I cannot agree that in cognition the object is in the end selected by an idea. On the contrary I think that the idea is itself in the end 'selected' by something not an idea.

Generally I agree that the real is what satisfies, and that no other definition of reality in the end is so ultimate as this. But in psychology I certainly cannot say that what satisfies is or has been willed. And even outside psychology I cannot take reality as being merely, or even in the first place, a satisfied will. I am unable, that is, to regard will, either in myself or in the Universe, as being more than one partial aspect of the whole. But I must hope to discuss hereafter some of the doctrines contained in Prof. Royce's instructive work.

## II.—THE RELATIONS OF ETHICS TO METAPHYSICS.

BY W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

THERE is a proverbial jibe at Philosophy as fruitless and unprogressive on the ground that it always asks the same questions and always patiently submits to receiving the same (contradictory) replies. Proverbs are however two-edged tools, and the truth undoubtedly contained in this familiar reproach might easily be shown to be very much to the credit of Philosophy, in a moral, as well as an intellectual, reference. In any case it may serve to justify the introduction of the question discussed in this paper in the form given to it by Plato:—

This, my dear Glaucon, is the moment when everything is at stake with a man; and for this reason, above all others, it is the duty of each of us diligently to investigate and study, to the neglect of every other subject, that science which may haply enable a man to learn and discover, who will render him so instructed as to be able to discriminate between a good and an evil life, and according to his means to choose, always and everywhere, that better life, by carefully calculating the influences which the things just mentioned, in combination or in separation, have upon real excellence of life; and who will teach him to understand what evil or good is wrought by beauty tempered with poverty or wealth, and how the result is affected by the state of soul which enters into the combination; and what is the consequence of blending together such ingredients as high or humble birth, private or public life, bodily strength or weakness, readiness or slowness of apprehension, and everything else of the kind, whether naturally belonging to the soul or accidentally acquired by it; so as to be able to form a judgment from all these data combined, and, with an eye steadily fixed on the nature of the soul, to choose between the good and the evil life, giving the name of evil to the life which will draw the soul into becoming more unjust, and the name of good to the life which will lead it to become more just, and bidding farewell to every other consideration. For we have seen that in life and in death it is best to choose thus.<sup>1</sup>

The immediate reference of these few lines from the tale of Er, the son of Armenius, is to that critical moment when the souls who are to commence their new life on earth are

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Rep.*, 618 B, Davies and Vaughan's translation.

about to choose their lots. The number of lots 'far outnumbered the souls that were present' and it was indeed all-important that the freedom of choice given should be exercised wisely. But the real meaning of the passage has a much wider reference. In it Plato sums up his whole teaching as to the nature of Morality, its relation to life, and the method by which our knowledge of it is to be attained. To him the one duty of the citizen as an intelligent being is, by 'diligent investigation,' to reach that comprehension of the true manner of life which alone could render possible the carrying it out in practice. No study so important, or so indispensable, as this. None which could rightly claim from us such unwearied effort and such single-eyed devotion to truth, whithersoever she might lead. With this feeling of the absorbing importance of such knowledge went the conviction that its attainment was possible. Influenced possibly by current belief in Athens, certainly by the teaching of his master, Socrates, Plato held that the 'manner in which a man ought to live' is in itself knowable and admits of intelligible exposition to others. From this it follows practically that men can be 'trained' in it until they become able to exercise a wise self-control for themselves; and even if many men are incapable of attaining such knowledge for themselves they can and should be guided by those who have that capacity. "Every one should be governed by a wise and divine power which ought, if possible, to be seated in the man's own heart,"<sup>1</sup> but, in default, there is the alternative "to impose it from without". The Philosopher kings discharge that function in the body politic which his Reason ought to discharge in the individual man.

Further, the attainment of this manner of life, in other words, of Excellence, or Virtue, is obviously only possible in the proper discharge of those functions which we are by nature fitted to perform. Introspective analysis is the manifest method of investigation to pursue in the search for such functions. It may be assumed—no Greek could question this Platonic assumption—that man is, 'by nature,' a social animal, a citizen. The Ethical question thus takes the shape 'What is fitting for a citizen to do?' To this question the only trustworthy answer is that which is deduced from the answer to the prior question 'What is a citizen?' He is manifestly a part of a complex whole, the well-being of which, as of the parts themselves, depends solely upon the due discharge, by each part, of its proper function as

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.*, 590 D.

such. He cannot 'live unto himself,' for this in every, except a purely physical, sense would be death, not life. He must live 'in relation to' his fellows, and these relations constitute the definite Moral Laws in accordance with which his life should be regulated. To think otherwise, to attempt, *e.g.*, to portray a life in which some individual citizen has all conceivable good things, whether appropriate to him or not, is as absurd as to lavish all the colours of the rainbow upon the eye in a marble statue. Such efforts are self-destructive, for true life, with its result, true happiness, is only realisable by each becoming the 'best possible workman at his own vocation'. Perfect morality is attained when the simple rule 'Let each do that which is his to do' is completely carried out.

In this way we are necessarily taken back from theories of 'what ought to be' to the scientific investigation of 'that which is'. Our Ethics must be deduced from, and representative of, the truth of things. It is no use asking if we ought, or ought not, to pursue power, wealth, etc., until we have, by 'diligent study,' discovered what 'influence these ingredients have' upon life itself. Such investigation reveals to us everywhere a Cosmos, an ordered whole, in the Society as in the Individual, in the Universe as in the Society. True reality (as revealed not by Sense but by Science) is a spiritual whole of interrelated parts. Man only becomes his true self in so far as he is, on the one side, such a microcosm in himself, and, on the other, discharges those functions which are binding upon him as part of the larger cosmos to which he is related. His highest excellence is to know reality and live according to it. In so doing he enters into the mind of God, the Creator, and becomes like unto Him. For only "by ever holding fast the upward road of right conduct guided by understanding" <sup>1</sup> can he hope to reach that ideal of "likeness to God" <sup>2</sup> in which his soul can find complete rest.

Virtue is thus seen to be the truth of things and brings with it necessarily life and happiness. Conversely, vice, as inconsistent with the laws of Nature, necessarily works out its own punishment. The man who sins is 'unavoidably doomed' to suffer. The despot, the extreme type of wickedness, loses the power to live, in any human sense of the term, altogether; he parts with all freedom of action and becomes a veritable 'slave' to every momentary impulse, however degrading, unsatisfying, or maddening.

The questions thus raised by Plato, and the answers given,

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.*, 621 c.

<sup>2</sup> *Theat.*, 176 B; *Rep.*, 613 A.

have been subject of controversy ever since. Nor is the hostility less uncompromising as time goes on. The representatives of the opposite schools are as antithetical in their antagonism to-day as were Plato and the 'Sophist' twenty-three centuries ago. The Platonic theory may be summed up in two propositions, (1) Ethical doctrine must be deduced or derived directly from the results of metaphysical investigation; (2) This deduction is possible; in other words, a science of human nature, in its environment, is so far attainable that we can lay down a theory of conduct which men 'ought' to try to realise in daily life. Both propositions are stoutly affirmed, both with equal emphasis denied, to-day. On the one hand, writers such as Graham (in his *Creed of Science*), Watson<sup>1</sup> and T. H. Green remind us, as if it were a mere truism, that until "some definite conclusion in regard to the relation between man and nature is arrived at, no theory of Ethics is other than wasted labour".<sup>2</sup> On the other, Leslie Stephen (*e.g.*) assures us not only that the fulfilment of this condition is impossible, but that, luckily, the attempt to do so is both delusive and unnecessary. Ethics possesses at least one characteristic in common with the physical sciences, *viz.*, that of giving us "knowledge which, within its own sphere, is entirely independent of the metaphysician's theories—the region of Science, ethical as well as other, is a region in which all metaphysical tenets are indifferent".<sup>3</sup> This last writer goes even farther and asserts, not only that Ethical Science is 'indifferent' to metaphysical conclusions, but also that the two kinds of knowledge cannot be brought into connexion. "By the metaphysical method," he declares, "you cannot even approach the relevant questions of Ethics. . . . In the metaphysical region you may come across ultimate canons of truth, but by no conceivable ingenuity upon principles of action."<sup>4</sup> Finally, Prof. Sidgwick, *more suo*, agreeing and disagreeing with both views, comforts us by saying, "there are certain absolute practical principles, the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest; but they are of too abstract a nature to enable us to ascertain what we ought to do in any particular case; particular duties have still to be determined by some other method".<sup>5</sup> This verdict is apparently put forward as an effort towards reconciliation, but it would seem rather to accentuate the point at issue.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Outl. of Phil.*, p. 189. "To act morally is to determine oneself in accordance with the true nature of existence."

<sup>2</sup> *Proleg. to Ethics*, p. 54.

<sup>3</sup> *Sci. of Ethics*, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450.

<sup>5</sup> *Meth. of Ethics*, p. 378.

It is important that we keep quite clearly in mind what this point at issue is. We are not concerned with the possibility of a Metaphysic, still less with the truth or the cogency of any particular metaphysical system. We are dealing solely with the relation, positive or negative, between a thinker's ethical doctrine and his metaphysical belief. Some metaphysical position—explicit or implicit—a thinker must have. The choice lies solely between a good metaphysic and one not so good—between a carefully thought out body of doctrine on the one hand, and a more or less casual number of assumptions on the other. We may rail at Metaphysic as an “unearthly ballet of bloodless categories,”<sup>1</sup> or regard it as “a barren region haunted by shadowy chimeras, mere spectres, which have not life enough in them even to be wrong, nonentities veiled under dexterously woven masses of verbiage”;<sup>2</sup> but some working assumptions as to the ultimate truth of things we can as little do without as we can jump off our own shadow. Is it, or is it not, then, possible to separate these two departments of thought, so that progress or change in the one may take place without effect upon the other? The question may be asked in two ways—(1) Are the ethical doctrines taught by the more important writers in this subject derived from, or traceable to, their respective metaphysical beliefs? or (2), *in abstracto*, is the subject matter of Moral Science of such a kind that it is necessarily affected by our belief as to the ultimate nature of man and the universe?

The philosopher is tempted, naturally, to attack the question in the latter form, nor is it disputable that, should success follow the effort, the result must be more finally satisfactory than any mere historical review, however accurate and complete, can attain to. Unfortunately, it is difficult to treat the matter in this way without *petitio principii* and, in any case, it is, perhaps, the more hopeful course to stick closely to the facts of philosophical history, at least in the first instance, rather than to theorise entirely in the abstract.

A review, in detail, of the doctrines of even the more important ethical writers opens up a prospect, the length of which may cause a shudder; but, fortunately, it is only necessary, for the present purpose, to deal with one or two typical expositors. By confining ourselves, further, to the best known of these, we avoid the necessity of any detailed statement of their respective views and are able to fix our

<sup>1</sup> Bradley, *Prin. of Log.*, p. 533.

<sup>2</sup> L. Stephen, *Sc. of Eth.*, p. 447.

attention solely upon certain relevant features. Such selection must be, necessarily, more or less arbitrary, but that does not matter provided it be representative.

In the first place, then, it is obvious that a great body of thinkers (of whom Plato in the ancient world, Green in modern times, Prof. Watson among the present generation, are typical) do, as a fact, base their moral teaching directly and, as far as possible, deductively upon the results of their metaphysical investigations. It is needless to labour this point. Further, it will be admitted that to a certain extent (how far exactly is matter of controversy) such deduction carries us past the domain of abstract principle into that of a definite moral code, applicable to the main problems of civilised, or other social, life. It may, or may not, be true that (in Prof. Sidgwick's words <sup>1</sup>) "while there is much instructive description and discussion of the general attitude which a moral man should adopt in dealing with practical problems, there is no cogently reasoned solution of any such problems, proceeding from unambiguous ethical premises to definite practical conclusions," but it is at least indisputable that with these thinkers ethical doctrine, in both principle and concrete detail, stands or falls with their conclusions as to the 'truth of things'.

On the other hand it is equally obvious that many writers, in popular estimate, reach their ethical results by other roads than the metaphysical. Kant, Spencer, Mill, seem to possess at least this negative characteristic in common, and the investigations of the English Moralists of the eighteenth century appear equally free from the taint of Metaphysics. It will be better to consider the former individually, but the latter, for the present reference, may be taken collectively. Of them, in the main, the popular estimate may be admitted to hold good, but it can hardly be accepted, without important reservations, in regard to the former.

First *Kant*. Nothing could, at first sight, seem clearer than the separation of the Kantian ethics from the Kantian metaphysics. The one takes as fundamental postulate certain things the existence of which the other asserts stoutly to be unknowable. A deeper investigation, however, seems to show that this independence is merely superficial; the moral teaching is really an integral portion of a philosophical whole, each part of which is indispensable to the other. Kant's *Lehre* may be stated shortly as follows:—

An examination of the process of human knowledge reveals

<sup>1</sup> MIND, April, 1884.



to us at once its necessary limit and gives us the conception of a higher systematic unity of which scientific cognition forms merely an integral part.<sup>1</sup> Scientific cognition consists of a certain *matter* of experience, which is received from without, but only under the conditions of self-consciousness, the laws of which prescribe the *form* under which the empirical world is presented. Hence the limit of such knowledge is the limit of possible intuition, and the knowledge itself is conditioned throughout by the forms of the Understanding. It gives us merely a 'contingent aggregate'.<sup>2</sup>

Reason however demands not a contingent aggregate but a connected organic whole. The Categories cannot give us this. Their highest conception is that of natural causation in the world of sense experience—phenomena—and we require a causality which is, not conditioned, but unconditioned. The unity and the causality appearing in cognition are but the shadows of a higher unity and an unconditioned causality which can only come from Reason and which form Reason's necessary law. Have we any evidence of the actual existence of such a causality?

Yes. We have given in consciousness a fact of such a nature that its content is not limited by the conditions of intuition, and is inexplicable except through the supposition of Freedom, *viz.*, the Moral Law, or Duty, which is pure form and unconditioned, and can, therefore, be given only by Reason to Reason.

This 'freedom' is no arbitrary freedom; it is a definite kind of causality, working by Law. Its law is the autonomy of the will—a free will and a will subject to moral law are one and the same.

Now man belongs both to this noumenal world and to the phenomenal world. Hence arises Moral Obligation. The law of his Reason—Freedom—is a law of that real world which is the very foundation of that phenomenal world in which he lives, and is therefore operative in it and binding upon him. In the domain of the Practical Reason, then, we come into contact with noumenal reality and find that causality, that systematic unity, which the Categories of the Understanding cannot give us—find both ourselves, and God.

These ideas—God, Freedom, Immortality—do not admit of either demonstration or comprehension (otherwise they would be necessarily conditioned), but on the other hand

<sup>1</sup> This case for the 'Unity' of Kant is practically only a summary of the lengthy argument of Prof. Adamson in his *Philosophy of Kant*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Adamson, p. 75.

they are not *arbitrary* assumptions. They are *necessary* assumptions in the domain of Reason itself, and could only be rejected on the (obviously untenable) ground that they contradict the results of the speculative employment of the same faculty. Nor again is there any radical difference between pure practical and pure speculative Reason. They are both equally Reason and the same Reason, which as self-determining supplies us with notions of Freedom, as determined with notions of Nature, the Categories of the Understanding.<sup>1</sup>

If the above summary be correct the complete interdependence of the Kantian Ethics and the Kantian Metaphysics is obvious. On the other hand it can hardly be denied that he is wanting in the successful deduction, from these fundamental conceptions, of that detailed code of action which Prof. Sidgwick holds it is the sole function of Ethics to give us. In this respect Mr. Herbert Spencer and J. S. Mill, while teaching an ethical doctrine equally due to their respective metaphysical positions, are much less open to criticism.

*Herbert Spencer.* Mr. Spencer is sometimes spoken of as an Agnostic, a charge to which his use of the word 'unknowable' lends an occasional plausibility. But this unknowability refers solely to the conception, in its completeness, of the Ultimate First Cause of things. Omniscience, he holds, is beyond our reach, but scientific cognition of phenomena, so complete that it reduces the apparently bewildering chaos of experiences to an intelligible principle, is not beyond our analytic capacity. Reality, in all its fulness of detail, is due to the fact that

A Power of which the nature remains for ever inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or Space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. . . . Analysis reduces these several kinds of effect to one kind of effect; and these several kinds of uniformity to one kind of uniformity. And the highest achievement of Science is the interpretation of all orders of phenomena, as differently conditioned manifestations of this one kind of effect, under differently conditioned modes of this one kind of uniformity.<sup>2</sup>

Ethical phenomena form one portion of the sum total of phenomena to be so explained. The direct dependence of such phenomena upon the nature of Reality, and the unsatisfactoriness of any attempt to arrive at Moral Laws, except by deduction from metaphysical truth, are stated in the clearest language by Mr. Spencer:—

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Adamson, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup> *First Principles*, p. 557.

The view for which I contend is, that Morality properly so called—the Science of right conduct—has for its object to determine *how* and *why* certain modes of conduct are detrimental and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognised as laws of conduct.<sup>1</sup>

In other words, the ancient doctrine that Morality is in the nature of things—that 'morally right' is identical with that which is 'naturally fitting'—forms the backbone of Mr. Spencer's teaching. For him, as for Plato, the moral ideal will be attained when the moral conduct has become the natural conduct, and ethical guidance must be sought in the laws which analysis of man's place in nature reveals to us. The conception of nature, however, in the mind of the modern thinker, has lost the simplicity which it possessed in early philosophy. Nature is still a cosmos, an interrelated whole; perfection is still conceived as an equilibrium produced by proper performance of function by each part, but the equilibrium is no longer a definite state which, once reached, is to last for ever, and in which any change is, *ipso facto*, for the worse. The equilibrium is a moving one. Progress consists not only in the tendency towards a state of harmonious balance of forces, but also in the movement towards higher stages of these successive 'rhythmic' wholes. To the Greek thinker human nature, or at least the only kind of human nature he held it worth while to think about, was a fairly complete thing which required to take (so to speak) but a short step in the direction of more thoughtful self-control in order to reach that highest level we call the complete or perfect life. To Mr. Spencer life at any stage is but a passing phase in an evolution whose origin is lost in an unfathomable past and the final perfection of which is hidden in an unknowable future. The difference for ethical inquiry, thus arising, is fundamental. The modern thinker still asks the old question, 'What ought man to do?' but the import of this question has materially changed. Man is no longer merely a fellow-citizen, like unto ourselves, with wants, impulses, reasoning powers and ideals, identical with our own, and definitely intelligible. He comes clothed with an involved history which must be investigated before ethical problems can be even stated, and pointing to a far distant future to wait for before these problems can be solved. He is a link in a chain, the whole of which must, in some sense, be brought

<sup>1</sup> *Data of Ethics*, ch. 4.

into our field of view before we can hope to understand any part of it. We have to examine what man has been doing in the past, and not only what *he* has been doing but what the rest of nature has been doing as well. "Fully to understand human conduct as a whole, we must study it as part of that larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings in general,"<sup>1</sup> which can only itself be understood by examining it in the successive stages of its development. The *history* of man becomes all-important. This history is inextricably interwoven with that of nature as a whole, and cannot be fully understood until the evolution is complete.

The ethical problem has thus become wider, and infinitely more difficult, but is not so hopeless as this statement of it would seem to imply. The history to be investigated is an intelligible history. It is that of a continuous evolution exhibiting unity of plan and revealing, throughout the successive stages, the fundamental laws of its development. One great law, more especially, manifests itself throughout the, at first sight, bewildering complexity of these changes, and gives us an unfailing clue through the labyrinth of the world's history. This law may be stated as follows: "Nature has progressed, and is progressing, from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity".<sup>2</sup> This law is universal and all-pervading. It reveals itself in both the matter of the universe and in the motions of that matter. It is as obvious in the interrelations of conduct as it is in the constitution of physical reality. With it as a clue we are enabled to see clearly the past, to understand the present, to anticipate the future.

We can now see the inadequacy of the Greek conception of the ethical problem. Man is dynamic, not static. Morality is itself a progress which is essentially related to that of the rest of existence. There is "an entire correspondence between moral evolution and evolution as physically defined".<sup>3</sup> The two advance together and mutually imply one another. It would be impossible for the 'moral' man, *i.e.*, the man in whom the moving equilibrium is perfect, to exist in an incongruous environment. "The production of the highest type of man can go on only *pari passu* with the production of the highest type of society,"<sup>4</sup> which is, again, impossible apart from the existence of fitting surroundings. Complete moral evolution involves complete physical evolution. The perfect man implies not only a perfect *society*, but also an ideal *world*.

<sup>1</sup> *Data of Eth.*, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

On the other hand it is obvious that this ideal whole contains many elements which do not properly fall under the Science of Ethics. Moral Science deals only with conduct, *i.e.*, with the adjustment of acts to ends, and must limit itself to a comparatively small portion of even this field. The part of conduct it investigates is that alone upon which ethical judgments are passed. It is true that the components of moral conduct are inextricably bound up with the rest of conduct, and that the latter passes into the former by small degrees and in countless ways, but it is none the less true that by far the largest portion of conduct falls outside the sphere of Ethics. It is also true, and even more important to remember, that the same conduct, *i.e.*, the same concrete act, may be sometimes moral, at other times not. Ethics, that is to say, is limited to the consideration not only of a certain *part* of conduct, but, further, to a definite *aspect* of it. "Ethics has for its subject-matter, that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution as displayed by the highest type of being."<sup>1</sup>

If, finally, the inquirer, feeling a little puzzled, if not doubtful, suggests that Ethics deals not with 'highly evolved' but with 'good' conduct, a little reflexion will show him that the two terms are equivalent. Evolution consists in the more complete adjustment of acts to ends, and the term 'good' is the term universally chosen to signify the recognition of such adjustment in all three kinds of acts—self-preserving, offspring-preserving, society-preserving.

This sketch of Mr. Spencer's doctrine, stated as far as possible in his own words, reveals clearly the fact that his theory of what 'ought to be done' rests throughout upon his analysis of 'that which exists'. How far he is successful in deducing therefrom a concrete code must remain, perhaps, a matter of opinion, but it should be noted, under this reference, that his chief aim is to show 'how and why' certain conduct is right and other conduct wrong. His Ethics, consequently, becomes inextricably interwoven with his metaphysics. The popular notion to the contrary seems to have arisen from an accident of language. Mr. Spencer is so anxious to avoid the Scylla of 'Intuitionism' that he falls into the Charybdis of 'Utilitarianism'. Metaphor apart, influenced by the opposition (in its crudest form) of *a priori* or *a posteriori* knowledge, and rejecting the former as unreal, he deliberately adopts the language of sensationalism even when he is basing most distinctly his results upon scientific

<sup>1</sup> *Data of Eth.*, p. 20.

reasoning. Hence, though no condemnation of the Utilitarian test—a *feeling* of pleasure—can be clearer or more emphatic than his, he yet constantly uses Utilitarian phraseology. Strictly speaking, the opposition between the Evolutionary Hedonism of Mr. Spencer and the Utilitarianism of J. S. Mill is antithetical—the latter holds that an act is right because it gives pleasure, the former that it gives pleasure because it is right—but the verbal form in which Mr. Spencer frequently clothes his teaching hides this fundamental difference from the superficial reader.

*J. S. Mill.* To give, even summarily, a statement of Mill's ethical doctrine is, fortunately, needless. His *Utilitarianism* is probably the most widely known of all moral treatises; a fact due partly to the practical commonsense tone of the book, but, perhaps, even more to the beauty of the concrete ideal therein put before us.

Mill, however, is clearly conscious that the claims of even Utilitarian Morality to our allegiance must rest upon a surer basis than that of attractiveness. Having explained clearly what Utilitarianism means he proceeds to show that theoretically it admits of as cogent justification as any other system, and that its end is the only practical aim which men, as rational creatures, do or can set themselves to realise.

His method of proof is based directly and explicitly upon his general philosophical position. Rejecting, as untenable assumption, any intuitional theory of the origin of the Moral Sentiments, he maintains that rules of conduct are derived from, and can only be justified by, the facts of experience. He appeals solely to the analysis of human nature. His way of viewing human nature is, on the other hand, very different from that adopted by, *e.g.*, Plato, and is equally at variance from that of a Hedonist such as Mr. Spencer. Mill has no conception of any *ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, of anything which analysis of human faculties reveals as 'fitting' for man to perform. He makes no reference to man as part or member of any organic whole, whether cosmic or civic; still less does he accept the doctrine that the moral code should be deduced from those functions which men, as integral parts of such a whole, are intended 'by Nature' to discharge. Historical or evolutionary considerations, again, enter into his method of investigation as little as the conception of the social organism. Men are looked at, so to speak, as they stand, not regarded as links in a chain of progressive development. The present is in no sense a product of the past; at least, no attempt is made to explain the present by the past, or to discover rules for conduct by investigation into ante-

cedent social stages. That 'race experience' may, by growth and accumulation, gradually alter the physiological and psychological constitution of man in such wise as to seriously affect, if not totally account for, his attitude towards social and moral questions, is a conception entirely foreign to Mill's system of Ethics. It might almost be said, indeed, that *man* finds no place at all in this system, but only *men*. Average human beings regarded as an aggregate, and interrogated separately and individually, form the sole source from which we may obtain insight into ethical truth. We must not ask what men *ought*, normally, to do or feel towards each other as parts of a social organism, but what, examined individually one after another, they as a matter of fact *do* feel and perform. Just as, in the physical world, the proof that an object is visible or audible is obtained from the fact that men see or hear it, so in morals the only possible demonstration that an end should be desired or aimed at lies in the fact that men actually desire or aim at it.

The final result of this empirical observation of our fellow-creatures (including one's own self) is to establish three things:—

- (1) That as a fact men do desire nothing but happiness.
- (2) That this happiness = the general happiness, or at least includes that of some other individuals.
- (3) That the term happiness is not an empty, vague abstraction, but has a definite concrete meaning, intelligible to the plain man, and practically effective upon conduct.

To enter into the detailed reasoning by which Mill seeks to establish these fundamental points would take us too far from our main subject. I will quote only one short passage, by way of illustrating and emphasising his method. The immediate reference of the extract is to point No. (1):—

If it be psychologically true that human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole. Now to decide whether this is really so . . . we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and experience, dependent, like all similar questions, upon evidence. It can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observation of others. I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that . . . to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Utilit.*, p. 58.



Historical evidence, so far, has been all in one direction, but it must be frankly admitted, on the other hand, that of the English eighteenth century Moralists, speaking broadly, the fact holds, that no metaphysical theories, no ideas as to the ultimate (or even proximate) truth of things, form the basis of their moral teaching. In this 'age of facile individualism,' as it has been called,<sup>1</sup> attention seems to have been concentrated solely upon the fact that men everywhere exhibit feelings of moral approval or disapproval. Upon this fact the method of introspective analysis was brought to bear in the attempt to answer two questions, (1) How many different moral sentiments do actually exist? (2) Is their origin to be sought in Feeling or in Reason? The 'Reason,' however, to which Morality was by certain thinkers attributed was conceived as a peculiar, separate, moral Faculty, obeying its own laws, not to be identified with Reason in the ordinary sense, or held liable to the difficulties connected with epistemological speculations. Even if we adopt the late Prof. Wallace's<sup>2</sup> kindly estimate, *viz.*, "these separate Moral Faculty theories really rest upon the belief that moral good and evil are not arbitrary or esoteric distinctions, but rest upon a common and permanent element of human nature, and that, therefore, this fundamental nature, common to all men, must be able to detect their existence," even so, this belief remains an unproven assumption, unsupported by any reasoned scientific justification. The psychological analysis may be true, as far as it goes, but its journey is so very short that it hardly seems worth while to have started at all.

Are we to say, then, that Ethics is independent of metaphysics only in so far as it is valueless even as Ethics? Such answer is temptingly easy, nor can it be denied that the review we have just finished lends considerable plausibility to it. Considered *in abstracto*, again, the argument in its favour is irresistible. Ethics is indisputably a theory of the proper conduct of life. Some theory of life is therefore necessitated. No theory of life can be based (rationally) upon anything else than an examination into the nature of man and its relation to its environment, in other words, into the nature of reality. Conversely, Sophistry destroys Ethics by simply taking away our belief in a rational, *i.e.*, coherent or intelligible, Reality.

Is there, then, nothing in the contention of that school of thought which, for the sake of simplicity, I have identified with

<sup>1</sup> By Selby-Bigge in his *British Moralists*, p. lx.

<sup>2</sup> In his Inaugural Lecture at Oxford, 7th Dec., 1882.

the names of Prof. Sidgwick and Mr. Leslie Stephen? Far from it—there is great truth in their contention but (if I may say so without offence) they have expressed it badly. The object of this paper is not to champion one side or the other, but to do something towards that useful—albeit ungrateful—task of enabling each side better to understand one another. When it is maintained that Ethics is independent of Metaphysics what is really meant is that in this year of our Lord 1903 our knowledge of Reality is not complete enough to enable us to deductively demonstrate the multifarious detail to which answers must be given, and practically acted upon, in daily life. It is a fact, undeniable except by a fanatic, that every moral *code* must contain elements which are due to the necessity of answering, somehow, questions, the final solution of which lies in a far distant future. It is also a fact that a code containing none but elements of this haphazard kind cannot maintain its hold upon us for a day. Our theory of what *ought* to be is necessarily to be brought into co-ordination with our doctrine of that which is, but the co-ordination is not yet complete. Whether we lay emphasis upon the one aspect or the other is an accident of temperament. If our interest lies in the *how* and *why*, we gaze with astonishment at men who try to aggregate together rules of life from the shallow superficialities of daily experience, without any attempt to integrate these rules into a coherent whole. If our sole desire is to possess working rules we wonder how any man can busy himself with unprofitable abstractions instead of investigating the actual facts. That this latter is the real meaning of the dislike to any metaphysical system of Ethics, the quotation of a few phrases will sufficiently show. Green, *e.g.*, is 'instructive,' but gives us "no cogently reasoned solution of definite practical problems"<sup>1</sup>—a "method of Ethics means any rational procedure by which we determine Right Conduct or Practice in any particular case"<sup>2</sup>—"currently accepted principles are wanting in clearness and precision, they do not tell us *e.g.* whether primogeniture is just, . . . yet such questions as these are those to which we naturally expect answers from the moralist. For we study Ethics for the sake of practice; and in practice we are concerned with particulars."<sup>3</sup> "As we assign the relations between parts of space without asking what is space in itself, may we not determine rules about men without asking what is meant *e.g.* by personal unity? . . ."<sup>4</sup> "My view is that the Science

<sup>1</sup> Sidgwick, *MIND*, April, 1884.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>3</sup> Sidgwick, *Meth. of Eth.*, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> L. Stephen, *Sc. of Eth.*, p. 3.

of Ethics deals with realities; that metaphysical speculation does not help us to ascertain the relevant facts; and therefore that it has no more relation to Ethical Science than to any other branch of knowledge."<sup>1</sup> It would surely be nearer the truth to alter this phrase 'no more than' into 'just so much as'. Men were tried and sentenced in law courts before the sciences were sufficiently integrated to enable us to apply the truths of Forensic Medicine, but that this should be so was merely a temporary necessity. It is equally a temporary necessity that we have to lay down relations between man and man without the help which a complete understanding of personal unity would afford. We may emphasise at our pleasure (it is mainly, as I have said, an accident of temperament) either the word *Ethical* or the word *code*, but let us not convert a variation of emphasis into a difference in kind. The subject-matter of Ethics is as much an integral portion of the real world as that of any other Science. The integration of knowledge is unfortunately not yet so complete as that of the Reality we seek to know, but nothing can be gained by treating passing difficulties as insuperable obstacles. The dim perception of Reality as a coherent whole was the beginning of science—the clear vision of this whole in complete detail is the goal at which it aims. To believe otherwise is to commit intellectual suicide—to urge such belief upon others is to be guilty of treason towards humanity.

<sup>1</sup> L. Stephen, *Sc. of Eth.*, p. 450.

### III.—KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM (II.).

BY C. M. WALSH.

THE two accounts of Empirical Realism entertained by Kant being explained, an examination of their natures is in order. Now the first account of Empirical Realism turns out to be an account of something which is not Empirical Realism at all. It is an exaggerated kind of Transcendental Idealism in respect to Phenomena, supplemented by a doctrine of Transcendental Realism in respect to Things-in-themselves, between which no place is left for Empirical Realism except of the subjective representations of individual and distinct persons. For in this account Kant reduces all real sensible objects to be unreal except as states of our individual consciousnesses;<sup>1</sup> and he leaves over as outside realities only the unspatial and untimal things-in-themselves. It is a doctrine, too, that contradicts all common and popular views, and would probably not have been entertained by Kant himself had he not been able so readily to lapse into it from, and to escape from it into, the other kind of Empirical Realism. To illustrate this instability a single quotation will suffice. "That there can be inhabitants in the moon," says Kant, "although no man has ever sensibly perceived them, must be admitted; but it means only so much as this, that we could meet with them in the possible advance of experience; for [according to the second Postulate] real is all that which stands in a context with a sense-perception according to the laws of empirical progression. They are real, therefore, if they stand in an empirical connexion with my actual consciousness, though they are not on that account real in themselves, that is, outside this advance of experience" (iii., 348). Here the commencement is in accordance with the first account of Empirical

<sup>1</sup>"Das ganze Selbstbewusstsein liefert nichts, als lediglich unsere eigenen Bestimmungen," iii., 604.

Realism, and all the rest with the second. For the opening assertion is that to speak of the existence of inhabitants in the moon is *only* to say that we could meet with them if our—your or my—experience advanced so far.<sup>1</sup> This is an extreme overstatement. What we mean in speaking of inhabitants in the moon as existing, if we believe they exist, as Kant did,<sup>2</sup> is, to be sure, that we might meet with them in a possible advance of our experience; but we also mean much more. We mean that these beings *do* exist even if *we* did not, in which case they could not be connected with our non-existent experience. And we mean not merely that some corresponding things-in-themselves exist nowhere and at no time, but that objects extended in space exist there where we think of them as being, and now, although we do not, and cannot, sensibly perceive them. And this is what Kant himself affirms in the rest of the passage, where he says the inhabitants of the moon are real if they “stand in a context with a sense-perception,” or “in an empirical connexion with my actual consciousness”.<sup>3</sup> For this means that if it be true that there are inhabitants in the moon, they do actually stand in actual connexion with our existing experience—that they do exist in space and in time, although they do not exist in my space and time, and there might not even be a representation of them in my space and time—that they do, in fact, exist in connexion with an experience, which exists whether I and you and the rest of us exist to share in it or not. But if we meant *only* that things exist because we could meet them, this would mean that their empirical existence is contingent upon our meeting them,<sup>4</sup> and that otherwise their only existence is unempirical, being outside our experience. In this kind of so-called Empirical Realism it is evident there could be no phenomenal substances, since no phenomena or representations have permanence only in us, we ourselves not being permanent,<sup>5</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> So of past things he says on the next page: “Dass alle von undenklicher Zeit her vor meinem Dasein verfllossene Begebenheiten doch nichts Anderes bedeuten, als die Möglichkeit der Verlängerung der Kette der Erfahrung, von der gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmung an aufwärts zu den Bedingungen, welche diese der Zeit nach bestimmen”.

<sup>2</sup> Or at least in some planet, iii., 544. But cf. viii., 129 (*Logik*).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also v., 482 (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. “Im Raume ist gar nichts, ausser so fern es in ihm wirklich vorgestellt wird,” iii., 602 n.

<sup>5</sup> Kant himself distinguishes between a permanent representation and the representation of something permanent in existence, “welches also ein von allen meinen Vorstellungen unterschiedenes und äusseres Ding sein muss,” iii., 80 n.

the whole first Analogy would be meaningless; and the second Analogy, as we have seen, would have meaning only as a "regulative principle of the reason," regulating our views about our experience, but not regulating (or constituting) the empirical world itself. The view, such as we entertain about experience, that inhabitants in the moon may be existing now although we do not sensibly perceive them—a view which allows of "phenomenal substances," their permanence through the whole course of nature, causation between their accidents, and their interaction through the immensity of the universe, in times and places when and where perhaps nobody on this earth ever has or will sensibly perceive them, thus existing not only in a possible but in an actual connexion with the phenomenal objects we actually experience, and so with our experience—is covered only by Kant's second account of Empirical Realism. This second account, therefore, is a necessary component in Kant's philosophical system.

But this second kind of Empirical Realism is also not Empirical Realism properly so called. The first kind failed to be Empirical Realism because it failed to be realism: it was Empirical Idealism. This kind fails to be Empirical Realism because it fails to be empirical: it is, properly speaking, Transcendental Realism. It is transcendental as much as the Transcendental Realism in respect to Things-in-themselves, which Kant professed. It differs from that Transcendental Realism only in the detail that that Realism takes the transcendental things to be wholly different from our sensible objects, and hence to be unknowable, while it takes the transcendental things to be like our sensible objects, at least in the qualities of extension in space and endurance or succession in time, and so to be subjects of intuitional and causal science. But it is transcendental, because it places the real objects of experience in a single experience which is not yours nor mine and hence nobody's, and because, in correspondence to our sensible objects or phenomena, individually in us, it posits what can only be *other* objects (to call them sensible objects does not help the matter, and merely indicates their resemblance to our sense-objects) in a single world of phenomena. This single world is viewed as extended in one space and as enduring in one time; but this space and time must be outside your and my space and time, and so are strictly transcendental. Kant's doctrine is, then, strictly speaking, one of Transcendental Realism in respect to Sensible Objects in Space and Time, or in respect to Phenomena, and it should so be distinguished

from his doctrine of Transcendental Realism in respect to Things-in-themselves. But if we want a short term, it might be called Phenomenal Realism.<sup>1</sup> To call it Empirical Realism can only lead into error.<sup>2</sup>

This Phenomenal Realism does not mean that corresponding to our sense-objects are things-in-themselves in any wise resembling them. That is the kind of Transcendental Realism which Kant rejected. It means that corresponding to our sense-objects are other objects at least partially resembling them, which other objects are transcendental to us men, because not in the experience of any of us, wherefore they belong to the other species of transcendental objects, namely, as objects existing apart from us but *in another*. They may be sense-objects or phenomena existing in another Being, being caused in it by other outside things (these the things-in-themselves), or being produced in it by its own spontaneous activity, in which case they may be called its Ideas. Kant himself, however, did not carry his doctrine to this extent. He places the objects outside us in a single world of phenomena in a single time and in a single space belonging to a single consciousness. And there he leaves them. Time and space, as forms of intuition, must belong to the sensibility of some percipient Being, as also must a consciousness belong to some such Being. Kant does not tell us to what Being his one outer space and time and consciousness belong. Nor does he tell us how the phenomena appearing in that consciousness are occasioned there—whether they are its own products or are caused there by the action of still other outside things. Having reached an indefinite kind of Phenomenal Realism, which he misrepresents as empirical realism *to us*, although it can be empirical realism only to the one unmentioned Being, in whose one consciousness they exist, he is satisfied. But we cannot be.

Now a Realism of some kind we all do hold. We all of us distinguish between our representations of objects and the objects of our representations. We all think that while our representations and all that we have direct consciousness of are distinct, yet we do, through our representations,

<sup>1</sup> In contrast with Kant's term "Material Idealism" it might be called "Material Realism," except that Kant's is a peculiar variety of this Realism, and therefore needs special characterisation.

<sup>2</sup> "Empirical Realism" naturally suggests a doctrine that we have direct sense-perception of the real objects which exist apart from individual sense-perceptions of them. We have seen that Kant sometimes fell into this, but that he withdrew from it, and it is not his main position.



sensibly perceive and think of the *same* objects, which exist apart from and independently of ourselves. And because we all do hold this opinion, it may be considered a necessary opinion. It is an opinion which sane minds, induced by the conditions we meet with, normally and very early in our careers, do produce, and never find a reason to give up. On this account Kant considers it *a priori*. He admits it not to be a demonstrable cognition. But he regards it as a necessary constituent of our minds. In other words, in a search for the ultimate in our minds he stops at such an opinion as this of Realism, and does not seek further for a prior constituent in our minds that may, conjointly with circumstances, explain the origin of this opinion. That two distinct minds sensibly perceive the *same* sensible objects, it never entered his head to doubt (*cf.* iv., 42). But now occurs a curious deviation of Kant's position from that of all other men before him. That two distinct minds sensibly perceive the same sensible objects, Kant never directly says. But that by the necessary constitution of our minds we all judge that two distinct minds sensibly perceive the same sensible objects, was his position. This opinion was the *datum* with which he busied himself. And this opinion he enclosed within the realm of experience itself. This opinion, and certain others which make up Realism, he did not view as merely regulative of our views about objectified things. He viewed them as constitutive of our experience itself. But this merely means that the term "experience," instead of being confined to what we are directly conscious of, is extended to cover things of which we are not directly conscious and about which we merely have inferential opinions. Experience, so defined, contains an absolutely certain element and an element not absolutely certain. Yet Kant is apt to treat the latter as equally certain with the former. And yet again his attitude toward the latter is not so much that it is certainly true, as that we must certainly entertain it as true.

Such is Kant's so-called "critical" position in regard to his own so-called "empirical" Realism. He hardly asserts that his second kind of Empirical Realism is true—that there *is* such a single outside phenomenal world. He claims merely that we must represent to ourselves such a single outside phenomenal world. His *datum* is not the single outside phenomenal world itself. It is our representation (or conception) of such a world; which he thinks is the same in everybody else as in himself. Now such a representation must be either true or not true. If it is not true, a philo-

sopher should put it aside and seek for the truth. But to suppose it true would require a great stretch of credulity. It is easy for each of us to believe that *my* space and time are forms constitutive of *my* intuition—forms belonging to *my* sensibility, so that, in a sense, they are forms produced in and by me. Then each of us, who are distinct, would have a distinct space and a distinct time; and sensible objects, being to each in his own space and time, would be to each distinct from those in any one else. Realism would then be confined to believing that there are *other* objects apart from our individual sense-objects, corresponding to them, causing their representations in each of us, existing in an outside realm, the same for all of us,—with reserve of opinion in regard to their special nature. But to hold that the forms of *my* sensibility are not only like but the same with the forms of *your* sensibility and with those of all other people's sensibilities—that we all jointly produce one space and one time in which our sensible objects are one and the same for us all—that we all share in one experience to which we jointly contribute the laws of our understanding,—such is an opinion which no reader of Kant's work could easily be led to accept, and which Kant himself could not entertain openly. Yet, according to Kant's second kind of Empirical Realism, the single outside phenomenal world, which swims between our individual worlds and the world of things-in-themselves, is not avowedly explained as belonging to the one consciousness of a single Being outside us; and so it can be explained only as belonging to us men jointly, or to Mankind personified, especially as it is supposed to be subject to our forms and laws in order that we may have certain knowledge of its forms and laws. But this is absurd, not only because this outside phenomenal world is believed to contain many phenomena that never appear to any of us, but because such a joint possession of a single consciousness by all of us is a monstrosity. And we have seen that Kant himself could never fully grasp this position, but could get a hold of it only by slurring distinctions that ought to be recognised. There can be a world outside us, object to all of us. But this world cannot be the same with the representations of it which, excited by it, exist in the sensibility and in the understanding of distinct percipient and thinking beings. We all of us entertain belief in some kind of outer world. But it is really an outer world, and is not inside us. The Realism which we all hold is a true realism. The only thing which we mean, when we know what we mean, by saying that two or more of us sensibly perceive the same

objects, is that our distinct representations of certain objects are of the same objects. We all even go so far as to think that the common objects are also in space and time. This is a special kind of Realism. It may be called "Material Realism," provided this term be distinguished from "Materialism," which is the still more specialised doctrine that such outside spatial and timal objects are things-in-themselves. It is not Kant's Phenomenal Realism, since it does not claim the outside spatial and timal objects to be dependent upon any forms of our intuition or laws of our understanding. If such special doctrine about the spatial and timal nature of the common objects be abandoned, or questioned, as it may be on fuller analysis, we are left with Realism in its generic simplicity.

Now there is a passage in one of Kant's works which, in conjunction with scattered remarks elsewhere, discloses a very different working of Kant's mind in reference to Realism, and one which brings him into much closer communion with other philosophers and with ordinary people. It shows us that he, too, could explain our belief in Realism as an inference from certain conditions given to us individually in our consciousness,—and of course then, in accordance with certain laws of our reasoning faculty, which may be alike in all of us. In the *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten* Kant casually mentions that the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves depends "merely upon the distinction" observed between two kinds of our representations, namely, those which "come to us without our will," which consequently "are given to us from elsewhere, we being passive," and those which we ourselves produce, showing activity of our own (iv., 298-299). This is by no means a "critical" criterion. On it rather is Kant's criticalness based. It is a very old criterion, and was employed even by the men whom Kant denounces as Idealists, namely, Descartes<sup>1</sup> and Berkeley,<sup>2</sup> but was rejected by Leibnitz, who was here more "critical," in Kant's sense, than Kant himself.<sup>3</sup> Also it is not a complete criterion, because dreams and hallucinations come to us "without our will," and therefore would come "from elsewhere" (as simple-minded people have often believed). To correct this,

<sup>1</sup> *Meditations*, iii. and vi.; *Principia*, ii., § 1.    <sup>2</sup> *Principles*, §§ 29, 149.

<sup>3</sup> That is, Leibnitz did not consider our two kinds of representations to be sufficiently indicative of the distinction between activity and passivity on our part, which distinction, for other reasons considering all our representations to be produced by ourselves actively, he made out to be apparent only, rather than real; cf. ed. Erdmann, 269A, 740B.

another criterion had early been introduced, to the effect that only those representations coming to us without our will, which are, as we have reason to believe, alike in many men, and which are regular according to a regularity discoverable among the majority of such involuntary and common representations, have come to us from outer objects. And this additional criterion we find employed by Kant already in the *Kritik* in his second Postulate,<sup>1</sup> it likewise having been used by Kant's "uncritical" predecessors,<sup>2</sup> and even, for a special purpose, by Leibnitz.<sup>3</sup> This second criterion is no more "critical" and no more demonstrative than the first, and if it may be employed as a postulate, the first would be an equally good postulate.<sup>4</sup>

But there was a mistake in the passage quoted where Kant makes use of the first criterion, as also in the use of the other criterion. For neither the first nor the second criterion requires the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves; but both are satisfied by the distinction between representations in us and objects outside us. And they are satisfied equally well whether the objects outside us be regarded as out of any spatial and timal relations, and then may be taken for things-in-themselves proper, or whether they be regarded as extended and temporal (in some space and time also outside us) and then be taken either for things-in-themselves (in an absolute space and time) or for some reason be rejected as such and now be described in some other way. Which of many alternative views about the outside objects is to be adopted can be determined only by later considerations and additional arguments. Kant's additional arguments only went so far as to show that the outer objects cannot be in an absolute space and time; and yet he carelessly accepted the unspatial and untimal absolute outside things, or things-in-themselves, at the same time

<sup>1</sup> See especially iii., 602-603.

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Berkeley, *Principles*, §§ 30, 36; *Dialogue*, iii.

<sup>3</sup> In order to distinguish which of our actively produced representations are (according to the pre-established harmony) modelled upon outside things, and which are not; see 344B, 378B, 444, 637A, 695B.

<sup>4</sup> The uncriticalness is especially apparent in the Methodologie in the 3rd Section of the Kanon, and in *Prolegomena*, § 18, where one empirically unknowable (universal agreement among men about their outer representations) is used as a touchstone for another empirically unknowable (agreement of the representations with the common object), and reversely, there being no beginning or end in this procedure, and everything depending ultimately upon the distinction between conviction (*Ueberzeugung*) and persuasion (*Ueberredung*), the former of which is as much subjective as the latter, and its claim to objectivity is not accounted for.

that, for an epistemological reason,<sup>1</sup> he accepted spatial and timal outside objects, which, for another epistemological reason, he also placed inside us, collectively somehow, and called "phenomena," thus applying to them the same term he applied to the representations only in us, and so breaking down the very distinction he was trying to establish.

Still, apart from recondite elaborations which further meditation may put upon the doctrine of other real things, there seems to be inherent in our thought a tendency to use the above two criteria so as to form a belief in the existence simply of objects outside us, in a general way. The belief so formed is not necessarily a belief in things-in-themselves, in the strict sense; but it is a belief in things which may, without impropriety, by us be called "transcendental objects," that is, objects transcendental to us. At all events there is no disproof of this belief, nor any good reason for not retaining and maintaining it. And the tendency to entertain it is so strong that even those whom Kant called Empirical Idealists, or simply Idealists, who have maintained the existence only of other minds and of other representations, have generally held the doctrine of a Supreme Mind, whose representations, then, are of supreme importance and constitute the *one* set of objects outside us corresponding to the "from elsewhere given" representations inside us individually, so that those Idealists were as much Realists as anybody. Such a one was Berkeley,<sup>2</sup> and such

<sup>1</sup> This is apparent in the passages referred to in the preceding note; for as agreement between our outer (extended) representations and the outside common objects is demanded for purposes of cognition, this involves that the outside common objects must also be extended. Here, in fact, is the additional reason which we missed in Kant's detection of the Paralogism in Idealism in the first edition, and in his Refutation of Idealism in the second.

<sup>2</sup> Kant says: "Der Idealismus besteht in der Behauptung, dass es keine anderen, als denkende Wesen gebe; die übrigen Dinge, die wir in der Anschauung wahrzunehmen glauben, wären nur Vorstellungen in den denkenden Wesen, denen in der That kein ausserhalb diesen befindlichen Gegenstand correspondirte," iv., 37. Berkeley held the first part of this description, but he did not deny that there are objects outside all of us men corresponding to our representations: precisely he did maintain the existence of such objects, only he placed them in God as "ideas" (calling them so because they are not given to, but are productively imagined by, God). Berkeley was thus an Empirical Realist (in respect to objects of the senses) and a Transcendental Idealist (in respect to material things-in-themselves).—As for Descartes, he of course was a Realist in the carrying out of his system, accepting Materialism as he did, and was a "problematical Idealist," as Kant called him, only at the beginning of his philosophising during his provisional skepticism. The term was more deserved by Leibnitz, who always maintained that we cannot prove the existence of an outer world; but it was not fully deserved even by him, since he held that we have moral certainty of it.

a one was also Spinoza,—which fact may be mentioned notwithstanding that Kant never referred to Spinoza as an Idealist; for he was one if Berkeley was, and was also an equally good Realist. Now neither the skeptic Hume, who tried to disprove the belief in the common world of outside things, succeeded in giving us any demonstrative reason for rejecting it; nor have the few dogmatic Idealists since Kant's day, who have attempted to construct systems without any common outside world, succeeded in giving us any intelligible system, much less have they added anything of value showing the need of denying such a common world. Let us, then, follow Kant and his misinterpreted predecessors, to the extent of being Realists.

There are several kinds of Realism. Kant himself offers us two—a transcendental one, but limited, and a so-called empirical one, of an amphibious nature. Shall we then accept both these, or only one, and then which one? Or shall we, gaining confidence in ourselves by the rejection of one of them, reject also the other and substitute still another in their place? Or shall we simply hesitate to adopt any one positively?

As regards the first question, Kant's critics have shown almost complete unanimity against maintaining both the Realisms together. And certainly, if there be a world of things-in-themselves, there is no need of another single objective world of phenomena distinct from our many individual subjective worlds; or if we can get along with such a single objective world of phenomena, accounting for it somehow, or leaving it unaccounted for, the things-in-themselves may be useless. Worse yet, the two distinct worlds of outside things cannot be brought into harmony with each other; for it would be a pure accident if two distinct sets of causes of our outer representations should happen to agree.<sup>1</sup> Or if, to avoid this, we suppose the things-in-themselves to be first of all the causes of the outside phenomena (in the one consciousness, say in God), and then these phenomena outside us to be the causes of our outer representations, this would be a doctrine too far-fetched to maintain for a moment—and

<sup>1</sup> In iii., 608-609, 1st ed., where the relation between the sensible world and the things-in-themselves is more elaborately expounded than anywhere else in Kant's writings, there is no need of such agreement, because the sensible objects are not made out to be causes of our representations at all, but themselves to be effects produced in us (but represented as out of us) by the unknown things-in-themselves. But this passage was written under Kant's first account of Empirical Realism, which turned out to be no Realism at all except the transcendental (of things-in-themselves), and dispensed with his Empirical, or rather Phenomenal, Realism.

it was not maintained by Kant, as we shall see presently.<sup>1</sup> But, very curiously, the unanimity with which the holding of both the two kinds of Kantian Realism together has been rejected, has generally appeared under the form of rejecting the Transcendental, and retaining the so-called Empirical, Realism, that is, rejecting the things-in-themselves, and retaining the outside phenomenal objects. Should we not rather, or at least also, reject the outside phenomenal objects? Let us see what the objections are to retaining them.

The question is properly this. That there are objects outside us, independent of us, affecting us, is conceded. How then shall we conceive of these? Is it proper to conceive of them as phenomena? Now it must be admitted that it is possible to conceive of them as phenomena. In the first place the word "phenomenon" means that which appears to us. Therefore as the outside things which affect us appear to us through the representations which they effect in us, they may be called phenomena. But such a use of the term has reference only to their function of appearing to us by affecting us, and does not describe what they are. It would leave it possible that they are things-in-themselves; and thus there would be no opposition between the terms "phenomenon" and "thing-in-itself". In the second place, however, the term "phenomenon" also means that which is the appearance (in some percipient being) of something else. If, then, the objects outside us are called phenomena in this sense, they are hereby distinguished from things-in-themselves, for they are only things *in alio*. It was in this sense also, and not only in the preceding, that Kant used the word, although he tried to leave out of account the *other* in which such phenomena outside us must reside, thinking he could satisfy their dependent nature by putting them also

<sup>1</sup> A doctrine somewhat like this, and equally far-fetched, had, however, been maintained by Malebranche, with the difference that he made what we have called "phenomena" (hence appearances to God of things outside and independent of him, which affect him) to be "ideas" in God's intellect (independent of his will) serving as the archetypes upon the model of which God has (through exercise of his will) created corporeal things outside his intellect. For Malebranche had two sets of objects outside us, the corporeal things proper, and the ideas of them in God; and he allowed only the latter to be "intimately connected" with our souls. The uselessness of the created corporeal things in this system is as apparent as that of any uncreated things-in-themselves, or of any created other things, in the Kantian. And likewise the uselessness comes from the fact that he made the things-in-God fully play the part of outside things for us. His belief in the corporeal things was retained mostly on scriptural authority. Berkeley's system differed by merely cutting off these useless things.



in us. But if they are only in us, they can only be in us individually, and can exist as phenomena only as they are in one or another of us: and this is out-and-out Idealism, contrary to the original hypothesis, which constitutes Realism, that there are objects outside us. If, then, we use the term "phenomenon" in this sense, of objects at all outside us, our theory of the outside world reduces either to a theory like that of Berkeley or to a theory like that of Spinoza, according as we accept a plurality of minds apart from the Chief Mind, or place all minds likewise in the Chief Mind, which now becomes the only one substance. From these two options of alternatives there is no escape. Either the phenomena outside us are things-in-themselves, or they are things-in-God. And if they are things-in-God, either we are likewise in God, or we are not. The former is a corollary analytically deducible from the meaning of the word "phenomenon" (as their being in us collectively is out of the question). We must either hold the former meaning only, which is indefinite and does not differentiate the outside phenomena from things-in-themselves; or we must reject as confused and untenable any difference Kant has sought to place between his world-view and either the Berkeleyan or Spinozan.<sup>1</sup> But even in the former meaning the term is inappropriate, because if there are outside things it is very supposable that some do not ever appear to us, so that they are not phenomena, but merely things that can be phenomena,<sup>2</sup> and it is a pity to name things by what they are able also not to be. It would, too, be inadvisable to attempt to use the word in that meaning, because the word also has the other meaning, and there would be danger of falling into it unawares. And this other meaning is likewise inappropriate, because it implies that the things-in-God are caused in God by things outside God,

<sup>1</sup> The similarity between Kant's world-view and Spinoza's is very apparent in the solution of the fourth Antimony toward the end of the second part of the second book of the *Dialektik*. The only difference is as to the relationship between the everlasting and never-begun phenomenal world, which has its own unexceptional laws, and the Necessary Being. Kant would make it a causal one, while Spinoza made it a substantial one (for which Kant elsewhere condemns Spinoza, vi., 40 n.). But it is evident that Kant's "intelligible causality" here is nothing but the relationship between a substance and its accidents, so that Kant really ought to have accepted Spinoza's system.

<sup>2</sup> The term "phenomenable object" would express this, just as "sensible object" refers to an object that *can* be perceived through the senses, whether it is or not. The German language has not so good a word even as the latter, since its "sinnlich" does not render this shade of meaning. "Sense-object" (*Sinnesobject*) properly means only an object actually perceived.

so that other absolute things-in-themselves would still be required, according to the absurd theory above rejected (which is absurd because if absolute things-in-themselves are to be left over, they might as well be allowed to affect us directly).<sup>1</sup> Therefore as there is no especial need of using this term, it seems foolish to use it unless we are willing to carry out what is involved in the concept it denotes. If we are merely using the word as a name, meaninglessly, it would be better to choose a name that has no meaning. The adoption of the term "phenomenon" instead of "thing-in-itself" has probably been due to eighteenth-century fondness, continued through the last century, for physics, and dislike of metaphysics. Yet the subject before us is metaphysical, whatever be the terms employed. And it is certainly unscientific to misapply terms

Are we then to retain Kant's things-in-themselves? Not necessarily, for the term "thing-in-itself" indicates a nature which we do not know to be possessed by the things outside us that are thought of as the causes of our outer representations (and therefore are said to correspond to them). When speaking of these outside causes as things-in-themselves, Kant has simply forgotten that things outside us might be things-in-another. The term "transcendental object," as already noticed, is not necessarily co-ordinate with the term "thing-in-itself," as it was taken by Kant to be; for a thing-in-God would be just as much transcendental to us (and transcendent, too) as a thing-in-itself. But Kant's things-in-themselves are objectionable also because they are not treated by him consistently. The term "thing-in-itself" properly means something existing by itself (*ens per se*), independently of anything else. Kant, however, allows, even maintains, that the things-in-themselves have been created by God,<sup>2</sup> so that they are no longer things existing by themselves with absolute independence, but they are dependent upon God for their existence, and their only independence is independence of us.<sup>3</sup> Then God is the only absolute thing-in-itself; and the term "thing-in-itself" (especially when used in the plural) being employed also in a sense only relative to us, any things-in-God, being distinct from and independent of us, would be things-in-themselves in this subordinate and relative sense. Now, that the plural things-in-themselves demanded by Kant are virtually taken

<sup>1</sup> This involution could easily be avoided, as Berkeley avoided it, by using the term "idea," or any other equally non-descriptive of passivity.

<sup>2</sup> III., 184-185; v., 107, cf. 105 (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. iii., 601 top.

by him for things-in-God, is indicated by his demanding an "intellectual intuition" for them<sup>1</sup>—an intuition which is said to differ from ours principally in being active and original (archetypal), whereas ours is mostly passive and wholly derivative (ectypal),<sup>2</sup>—and again by his calling them noumena,<sup>3</sup> or objects of the intellect, *i.e.*, of God's intellect.<sup>4</sup> Consequently such things-in-themselves are in no wise distinguished from phenomena in God, except as being produced by Him instead of being "given" to Him as effects produced in Him by other things outside Him; wherefore the term "noumenon" (like Berkeley's "idea") is preferable to the term "phenomenon" in application to the things-in-God outside us. Thus, rather curiously, Kant's Transcendental Realism in respect to Things-in-themselves turns out to be nothing else than what his Empirical Realism in respect to Phenomena also turned out to be, and with it reduces either to Berkeleyan Idealism, if he allows our subjects-in-themselves to be existent (though created) substances, or to Spinozan Pantheism, if he makes also our subjects-in-themselves to be subsistent in God.<sup>5</sup> Here appears a special reason for rejecting the holding of both the Kantian phenomena and the Kantian things-in-themselves: because they are really the same, and only confusion is engendered by the use of two equivalent terms. We may notice that if we maintain the existence of outside objects corresponding to our outer representations, such as can properly be called things-in-themselves, and distinguished from minds, we

<sup>1</sup> III., 216 n., 218 n., 1st ed.; 219-220, 2nd ed.; v., 422 (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*).

<sup>2</sup> III., 77, 79, 465; cf. 119, 123; see also ii., 404 (*De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis*, § 10), and v., 421. Kant seems to think that the objects of such intellectual intuition must be wholly different from the objects of our sensuous intuition; and this seems to be one of his reasons for thinking the things-in-themselves to be unspatial and untimely. There is, of course, no such necessity involved in the mere distinction between a passive and an active intuition.

<sup>3</sup> III., 221; iv., 64, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. iii., 222; iv., 65 n., 102-103; for our noumena are merely our thoughts about such objects.

<sup>5</sup> It may be noticed that Descartes made the same distinction between two kinds of substances as Kant between two kinds of things-in-themselves. The return to Pantheism within the Kantian school was nothing but a historical repetition of the course towards Pantheism in the Cartesian school—and again in the Lockian school, Locke also having had different kinds of substances. We have, then, three somewhat similar series: (1) Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza; (2) Locke, Berkeley, Hume; (3) Kant, Fichte, Hegel. In each of these the second member drew the involved consequence only in regard to the objects, the third also in regard to the subjects.

should really be holding some kind of Materialism (or Dualism of Materialism and Pneumatism). But Kant, in allowing that the subjects of our minds and the subjects (or objects) of our phenomenal matter or bodies may be the same because both are unknown (wherein he followed Locke), and especially in speaking as if he were thinking only of one such subject,<sup>1</sup> was really allowing the possibility of the very Idealism he so strenuously cast from him—the Berkeleyan, and even the Spinozan, and also even the Leibnitzian Monadism,—just as a Transcendental Agnostic ought to do.<sup>2</sup> If we ourselves, however, are willing to take the trouble of bearing in mind the qualifications under which we employ terms, there is no reason why we should not call the outside objects “things-in-themselves” *relatively to us*, or in a negative sense, as meaning things-not-in-us. And such, though not a recommendable term, would still be a better term than “phenomena”. But better still would it be simply to speak of such things as “things-outside-us,” or as “transcendental objects”.

There is, however, still another kind of Realism considered by Kant, but rejected. This is Transcendental Realism in respect to Sensible Objects in Time and Space. It is the doctrine, not properly that our “outer” (extended) representations or “phenomena” are things-in-themselves, as Kant frequently describes it, but that the outside things which he calls “phenomena” are things-in-themselves, or, in other words, that the objects of our outer (extended) representations, themselves existing outside us “in the same quality” as their representations in us, at least as regards the so-called primary qualities, are things-in-themselves instead of being phenomena of still other things, phenomena residing in the one consciousness of some one percipient Being. Such a doctrine, as already noticed, coincides with the likewise rejected Empirical Realism in respect to things-in-themselves, since it means that things-in-themselves are objects of experience to us. After the similarity we have found in Kant's treatment of “phenomena” and things-in-themselves, we must consider the distinction between this doctrine and Kant's own doctrine (the second) of Empirical Realism not to be very great. Yet in this rejected Realism

<sup>1</sup> III., 592-593, 604 f., 1st ed.; 289, 2nd ed.—For the same reason he ought to admit that these substrata may be different.

<sup>2</sup> A still plainer admission of the possibility of Idealism occurs in iii., 516, where Kant allows the hypothesis of our life being a dream to be a possible one; which he could not have done if he held his own “Refutation of Idealism” to be a strictly apodictical disproof.

the term "things-in-themselves" admits of being taken in its absolute meaning, so as to cover Materialism, and it is this doctrine which Kant rejected. Now apart from certain arguments which try to prove this doctrine inconceivable (as for instance that the attributes of things-in-themselves cannot wander over into our minds,<sup>1</sup> which of course is not the question), the only important argument Kant has for rejecting this doctrine, and the argument which is the motive for inventing the others, is the epistemological or "transcendental" argument, given in the Aesthetic and Analytik, and supplemented in the Dialektik. This argument asserts that such a doctrine will not permit of our certainty in applied mathematics and physics, and also will produce antinomies, and ultimately will lead to its opposite, the so-called Empirical Idealism, or doubt about the outer world itself; wherefore it is to be cast aside at the beginning as refuted by the fact of our possessing certainty in those sciences, and his own Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism are to be held because they constitute the only theory that will permit of certainty in those sciences and will not produce, but will dissolve, the antinomies, and save us from the offensive kind of Idealism. But we must notice that to account for our certainty in objective sciences, such as he takes applied mathematics and physics to be, Kant has to make use of his Empirical Realism in its second form; for otherwise there would be nothing objective about such sciences, and every man would have science only about the relations between his own sense-representations (or "phenomena" in this meaning of the term) and not about what goes on in any objects outside himself (or about "phenomena" in the sense of objects in space outside me). But that second kind of so-called Empirical Realism takes our sensible objects for objects in a single world in a single time and a single space outside any and all of us individuals. Therefore, let them be called "phenomena" as much as Kant pleases, they certainly are beyond our control, beyond the reach of any forms or laws in us, and if still subject to some forms and laws, only to forms and laws in the Being who has the One Consciousness. Or if the theory be that only so much of the outer world can get into our individual experiences as submits to our forms and laws (supposed to be alike in every person, but how known to be so?) this is disproved by fact; for, *e.g.*, many of our phenomena have no preceding cause in our experience. Moreover, it does not come to the point, since most of our pretended science is

<sup>1</sup> IV., 31; cf. iii., 68, 604.

about the single outside world itself, beyond what gets into our individual experiences. Consequently such Empirical Realism does not permit of *our* having certainty in applied mathematics and physics any better than does the rejected Transcendental Realism; but at best only allows to God such certainty (which God could not have in a system of absolute Materialism, but which is not a fact serviceable as a basis for us to start from in our argument). Also under that Empirical Realism the Antinomies, if they exist at all, would exist as much as under the condemned kind of Realism; for it was only by the first Empirical Realism, which turned out to be no realism at all, or by forgetting and ignoring the only genuine kind of so-called Empirical Realism, the second, which turned out not to be empirical, that the first two Antinomies were disposed of; and as for the last two Antinomies, they could be solved in the same way as Kant solved them—if indeed that was a solution—by employing the distinction between the things-in-themselves as substances and their accidents. So long as Kant retained his so-called Empirical Realism in its second form, the rejected Transcendental Realism would be equally possible and tenable, and therefore the much-vaunted Transcendental Idealism would not be necessary. For what becomes of the argument claiming to necessitate adoption of this Idealism, if, after all, the purpose for which its adoption is required is not fulfilled? Nor would this purpose be fulfilled if we gave up Phenomenal Realism and fell back upon Kant's first account, which was only Transcendental Idealism of Phenomena along with Transcendental Realism of Things-in-themselves; for then the things-in-themselves would have something to do with the nature of our phenomena, and our phenomena would not be subject only to our forms and laws, would not be wholly under our control. The only way the epistemological argument can be satisfied is by giving up Realism altogether, in which case one might as well become a Solipsist right away and treat oneself as God. Whoever is willing to run into such aberrations for the mere sake of being able to account for his pretending to have absolute certainty in the synthetic universal sciences of applied mathematics and physics is at liberty to do so. But he might better stop to inquire whether in the process those sciences themselves have not vanished, or, if he is unwilling to admit that, to examine whether the epistemological argument itself is good; for perhaps, in any case, it may turn out to be inaccurate, circular, and insufficient to account for certainty in synthetic universals.

This paper does not advocate the adoption of the Transcendental Realism rejected by Kant. It attempts merely to show that in rejecting this theory and in setting up his own Kant did not have clear and distinct ideas about the subjects of which he was treating. It attempts to show that Kant was confused in his theory of Empirical Realism, or conception of an outside phenomenal world, which his critics have generally been willing to accept, as much as in his conception of things-in-themselves, which his critics have generally repudiated. It attempts to show that Kant did not present to philosophy a new consistent metaphysical view of the world able to rank with those already founded; but that he brought forth only a muddled and ambiguous conglomeration, which, when clarified, resolves itself into one or another of the older views. Nor did he endow philosophy with valid proofs of any of its metaphysical positions, positive or negative. His "critical" philosophy is bottomed upon the argumentation that certain elements of thought are necessary for the possibility of certain cognitions or convictions, taken as facts. In religion, as is well known, it requires, for the possibility of morality, not that God exists, but that we must believe that God exists. And so in physics it requires, for the possibility of experience, not that a certain kind of Realism exists, but that we must think that it exists—must represent the world in this way. Herein only lies the original feature in Kant's philosophy,—and also its hollowness. Yet the agnosticism maintained by Kant in regard to things-in-themselves is necessary in regard to objects outside us in general. Their very outsideness puts them out of the field where evident and demonstrative cognition is possible;<sup>1</sup> into which field they cannot be brought back by the jugglery of a few ambiguous words. Still, as Kant himself said, when cognition is removed, belief may remain (iii., 496). And again he well said that it is not so needful to demonstrate the existence of God as to believe in Him (ii., 205); for the same may be said in regard to the outer world in general. But even for properly believing we need clearness and consistency of thought. Let us say, then, that it is not so desirable to seek to prove a special kind of Realism as it is to seek to be clear and consistent in our thoughts about what may be the various kinds. When we succeed in this, perhaps one kind may appear more credible than the rest.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "Da das Object ausser mir und die Erkenntniss in mir ist, so kann ich immer doch nur beurtheilen: ob meine Erkenntniss vom Object mit meiner Erkenntniss vom Object übereinstimme," viii., 50 (*Logik*).



#### IV.—PROF. ADAMSON'S PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURES.<sup>1</sup>

BY G. DAWES HICKS.

1. PHILOSOPHICAL literature has been enriched by a contribution of the utmost value and importance through the publication of the Lectures of the late Prof. Adamson, so carefully and judiciously edited by his friend, Prof. Sorley. When Prof. Adamson died, in February, 1902, it was generally recognised that one of the most learned and acute of English thinkers had prematurely passed away, and the fear seemed only too well founded that the ripe results of his life-long devotion to philosophical problems would, in large measure, be lost to the world. For, in later years, he had committed comparatively little to writing. He appears to have shrunk from stereotyping his views in print, and to have found in University teaching a more congenial means of giving utterance to conclusions, continually undergoing amplification as the outcome of further reading and reflexion. Seldom has philosophical lecturing served the strenuous purpose it did in Prof. Adamson's hands; it became for him, one might almost say, an instrument of research, so that whilst ostensibly occupied in "giving to others what Plato wisely calls 'the best and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have,' education of soul," he was at the same time engaged in "a single-minded effort to reach the truth, and so far as possible to express it". Consequently, with the exception of a few Occasional Addresses, all that remained of his work as a Scotch Professor (1893-1902) was contained in the notes of the succession of students who attended his classes and took down what he delivered extemporaneously. In seeking, therefore, to recover and preserve his last word on the problems of human thought, Prof. Sorley followed the only course available. He selected out of many volumes of students' notes those which seemed to present the maturest expression of the author's philosophical views and fixed upon reports of four series of lectures, dating from the sessions 1897-1898 and 1898-1899,—two historical and critical, leading up to a constructive Theory of Knowledge; two psychological, dealing with psychical

<sup>1</sup> *The Development of Modern Philosophy, with other Lectures and Essays.* By Robert Adamson, M.A., LL.D. Edited by W. R. Sorley, M.A., LL.D. 2 vols, 1903. Blackwood & Sons.

processes generally, and then more especially with the processes of Thinking,—for the basis of the present work. The first feeling of the reader will be one of thankfulness that so much has been rescued from oblivion, combined with appreciation of the editor's labour in arranging and adapting the materials for the press. The conciseness and consecutiveness of the lectures almost conceal the fact that they are lectures, and altogether the work possesses a systematic form and completeness truly, under the circumstances, remarkable.<sup>1</sup>

In his admirable Introduction, the editor refers to Prof. Adamson's steady adherence to the method of overcoming philosophical difficulties by reasoning them out or thinking through them. "The light that guided him was the dry light of reason, and he would never pretend or imagine that he saw more than reason illumined." From first to last, the attitude of his mind was essentially critical, and it was mainly through criticism of the work of others that he reached and formulated definite views of his own. "Philosophy," he says in one of the Occasional Addresses, "has sometimes been blamed for its habitual method of proceeding by negative criticism, and it must be allowed that the business of a philosopher has seemed too often that of rending his predecessors. Yet a general defence might fairly be rested on the ground that such is the method of thought, which always advances by distinctions and limitations, and such is the process of all organic growth and development. A negation never merely expunges. It defines, and at least points the way towards a positive" (ii., 110). The historical lectures on the "Development of Modern Philosophy," contained in the first volume, are one consistent exemplification of this dictum. They possess a continuity and organic connectedness of quite exceptional kind, because the author was gradually working up to a systematic Theory of Knowledge through a sustained attempt to view its problems in the form they assumed at different stages in the development of thought. He had the rare gift of getting to the heart of a philosophic system and of exhibiting its essential features in brief, forcible, and precise language. But he was never content with that alone. In each case, he brought to bear the penetrating and original criticism of a thinker who had placed himself *within* the circle of ideas with which he was dealing, and who, by resolutely following out a philosophical principle to its logical issue,

<sup>1</sup> The volumes are singularly free from *errata*. I have noted only the following: Vol. i.—p. 178, 15 lines from top, for "were present" read "we represent"; p. 265, 6 lines from top, for "injustice" read "justice"; p. 273, 15 lines from top, the comma should be after *to* instead of after *of*. Vol. ii.—p. 238, 13 lines from bottom, for "subject" read "subjective"; p. 261, last line, the word "somewhat" is awkward and misleading. Further, I cannot help thinking the passage on p. 261 of vol. i., beginning 9 lines from top, ought to read: "It may be conceivable—though I do not think it is—that development of the personal finite Ego from the Absolute Ego should accommodate itself to the *second* of these conceptions; it is hardly possible that it can do so to the *first* of them".

was enabled to indicate the exact point at which its inadequacy for further advance became evident.

In regard to fundamental speculative problems, Prof. Adamson's own position underwent extensive modification with the lapse of years. As a student at Edinburgh, he served a period of intellectual apprenticeship to J. S. Mill, and used to relate how he was in the habit of defending the Utilitarian standpoint in his college essays against the objections of the teacher of his class. On becoming acquainted, however, with the Kantian writings, to the study of which he appears to have devoted in the main his Shaw Fellowship period, his confidence in the traditional English method of approaching the problems of Knowledge and Ethics gave way, and from that time forward nothing was more characteristic of him than his insistence upon the supreme importance of the Critical analysis of experience as the basis from which to attempt the questions of modern thought. "If we are to connect our knowledge into coherency and system," he wrote in 1879, "and to understand, so far as it may be given to us, the significance of the universe in which we find ourselves, we must resume the problem as it came from the hands of Kant."<sup>1</sup> And in his Inaugural Address of 1895 he still maintains that in order to make discussion of our present position in philosophy clear and precise, reversion to the Kantian system is necessary (ii., 13). During most of the time at Owens College (1876-1893) he would have expressed himself as being in general sympathy with that mode of advance from Kant pursued by the later idealists, but at no time would he have accepted as satisfactory the constructive work of Hegel or that of T. H. Green and his followers. "Every effort of speculative thought," contended Dr. Adamson in 1881, "is affected by the general condition of knowledge, and every advance in scientific inquiry opens out new aspects of the notions through which explanations of speculative difficulties have been found. The problem which now lies before philosophy is, in brief, the effort to re-think the new materials that have been furnished in such ample quantity."<sup>2</sup> His own attempt to fulfil this requirement led him to the conviction that an important transition was necessary in the point of view from which the philosophical question must be contemplated, and in the Inaugural Address at Glasgow (1895) he definitely announces his adoption of a "new methodical principle in philosophy". Towards the idealist conception he still, in a later Address, acknowledges "a friendly and companionable feeling" (ii., 109), but it had been too "shy of the facts of experience and inclined to wheel in endless circles round the imperfect pictures which the dividing faculty of thought readily supplies" (ii., 8). In Prof. Sorley's words, "for him, unlike Kant, the Copernican change consisted in displacing self-consciousness from the position it occupies in every system of Idealism".

With the exception of a short fragment on Spinoza, it has not

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 186.

<sup>2</sup> *Fichte* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), p. 220.

been found possible to include in the present work any of the Owens College lectures, and the probability is they will remain unpublished. I propose, therefore, in what follows to indicate the main lines of difference between the position reached in the volumes before us and that which was formerly defended with an originality and independence characteristic of Prof. Adamson's teaching throughout.<sup>1</sup>

2. The determining factor giving rise to what Prof. Sorley describes as the "Copernican change" was undoubtedly the increasing weight which Dr. Adamson came to attach to psychological inquiry as a means of approaching, and contributing towards, the solution of speculative problems. A twofold development seems clearly traceable in his thinking. On the one hand he appears to have advanced farther and farther from the view according to which psychology is to be regarded as a purely empirical or natural science; on the other hand he appears to have been brought more and more to the belief that underlying philosophical Empiricism or Naturalism was to be discerned a fundamental principle as to the nature of knowledge which seemed to him of the utmost significance and value.

In his earlier writings, Prof. Adamson was in the habit of drawing a complete distinction between Psychology and Epistemology both in regard to scope and method. "Psychology," he declared in 1881, "as ordinarily conceived,—the scientific account of the phenomena to be observed in consciousness, the description, analysis and history of mental phenomena,—stands on precisely the same level as the natural sciences, and, like them, leaves out of consideration the problem with which philosophy as such has to deal."<sup>2</sup> Doubtless the qualification indicates that he had begun, even then, to question the sufficiency of such a definition. At all events later, in his lectures at Owens College, this conception of the science was abandoned, and the view adopted which in the essay of 1894 (ii., 45 *sqq.*) he subjects to criticism, *viz.*, that psychology is a treatment of the facts of mind, an investigation into the activities or processes of the inner life. Facts of mind had always the characteristic of being states or phases of a subject, in some way or to some degree aware of itself in and through them. This characteristic entirely separated mental phenomena from the phenomena of external nature, and gave to the former, as contrasted with the singleness of appearance on the part of the latter, a unique double-sided aspect, which altogether precluded a transition from the one to the other as even a possible conception. Still, however, psychology, so far from furnishing a starting point for philosophical inquiry, was itself one of the most concrete of the sciences, and presupposed, as in logical order they did, the more abstract and general study, which Kant called "transcendental".

<sup>1</sup>The materials in my possession are notes of various courses of lectures delivered in the years 1886-1888.

<sup>2</sup>Fichte, p. 111. Cf. *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 22.

In the volumes now published the sharp line of demarcation between Epistemology and Psychology has disappeared, and psychological considerations are allowed a much more primary significance than formerly in regard to the problem as to the nature of reality and the relation of knowledge thereto. Whilst still insisting that, in their material and in point of view, psychology and epistemology are distinct, and that "only confusion can result from prematurely mixing up the two methods and drawing upon the one while carrying out an inquiry under the other," Prof. Adamson is now not less anxious to guard himself against the unqualified rejection of the psychological method to be met with in Kant's treatment of knowledge and to maintain that for the complete solution of the problem it is necessary to combine both modes of investigation (see, *e.g.*, vol. i., pp. 112, 114, 167, and vol. ii., p. 254). Whilst still insisting that "the origin of any special modification of our experience can in no way determine its validity or worth for cognition" (i., 245), he now finds it utterly futile to carry out the inquiry into the meaning and significance of the objective reference in knowledge, without calling to aid the account psychology has to give of the way in which the distinction between subject and object makes its appearance in the history of mind.

The psychology thus brought into requisition as a *Hilfsmittel* towards the solution of what was evidently for Prof. Adamson the central problem of speculative philosophy is, however, a method of research wholly different from that descriptive treatment of psychical phenomena and their laws, the results of which he had previously declared to be "of quite secondary import for the ultimate doctrine of knowledge".<sup>1</sup> No contrast could well be sharper than that between the attenuated, abstract, "objektivierende Wissenschaft" of Münsterberg's *Grundzüge* and the province of eminently concrete, organic material handled in the second volume of the present work. And the difference is due to the fact that while in the former case a feverish anxiety is manifested lest psychology should be tainted by any "kind of compromise with philosophy," in the latter the conception of psychology as merely a branch of natural science is expressly repudiated. "To trace out the history of the mental life, to determine the natural conditions on which it depends, and to follow the several stages of its development from the lowest to the highest, keeping ever before us the concrete character of the whole, is," says Prof. Adamson, "impossible except as part of and in the light of a general philosophical view" (ii., 21). But, inasmuch as philosophy, as a whole, "must keep close to experience and draw its sustenance therefrom," psychology loses not but really gains its character of *Erfahrungswissenschaft* by being regarded as a pursuit so interdependent with Logic and Metaphysics that its problems lead on inevitably to theirs.

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 23.

The ground on which Dr. Adamson disputes the legitimacy of ranking psychology with the natural sciences was already formulated in the Owens College Lectures, although, at that time, the consequences were not fully developed. "Where we isolate the content (of thought) and treat it as having a quasi existence *per se*, we are," he wrote in *MIND* some years ago, "in the attitude of objective or natural science".<sup>1</sup> Now, according to the view which has lately found perhaps its most pronounced expression in the work of Münsterberg, already mentioned, *that* is precisely the attitude of the psychologist with regard to the events or processes of mind; he isolates them from their context in the mental life, and treats them as "objects which exist in consciousness as physical objects exist in space". Prof. Adamson, on the other hand, insists that, since in actual experience the events or processes never are thus isolated, to treat them as though they were isolated inevitably results in depriving them of their peculiar and distinctive character. Mental facts, as such, never can be presented in the fashion of objects; they are always facts *of mind*, and this qualification, which distinguishes them from every other class of facts, is exactly what prevents their appearance as objects. We cannot, that is to say, apprehend as themselves objects the acts or processes in and through which there comes to be apprehension of objects at all. By "object," in this connexion, he may be understood to mean that which is represented as a separate distinct existent, standing over against the cognising subject, and upon which the activity of the latter is directed. And the point of the contention is that when we describe mental states by the aid of this category we are describing them not as they are for the consciousness they compose, but as we are vainly making the attempt to regard them from the point of view of an outside observer. All care may be taken to indicate that by object is here meant psychical object, and that, therefore, no predicate which refers to the trans-subjective order of facts is assumed to characterise these so-called objects. For all that, they are still conceived, after the fashion of external things, as objects which the subject dissevers from, and opposes to, himself, rather than as ways in which he becomes himself; they are still contemplated as objects *of* which he is conscious, rather than as modes *in* which he is conscious; they are still spoken of as being *in* mind, rather than as being *of* mind. Such arbitrary severance of the mental life into an observing subject and a series of psychical events, which are taken to be "presented to" the subject, renders both terms of the antithesis unintelligible. Of the nature of the subject we can know *ex hypothesi* nothing; of the psychical states it must be said that there is nothing in them to constitute a mind, still less to entitle the observing subject to regard them as constituting *his* mind. In opposition, then, to this mode of conceiving mental facts, which

<sup>1</sup> *MIND*, O.S., ix., p. 434.

comes historically from the Kantian doctrine of an 'inner sense,' Prof. Adamson proceeds on the view that it is psychology, and not, as in Münsterberg's scheme, history, which has to deal with mental facts as *Erlebnisse des Subjekts*,—processes, that is, which essentially are *not* to be cut loose from the context in which they occur, but to be regarded as stages in the development of mind as a whole,—mind, that is more truly said to *be* its mental states than to *have* them.

On the basis of this conception, the relation of psychology to the Critical Theory of Knowledge can be determined with considerable exactitude. If psychical states as such are never objects; if, in other words, isolation, separation, individuality, are not given facts, but results that come about in experience, which it is the business of psychology to explain, the question arises whether the awareness of objective facts through mental states is itself an invariable concomitant, a primitive, original feature of consciousness. The highly complex set of conditions involved in the perception of an object are sufficient to justify a negative answer. And if we do not start with the representation of outer objects, equally certain is it that the reference to the subject is a derivative and secondary element in conscious experience. For the recognition of what is subjective comes into being only in correlation with the recognition of what is objective, and both imply a combination of factors altogether beyond the range of the rudimentary mental life. Psychology, then, may be said to have for its data, (1) the phenomena of consciousness as primary or immediate experiences, and (2) the process by which, from the characteristics of such immediate experiences, there is developed the distinction between subject and object. Epistemology, on the other hand, is concerned with the worth or validity of conceptions based upon that distinction; its problem, therefore, arises from the recognition of an antithesis, the historical formation of which psychology has to trace.

Psychology thus recovers in regard to the Critical problem of knowledge very much the position the cruder psychology of the pre-Kantian writers occupied in regard to the problem of knowledge as they conceived it. For if the 'objective reference' be itself the outcome of psychical development, then obviously the import or validity of that reference cannot be determined apart from consideration of the ways in which it has been acquired and has gradually attained to definiteness and completeness in the mental life. The nature of the reality manifested in mature experience cannot be independent of the process in and through which the manifestation is brought about. A field of inquiry of incomparably wider scope and significance than is usually hinted at in psychological text-books is thus opened out for the psychologist and the close and intimate bearing of his researches upon ultimate philosophical questions becomes apparent. And in this connexion, it is worthy of notice that at the end of his



psychological lectures in the second volume Prof. Adamson is to be found discussing the very same problems which, from the point of view of Epistemology, he had dealt with at the end of the first.

3. The fundamental conceptions which the author carries to his treatment of Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge are made to emerge, as already intimated, from criticism of the several systems of philosophy, which form the subject of the historical lectures.

The familiar distinction between a mental state as an event or occurrence of the inner life and the content of which in and through the mental state we are aware, is exhibited with great clearness through consideration of Locke's ambiguous use of the term 'idea,'—on the one hand, when he declares it his purpose to describe the manner in which the understanding comes by its ideas, on the other hand, when he defines an 'idea' as the name for "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks". Nothing could be more admirable by way of illustration than the instance given of the error to which this confusion leads. Locke, it is pointed out, identifies the simple idea, regarded as the pure product of affection of a purely passive mind, with the highly developed content of thought, the idea or representation of a simple quality (i., 118). The implications of the distinction between psychological state and content are further unfolded by reference to the double meaning attached by Berkeley to the term 'existence,' in the one case when he speaks of ideas or objects as existing, in the other when he speaks of souls or spirits as existing, and a doubt is at once suggested as to the propriety of using the notion in the first of the two senses (i., 126). The consequence of proceeding on the other alternative is shown in the result reached by Hume that the only type of existence is that of isolated impressions and ideas (i., 145).

So again, following the line of thought originating with Descartes, other characteristics implied in the same distinction come to recognition. At the outset, in the advance which Descartes effects from the isolated datum *Cogito ergo sum* through aid of his fifth axiom, there arises the question whether the 'objective reality' (or content) of an idea can be regarded as an existing thing, for only on that assumption can the step he takes from thought to reality be logically justified (i., 15). Another feature connects itself with Malebranche. Malebranche, it is shown, sees quite distinctly that what he calls an 'idea' (= the essential nature of what is apprehended) cannot be identical with the operation, or the 'modality,' through which it is apprehended. The idea is universal; any modality or operation of the soul is particular. The very nature of the former prevents our regarding it as identical with the latter, for how can we conceive of an apprehended circle or square as an operation of the mind? (i., 53-54.) But proceeding upon the scholastic distinction of existence and essence, he

could not avoid ascribing to the 'idea' a kind of quasi-independent existence, and erecting it into a sort of entity, having its *locus* in the divine mind. To Antoine Arnauld, the acute critic of Malebranche and of Leibniz, the credit belongs of having discerned the weakness of this position. Perception, Arnauld contends, is doubtless an operation of the mind, but our notion of it is incomplete if we take it to be an operation pure and simple. It is always an operation or act of apprehending, and from it the content apprehended must not be separated and placed in a transcendental sphere of being. The distinction is one of aspect, not of existence; the existing fact is the mental operation, the 'idea' is a construction resulting from that operation (i., 55-56). Finally, the difficulty which Arnauld discovered in the reasoning of Malebranche besets Leibniz, when he resorts to an arbitrary fiat of the divine will, susceptible of no further explanation than is afforded by the dubious *Principium Melioris*, to effect the transition from a world of ideas as contents of the divine mind to a world of actual existences, external to the divine mind (i., 104).

Before the Kantian philosophy, then, is reached, Prof. Adamson has already extracted from previous systems two principles of wide generality that form, so to speak, the guiding threads of his psychological and epistemological investigations. The first is that, although the distinction between the act of apprehending and the content apprehended is one of primary significance, it is not to be interpreted as a distinction between two isolated or independent facts. There is only one existing fact involved, the act, namely, of apprehending, which is in its own nature the being aware of a content; the content, regarded in abstraction from the mental act in and through which it makes its appearance, is not itself an existing fact, but an orderly, connected way in which a finite mind arranges its experience. It is exactly the peculiarity of the life of mind that compels us to describe each of its processes in a fashion which indicates a double-sidedness or difference in point of view. But this peculiarity is wholly misconceived, if it leads us to ascribe to the contents of our mental states a fictitious independence, to represent them as in some way 'given' to the apprehending subject, who has no other function in regard to them than that of directing upon them a kind of inner vision. There is no having such contents apart from the process of apprehension itself; they are products of the activity in and through which they are apprehended, "made by it," as Prof. Adamson in one place (ii., 57) expresses the relation. If, for example, we say, apprehension of any content, A, implies recognition of its resemblance to, or difference from, some other contents, A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>, A<sup>3</sup>, and if we regard the contents A, A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>, A<sup>3</sup>, as separate from the act of apprehending, then unawares we are taking the content, A, as it is *after* the act of apprehension to be the fact given to be apprehended. And there is no escaping this dilemma unless it be admitted that the process of recognising resemblances or differences, of discrimin-

ating, and by discriminating of assimilating, is not extraneous to the contents supposed to be operated on by it, but is the process whereby the contents are constituted and come into appearance at all. The second principle is not less fundamental, but is more difficult of correct and adequate statement. Put in Prof. Adamson's own words it runs thus: "Acts or states of consciousness are not rightly conceived as having for their objects their own mode of existence as ways in which a subject is modified. That is to say, a presentation or idea is not to be regarded as an act of inner knowing which has for its object the presentation or idea itself. Regarded from the side of their existence, these acts or modes of consciousness are not objects of which the finite subject is aware; they are successive modes of his own inner life, of which inner life as such the subject in turn becomes aware through the help of distinctions that are given in the content of the presentations and ideas" (i., 288). Or again, "an act of apprehension has not its own content as the object to which reference is made" (i., 287). To some extent, this is but a repetition of the position that psychical states are not objects. It is, however, also a good deal more, and the additional factor may be indicated in some such way as the following. The psychical state in and through which any content is apprehended does not itself partake of the character of that content. The act of apprehending red is not itself red any more than the act of apprehending a triangle is itself triangular. Of the character or nature of the psychical state as such we are never directly aware; it does not throw forward its own mode of being into the content to the cognition of which it gives rise. We are conscious *in and through* our mental states; we are not conscious *of* them. The ground is thus cut from under the Cartesian principle upon which the argument for subjective idealism has always rested, *viz.*, that we have immediate knowledge of subjective states and only mediate or inferential knowledge of what is trans-subjective. Rather is the exact reverse true: "it is doubtful whether we ever have knowledge of subjective experience as such" (i., 285); "the ultimate nature which we designate by the term 'being conscious' is never itself a content of consciousness" (ii., 181). In other words, there is a profound difference of meaning between consciousness and the process of inner observation or introspection. To become *reflectively* aware of a mental state as forming part of the inner life is possible only for a highly developed mind; it is *never* identical with being actually in that state at the moment of its occurrence.

4. Reverting, in the light of these principles, firstly to the psychological account of the mental life as a process of development, I proceed briefly to illustrate Prof. Adamson's mode of treatment, not confining myself exclusively to the published material, but drawing also upon his earlier lectures.

Numerous difficulties surround the attempt to obtain a conception of those immediate experiences with which the mental life

must be supposed to begin. In default of direct knowledge, no other course is open than that of reasoning backwards from the complex facts of mature experience and eliminating those features that evince the marks of secondary products. On the side of cognition, it seemed to Prof. Adamson the simplest conceivable phase of consciousness would be afforded by the mere recognition of a content, possessed in however vague, chaotic and confused a manner, of some distinguishable character. The recognition would involve, therefore, the elementary function of discriminating; it would not be a state of mere passive reception, but in essence an act of judgment, although judgment is a term indicating far too developed a process to be rashly employed. On the side of feeling, we were driven, he thought, to the conclusion that the rudimentary act of recognising a content, involving, as it must, a change in the equilibrium of the inner life, would have from the first the accompaniment of pleasure or pain. Finally, although there would be nothing in the primitive consciousness corresponding to 'will,' yet it might be legitimate to assume, as dependent on the elementary feelings and following thereon in quite mechanical fashion, the germs of what we denote by the terms impulse or striving. These three factors would not at first be distinguished by any of the broad obvious differences with which we are familiar. What we have to conceive is rather a subject dimly obscurely aware of sensuous contents, experiencing pleasure or pain thereby, and in consequence being stimulated to movement.

From such rudimentary beginning, the first problem, because round it most other psychological problems group themselves, is to determine the way in which the all-important distinction of self and not-self comes to be made and gradually to acquire fixity and definiteness. In the volumes before us, two accounts are given of the conditions involved in the primitive form of this distinction, and they appear somewhat difficult to reconcile. In one place, the space-character in certain contents of sense experience is fixed upon as that which furnishes the basis for the earliest and crudest recognition of difference between the objective and the subjective (i., 291). In another place, it is maintained that the simplest phase of the distinction in question concerns solely the difference between sensuous perception and revived idea, the recognition of the latter difference depending on the fact that bodily feelings and impulses accompany actual stimulation of the sense organs and are either absent or less prominent in the case of revival (ii., 274). Probably, however, the apparent discrepancy does not indicate any real inconsistency of view. There is, as is elsewhere remarked, no such simplicity about the notion of object as to render it at all likely that its introduction is due to any one set of circumstances. In the first passage Prof. Adamson is doubtless referring to that element of objectivity which might be specifically described by the term 'externality,' and is seeking to determine how it is originally differentiated from what relatively to it comes to be regarded as

'inner'; whilst, in the second passage, he has in mind the feature of 'reality' that comes to attach to the object in contrast with what is opposed thereto as 'unreal' or imaginary. Each process is certainly susceptible of resolution into a number of constituent factors. For instance, the elementary experiences arising from resistance to movement are, beyond question, essential ingredients of the earliest representation of the extended, and it must also have been by their help that the primitive subject was enabled to characterise what was immediately presented to sense as real. Again, it is certain that in the earlier stages the self was identified exclusively with the body, and that the discrimination of the self from the not-self would be effected more or less through the presence of those presentations, feelings and impulses which mark out the body from extra-organic things. Tracing the subsequent forms of the bi-partition thus introduced into conscious experience, Prof. Adamson was at pains to show that each new characteristic giving definiteness to the object would have corresponding to it a new characteristic giving definiteness to the conception of the self or subject. For example, the characteristics of permanence and independence could not be ascribed to a perceived thing without recognition at the same time of the continuity of the inner life as opposed to its transitory and momentary acts of apprehension; the subject could not conceive of himself as one and identical amidst the variety of his changing activities without at the same time forming an analogous conception of the unity and identity of the perceived thing, in contrast to its contingent and variable qualities. A strict correlation, therefore, obtains in the development of mind. From the first vague distinction, indicated by the terms 'feeling' and 'space-extendedness' to the highly elaborated opposition of subject and object in mature experience, the advance throughout has been two-sided and reciprocal in character.

It was with reference to the processes of Attention and of Thinking that Dr. Adamson was accustomed to work out more fully the stages involved in mental development. As regards the first, he was unable to accept either of the two main theories current among psychologists. Attention did not seem to him rightly interpreted as a simple, unique, irreducible activity of mind, nor did he think the phenomena of attention could be explained on Herbartian lines in terms of the reciprocal relations between presentations. Both theories committed the error of severing the act of attention from that which was attended to, and of giving to the apperceived contents a form of substantive and independent existence. Under the name Attention, there was indicated rather, in his view, a class of complex and variable processes which come about gradually in the history of mind. The earliest phenomena capable of being described as facts of attention would be initiated by differences in the intensity of feeling accompanying any content apprehended. Variations in intensity of feeling would produce at

first no more than the purely mechanical result of retaining for a longer time than would otherwise be possible the apprehended content in consciousness. Increase in the duration of the act of apprehension would tend to permit of more precise and accurate discrimination of the content involved and afford facility for its easy and rapid reproduction in the form of idea. Repetition, in its turn, would afford the material for increased precision of discrimination. Any particular stimulation would occur not in isolation, but in conjunction with a very considerable body of simultaneously existing acts of apprehension,—in the earliest stages those which are concerned with the bodily feelings and sensations. Each succeeding stimulus, while yielding a presentation manifesting differences from what is simultaneously present at the moment, would thereby give to the resulting content new definiteness of outline. And every establishment of a new definiteness in the content apprehended would serve as a means of instituting a new comparison when a repeated stimulus of like kind, operating in surroundings no longer identical with the surroundings of the previous stimuli, took place. There was, he believed, no way of accounting for the clearness and distinctness that constitute one familiar result of attending except by thus connecting the whole process with the elementary function of apprehension, the act namely of discriminating, of recognising features of likeness and difference. In the earlier stages there could be involved by no possibility the definitely recognised distinction between the act of attending and that which is attended to. The rise of that distinction, which could only happen when the consciousness of self had attained a certain degree of stability and fixedness, would coincide for the most part with the conditions under which there is gradually formed, from the elementary experiences that precede and accompany the execution of movement, the individual will, and Voluntary Attention might fairly be regarded as Volition in one of its phases. Sense presentations accompanied with a large quantity of the experience of movement would naturally retain a prominent position in consciousness, and if they excite at the same time the feelings of pleasure or more specially of pain, and are conjoined with motor experiences that are related to continuance of pleasure or removal of pain, they would claim relatively the largest place in consciousness. Thus, in a general way, one could understand how it is that with the phenomena called attention there come to be associated those experiences of straining or effort, which, however, can only be markedly present when the will has been definitely formed, and when the subject is able to exercise control over the trains of ideas and movements. Not, then, by reason of any special activity, but through the circumstances under which the fundamental activities of mind, the activities involved in apprehension generally, develop, do the phenomena of attention, concerning which as they are exhibited in mature experience no one is in doubt, come about.

A similar mode of treatment is adopted in the extremely valuable analysis of the process of thinking contained in the work before us. Here, too, Prof. Adamson is largely engaged in combating the view that thinking is to be regarded as a special activity of mind, which operates on the materials supplied in isolated perceptions and ideas. Thinking, no doubt, in the stricter acceptance of the word, first makes its appearance in and through the separation of the relations of space and time, of identity and difference, of unity and plurality, etc., from the related contents, and the first products of thought, in this sense, are the generalised representations of these relations. But it by no means follows either that the severance mentioned corresponds to an actual separation in mode of existence, or that it points, as, for example, Lotze supposes, to a special form of reactive energy on the part of the soul. There is, indeed, nothing in the nature of even the most evolved products of thought to justify ascribing them to a specific and unique source, or to militate against the theory of a fundamental identity in process between the simpler activities of mind and those comprised under the head of thinking. All mental states, not excepting those of the earliest stages of the mental life, are essentially acts of discrimination and comparison, differing in degree but not in kind from the acts which give rise to the abstract and general notions of the mature mind. Only by a process of relating and comparing contents are likenesses and differences recognised at all, and it may be said that every likeness or difference recognised is by that very fact general and abstract in character; it is freed, in other words, to some extent at least, from its temporary surroundings and dwelt upon, more or less, for itself alone. Further, it is one of the main purposes of Prof. Adamson's analysis to show that the characteristic of necessity or objective validity especially attaching to products of thought is no new appearance in the inner life, but the natural development from the establishment in consciousness of the distinction between the act of apprehending and the content apprehended, a distinction which in its simpler form manifests itself in perceiving so soon as even a crude consciousness of self is possible, and which becomes more and more complicated as the consciousness of self increases in richness and fulness of detail. In conformity with this analysis, the difference between the notion of an object and the perception of an object may be said to consist in the difference between the number of distinctions whereby the object perceived or conceived is marked off from its surroundings. Perceiving, as being more or less bound down to a momentary stimulation of the senses, necessarily involves a smaller amount of such distinctions than thinking, which, on the basis of repeated perceptions, has become able to recognise the more permanent, invariable, essential features. And a corresponding comparison would hold good between the reflective consciousness of self and what might, without impropriety, be called the perceptive consciousness of self,—between the subject, able to conceive of himself



as the permanent correlate to the varied range of experience that has come before him, and the subject more or less apprehended as a centre of bodily feelings and the source of bodily movements.

From the psychological point of view, there appears, then, ample warrant for the conclusion that "mind is not an abstraction, that it lives only in and through its concrete expression, and that what we represent as the product of mind might just as fairly be said to be the very making of mind" (ii., 18). Mind brings with it no forms, whether of attending or thinking or even of its own unity, wherewith to master the world of fact. The states or processes, which constitute the mind's existence, and which from first to last are acts of discriminating, comparing and relating, have significance only as being ways in which awareness of contents comes about; they contribute nothing out of some original nature of their own to the nature or structure of that which they know. It is only in and through the gradual arranging and organising of its experience that mind comes to possess any unity or structure of its own, any notions or categories by which to interpret the system of nature of which it forms a part. And, on the other hand, as at the beginning there is no mind fully equipped for exerting activity, so there is none for passively receiving isolated impressions of sense. The material of experience, indeed, is given, but it is given in the form of a whole, which, as apprehended, is at first vague, undifferentiated, indeterminate, though containing within itself the conditions which enable apprehension of its parts and of their relatedness ultimately to be attained.

5. I turn, secondly, to the epistemological inquiry, conducted with the help of the two principles already explained, though furnishing at the same time independent grounds in support and confirmation of them.

The point of departure from which Prof. Adamson works his way to the position he describes as "no more than the legitimate development of what is contained in the Kantian work" (ii., 311) is that of the Subjective Idealism, which he finds lurking in most pre-Kantian systems, and vitiating much of Kant's own reflexion. The implications of the view in question are suggestively unfolded in a criticism of the Kantian doctrine of the "thing-in-itself". Ordinary experience accounts for the fact that sensations are given to, and not produced by, the conscious mind by referring to the natural conditions under which sensation comes about. But the natural conditions to which, in ordinary experience, we appeal are never unknowable things-in-themselves, but the determined, and to that extent at least known, objects of perception. Against this simple, common-sense explanation, an idealism of the Berkeleyan type presses the argument that the natural conditions are themselves just such produced dependent results as those which are to be explained by their means, that, in fact, the *petitio principii* has been committed of accounting for the production of sensations by appealing to sensations themselves. The plausibility of this

argument depends, however, upon the illegitimate identification of two totally distinct propositions: "(1) that whatever knowledge we have belongs to mind and is of the nature of mind, and (2) that whatever is known consists in its own nature of those processes which are called by us 'states of mind'" (i., 233). Knowing is, of course, always an act or process of mind, but so far from this carrying with it the consequence that the object known must be a state of the subject knowing, it justifies rather the contention that were the content known equivalent to a mode of existence, a finite mind could never become aware of its own existence. Subjective Idealism starts with the assumption that the finite mind exists and knows itself as existing, but "the contents of consciousness which really constitute our knowledge are not in their own nature characterised either as having substantive existence or as constituting ways in which a finite subject exists" (i., 234). If, therefore, we have reason to believe that the external objects, to which contents of knowledge refer, give rise to the stimulation from which apprehension of sense qualities follows, the fact that the said objects are knowable, or partially knowable, is no valid ground for discrediting the belief.

According to the Kantian theory, however, the objective reference in knowledge signifies no more than the orderly and connected way in which the manifold of intuition is combined, that feature in the perceived content which constitutes its necessary and universal aspect, as opposed to the merely arbitrary sequence of sense-particulars. The object, in other words, denotes for Kant the correlative in knowledge of that unity of apperception which is the logical condition of knowledge. Everything, then, depends upon the interpretation to be put on the all-important notion "unity of apperception". And here Kant wavers between two alternatives equally unavailing for the problem under consideration. On the one hand, he draws a sharp distinction between the individuality of the finite subject and the transcendental ego, and then he characterises the latter as a purely formal identity, without element of difference, in which case it cannot contain the source of the materials of sense; on the other hand, he tends to identify the two, and then it becomes impossible to distinguish his doctrine from the Berkeleian idealism he repudiates.

In the present work,—and herein one notices a decided divergence from his former exposition of the Critical Philosophy,—Prof. Adamson appears to think that the latter tendency is on the whole most in accordance with the general drift of Kant's reflexion. If, then, the Categories are but forms of the finite mind, evidently their application to the sensuous data cannot save the content apprehended from the character of pure subjectivity. And to point, as Kant does, to the difference between external and internal intuition, even though that distinction were less open than it is to objection on other grounds, in no way relieves the difficulty, for both types of objects, the so-called outer equally with

the so-called inner, are still left in the position of *Vorstellungen*, states or modifications, that is to say, of the individual mind.

Repeatedly, in the course of his argument, Prof. Adamson returns upon the Kantian theory, as thus interpreted, in order to force its inherent weaknesses to the front. Apart from the difficulty already alluded to, he points out that the conception on which it proceeds is utterly irreconcilable with the account psychology has to give of the genesis and development of mind. "What Kant offers as the explicit notion of object may be a description of what thought achieves, and may have even special importance as a description of a necessary stage in the development of experience; it cannot be accepted as indicating the immediate proximate addition to the first incoherent movement of sense-perception. . . . No one can suppose that the first, the simplest, form in which the antithesis arises in consciousness between the subjective contents of mind and an object is that developed systematised representation which appears in Kant's analysis as the correlate and expression of understanding" (ii., 254). So again, the objective unity of self-consciousness, although obviously involved in all our thinking treatment of experience as a systematic whole, is altogether inconceivable as a simple, primary datum. "From the psychological point of view, at all events, we are compelled to recognise a continuous gradation in the consciousness of self; and we cannot regard that highly developed form of it, in which it is the correlate of the orderly systematic representation of a world of things in space and time, as being the first form in which it comes forward in our experience. It may be true that what we call thinking is just the operation in and through which self-consciousness develops. But we are not justified in deriving the operation of thought from self-consciousness, still less from a form of self-consciousness which we cannot suppose to be present from the outset in the development of mind" (ii., 255-256). Once more, the conception of thinking as the activity which is necessary in order that consciousness should recognise itself as a unity may correspond fairly well to what comes about in our experience, but it cannot be accommodated to that primitive stage of mental evolution in which the representation of either object or subject is wholly wanting. The theory in question, then, places mind in an altogether false relation to experience; it lays the emphasis on the wrong side of the antithesis. So far from mind constituting experience, it would be truer to say that experience constitutes mind. So far from the unity of consciousness being there at the beginning to organise experience into knowledge of objective fact, it is only in and through the knowledge of objective fact that unity of consciousness is either possible or has significance.

There remains, however, the other trend of reflexion in Kant according to which the transcendental unity of apperception is not to be identified with the individuality of the finite subject. On

this, in his earlier lectures, Prof. Adamson was wont to lay stress as the really valuable side of the Critical Philosophy, and to maintain that the merely formal character assigned by Kant to Self-consciousness was by no means a necessary feature of the conception as such. His view of what the theory really implied was expressed in some such terms as the following. The criticism of Knowledge had been perfectly general in character, and, as such, had been entirely independent of any individuality in the subject of reference. It merely warranted us in saying that whatsoever notion we form of experience, as being antecedent to, or subsequent to, the existence of empirically conditioned finite minds, no world of reality at all can be conceived except as involving relations possible only for intelligence. What it came to in brief was this, that when we represent to ourselves a universe as consisting of related facts, whatever those facts may be, we are representing that which is possible only in and through conscious experience. The individuality of the finite subject being, then, one of such facts, we are entitled to insist that it too shall be interpreted in terms of intelligence. No doubt the phrase "in terms of intelligence" is liable to misapprehension. It must be taken, however, to refer to the contents of knowledge, and so far as they are concerned the principle is laid down that no relations of reality can be admitted as ultimate which are incapable of expression as relations of thought. If that conception be followed out, it need be in no way incompatible with what as mere matter of fact is admitted and must be admitted in respect to knowing and thinking as modes of the activity of finite subjects. As portion of the total world of experience those activities of the finite subject have their function. It is in and through them that the world of intelligible reality attains its highest expression, and such subjective activities by reason of their difference from the reality that is expressed in and through them in no way render impossible the assumption that the essential relations of things are relations of thought.

Such briefly was the direction in which at one time Prof. Adamson was prepared to carry forward the Kantian argument. A more thorough analysis of what Kant had to offer in respect to the interpretation of real existence would, he thought, lead to the necessity of largely extending the scope of that notion. For in the end Kant was compelled to admit a reality which could not be brought under the first narrow conception of reality as a determined content of perception in space and time. The treatment thus allowed to be valid in respect to that aspect of spirit or mind which is the foundation of morality must be extended to the whole realm of being, and the final conclusion of Kant, that underlying teleological judgments was the notion of intuitive understanding as forming the ultimate root of real existence, must be regarded not only as a regulative idea of reason, but as an idea necessary to complete our otherwise limited conception of the world of experience.

It is, however, clear from the present work that Prof. Adamson had come to doubt the legitimacy of this mode of advance, and had in a sense returned again to Kant for the purpose of proceeding along a different path. "It is evidently a hypothesis for which no definite grounds can be offered," he says, in criticising a statement of Prof. Stout's, "that the real core of existence is of the nature of consciousness" (i., 347). That "no foreign factor can play a part in the development of thought itself" is, he declares, "the tremendous assumption of all speculative Idealism" (i., 259). He no longer finds it possible to amend the Kantian distinction between category and idea by accepting the equally objective character of the regulative principles, for in any legitimate sense of the term 'object' the regulative principles can not be regarded as constituting part of the structure of the objective world (ii., 293).

The grounds that ultimately compelled the relinquishment of the standpoint of Post-Kantian Idealism may be gathered from the volumes before us. Prof. Adamson seems to have become convinced that the Hegelian system, having for its fundamental position the conception of thoughts or intelligible essences as constituting the structure of reality (i., 274), involved, in the long run, the same error which lay at the root of all forms of subjective idealism,—the confusion, namely, between the life of mind as a concrete mode of existence and the contents of knowledge or thought in respect of which the predicate of existence has no significance. So far at least as the finite subject is concerned, analysis had yielded the result that 'ideas,' as existences,—states of mind, as psychical occurrences,—never enter into knowledge, that in fact existence never is a part of the content of any idea; and if it be contended that content and existence in the Absolute coincide, some attempt, at all events, must be made to show how such coincidence is conceivable. Now, the place assigned by Hegel to nature seemed to Prof. Adamson wholly unintelligible, and the *Naturphilosophie* to be "in the mass and in detail a needless excrescence and a blunder" (ii., 12). And there can be little question that he encountered with respect to the Hegelian position generally the "difficulty so persistent in its appearance in Leibniz's doctrine," and "so uniformly felt in all idealist systems" (i., 104),—the difficulty, namely, of effecting a transition from the sphere of "essence" to that of concrete existence. The crude expedient of a creative act of the divine will, which Leibniz called to his aid, in so far as it is capable of intelligible interpretation at all, involved the curious assumption that between essence and existence the difference was merely a difference of degree. The compossibles, as the contents of the ideas contemplated in the divine intelligence, needed, that is to say, a supplement added to them in order to issue forth as actualities. But addition can only take place when the things added are alike in kind, whereas ideality and actuality are evidently, on Leibniz's own showing, qualitatively unlike. In the Hegelian philosophy, the conception of development supplanted that

of an inexplicable creative act, but development, regarded as the unfolding of what is already contained in the nature that develops, instead of furnishing an explanation, seems to Prof. Adamson only "to repeat as ground what is actually presented as effect or consequent" (ii., 187). He would, indeed, have agreed with Dr. McTaggart that Hegel is wrongly charged with attempting to deduce facts from the nature of pure thought.<sup>1</sup> So far from accepting the interpretation criticised by Dr. McTaggart, Prof. Adamson used to insist,—and the exposition of Hegel's teaching in the present work is quite in accordance therewith,—that it was never intended by the use of the dialectical method to assign any measure of real existence to the abstract generalities, which, taken together, made up the systematic idea of reality. In the procedure of the *Logic*, Hegel was well aware that he was doing no more than disentangling from the conception of reality the several elements indispensable in its regard, that he was doing no more than laying bare, so to speak, the ultimate structure of self-consciousness which in reality existed only in the concrete life of mind. But, even when so much is granted, the abstract thoughts were still in their totality taken to form a species of absolute structure or organisation in regard to which concrete reality had no other function than that of *manifestation* or exemplification. And under cover of this baffling use of the notion of manifestation, which rightly has significance only in reference to the non-existent contents apprehended, there has been surreptitiously introduced the transition from essence, conceived as though it had objective existence, to fact or actuality. As in the case of Leibniz, there has been left unexplained precisely that which called for explanation.<sup>2</sup>

Hegel's emendation of Kantian doctrine is, in fact, an inversion of what is demanded by a more thorough analysis of knowledge. Recognising that an ultimate distinction of kind between Category and Idea was inadmissible, he broke down the distinction by accepting the regulative principles as entering, equally with the constitutive, into the very structure of the objective world. But the feature really calling for emendation is rather the function assigned by Kant to the Categories. If they are regarded not as giving an exhaustive statement of the structure of the object, but

<sup>1</sup> *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 55 sqq., cf. p. 207.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. McTaggart endeavours to show that the transition in question is actually made at the very commencement of the dialectic, which, he argues, requires as its postulate that experience really exists. By starting with the idea of Being, Hegel, he thinks, necessarily assumes "the existence of some experience,—in other words, that something is". And such an assumption, he contends, is justifiable on the Cartesian ground that either denial or doubt would involve the existence of the denial or the doubt as well as the existence of the person who denies or doubts (*op. cit.*, pp. 20-21). To which Prof. Adamson would have replied that if by the denial or doubt you mean the 'content of an idea,' existence is not involved in it, and that if it were, the passage to the existence of the denier or the doubter would be for ever foreclosed.

as abstract expressions of the ways in which a finite subject comes to interpret its sensuous experience under the conditions of space and time, and thereby to attain to self-consciousness, the regulative principles will indicate a higher grade in the same development, and the difference will represent no more than a difference of content. The opposition of form and matter will be overcome, not by assuming an absolute mind as the ground of their unity, but by recognising that the material of experience is naturally characterised by coherence and constancy of connexion, and that were it otherwise mind of any sort would be an impossibility.

6. In contrast to an idealism or rationalism of the Hegelian type, Prof. Adamson describes the philosophical position to which his own investigation leads as realism or naturalism. Formerly, in his Owens College lectures, he used the term "naturalism" as designation for the view in accordance with which the knowing subject is to be conceived as a natural object, and as standing in connexion with the objects of its experience after a fashion similar in kind to the connexion assumed to hold among objects of nature generally. Such an implication is, of course, entirely foreign to the theory with which we have here to do. Again and again it is pointed out that nature regarded as a complex of objects in space and time is not, and cannot be, equivalent to the sum-total of reality. For the latter includes both mind and nature, and, as constituting a whole, these two can neither occupy a position of absolute independence, nor can their inter-relation be that of two types of existent objects which come somehow into combination. The very features upon which the view of external nature as itself constituting a whole is based are features which express no more than ways in which external nature is represented by us. The mechanical theory, which makes abstraction from all that is qualitative, and limits its treatment to the perfectly general laws of quantitative relation, deals with what can be at best only the form of reality, and furnishes in no sense an adequate explanation even of mechanism itself. It is compelled to assign all qualitative difference to consciousness, and too readily neglects the consideration that such qualitative differences must have something corresponding to them within the sphere of mechanism. It is prevented by its conception of law from taking account of the highly specialised forms in which all concrete facts come before us, and consequently leaves on our hands a residuum, on its principles practically irreducible, but nevertheless of primary significance for any true understanding of the real character of natural phenomena. Accordingly, however legitimate and necessary such procedure may be within its own province, we are bound to insist that there can be in the concrete no existents corresponding to the abstractions of mechanical science, and that ultimate reality cannot be broken up in the way assumed for purposes of scientific explanation. The Atomism, for example, which represents all mechanical occurrence as coming about from the changing rela-



tions of ultimate elements, which are themselves to be conceived as *unchanging*, rests in the long run upon an assumption exactly similar in kind to that made by the opposed idealist theories, the assumption, namely, that what is undoubtedly a characteristic of the contents of our intellectual apprehension (changelessness) must necessarily be a characteristic of the realities cognised thereby. But the assumption is not only in itself unjustifiable; it is utterly irreconcilable with what admittedly is a fundamental feature of all that is real, namely, that it is a process. "Change," as Lotze puts it, "must find its way to the inside of being": a change in relations can only be a real occurrence if the nature of the related elements be itself involved in the change. Generally, then, it is to be said that the mechanical theory, even within its own field, begins with abstractions and ends with abstractions; it can in no sense be accepted as a final and exhaustive explanation of what comes before us in external nature.

Reality, therefore, in the concrete, can find adequate expression neither in terms of idealism nor in terms of mechanism; still less can it be regarded as the arithmetical sum of two types of being, alike possessing substantive existence and connected only in the manner represented by the scheme of reciprocal determination. "Reality is an interconnected system, of which the correlatives, mind and the apprehended world of fact, are the partial manifestations" (ways, that is to say, in which we imperfectly represent what in themselves are aspects of one and the same process of actual existence). Of that reality, the life of mind is an integral part, not less necessary to the completeness of the whole than nature (ii., 20). Nor does it at all detract from the position that mind occupies in *rerum natura* to say that mind *comes into being*. The prejudice in question arises from our imperfect way of representing the law of change in the ambiguous form of a series in time. In all knowledge, the content known is freed from the conditions of time, and is in so far timeless. By an easy transition, we identify this universal characteristic of subjective apprehension with the nature of the real, and conceive of the latter as enjoying a timeless mode of existence in contrast with which that which emerges into being in time seems secondary and inferior. But not only is the contrast valueless, for the predicate of eternal would in no way intensify existence or enhance its worth; it creates a qualitative distinction between reality and its products which impoverishes the former of all the characteristics of the latter, and we are left with the empty substratum, which, whether in the form of mind or matter, has played so evil a part in philosophical speculation. If, however, that error be avoided, there is, in Prof. Adamson's judgment, nothing to contradict the supposition that in the real process of existence certain highly complex combinations, describable by us as mechanical, take the form of that immediate experience which constitutes a mode or state of consciousness. The circumstance that we cannot represent to ourselves the psy-

chical as itself a change of the mechanical kind should occasion no insuperable difficulty. For a state of consciousness, whatever its nature, forms no part of the content apprehended; and of what we call the mechanical we have, as already insisted, only an abstract and imperfect conception.

If this view be accepted, the question arises as to how far we are justified in supposing that the nature and structure of real existence find adequate representation in knowledge. So far as sense-perception is concerned, the answer is simple. The content perceived is certainly to be distinguished from the real fact to which it refers, but not as though it were another existent intervening as a *tertium quid* between the real fact and the perceiving mind, and preventing the latter from ever coming into contact with the former. The distinction indicates no more than the exceedingly partial fragmentary character of the picture which, in and through the act of perceiving, we form of the real fact immediately before us. It is, however, with regard to the products of thought, by which a conscious mind seeks to correct and supplement its first imperfect impressions, and yet in doing so would seem to place itself at a farther remove from the reality it depicts, that the problem as to whether our mental operations truly represent the nature of things chiefly calls for treatment. Throughout the present work, for example, the antithesis between truth and fact has been emphasised. The characteristic of fact is its concreteness; the contents of thought are universals. The order of fact is one of change; the contents of thought are just the types for us of the timeless and the unchangeable. The relations which seem to us to characterise the order of fact are the relatively external relations of co-existence and sequence; the relations in the order of thought may be said to be those of logical dependence. The contrast, then, is sufficiently pointed. In dealing with it, Prof. Adamson reverts, in the first place, to his psychological doctrine of the continuity between thought and perception. Each of the characteristics mentioned as distinctive of thought can be traced back to their earlier forms in the more primitive process of perceiving. The object perceived, however concretely represented, comes to have the two aspects of being independent of and determining the act of perceiving, and of being common to all percipient minds. Generality, therefore, is present, crudely no doubt at the outset, in the apprehension of fact, which we are in the habit of confining to perception, and differs in degree only and not in kind, from the generality of truth which we are in the habit of assigning specifically to thought. Again, the content apprehended in sense-perception, as distinguished from the act of apprehending, presents, no less than a content of thought, the aspect of timelessness; the simple qualities apprehended in perception undergo no change; change in their case, as in that of notions, means the substitution of one for another. Once more, the relation of dependence is the result of a generalisation of space

and time relations, and of such identities as come before us in the presentations of sense. Consequently, the contrast between truth and fact is far from absolute; perceiving and thinking denote only stages in the development of one and the same fundamental process. And the advance is throughout dependent upon and conditioned by the concrete material of experience, the transformation which that material undergoes is throughout regulated and controlled by the uniformities of conjunction in real existence, and such reconstruction as may be specifically ascribed to the activities of the inner life is possible only because those activities themselves have been formed and determined in and through the real process of which they are a part and upon which in turn they come to be exercised. The categories of thought, therefore, throw over the given material of experience no specially subjective colouring; they are but ways in which the mind organises and arranges its experience, ways which have themselves been fashioned by the experience which they organise. Accordingly, Prof. Adamson maintains, in the second place, that, since it is the necessity of fact which creates the necessity of thought, there is contradiction even in supposing that thought, thus determined and conditioned, should by its own nature be incapable of solving problems which it is compelled to put to itself and of which it is constrained to seek the solution.

7. I have been endeavouring in this article to trace the course of a very remarkable effort at philosophical construction and to marshal its several lines of reflexion under one connected view. Only in conclusion do I venture upon suggesting one or two questions, by way of criticism.

In constructing his theory of an ultimate reality, in which conscious minds arise and obtain a field for the development of self-consciousness, Prof. Adamson has found the category of reciprocal determination, with which scientific naturalism has usually terminated, wholly inadequate for his purpose, and is constrained to offer a more metaphysical interpretation of the concreteness and interconnexion implied in whatsoever can lay claim to the title, real. He insists upon the impossibility of retaining the Kantian distinction between the abstract notion of causal nexus and the concrete idea of the adaptation of nature to intelligence, according to which the first is a necessary condition of experience and the second a regulative principle. The latter, the principle of the existence of definite uniformities in the material of perception is, he contends, "a condition constitutive of our intelligence, involved in its genesis, and, therefore, in some fashion, assumed at every stage in the development of that intelligence" (ii., 298). Were there no constancy of connexion and recurrence in nature, then neither thinking nor perceiving would ever spring into being (ii., 299). Further, there are in nature not only laws, but what Dr. Chalmers called "collocations" (ii., 309). In short, reality is a whole in the sense that "throughout our experience nothing is or can be given

which is without intelligible connexion, which is incapable of being worked into a systematic form" (i., 350). But uniformity, connectedness, collocation, intelligibility,—these are characteristics of the real which not only admittedly stand in the closest relation to the products of our thinking activity, but are themselves what Hegel designated "objective thoughts". Do they not force upon us a more radical transformation of the older naturalism than even Prof. Adamson appears to have thought necessary? He is strenuous in maintaining that "the coming into being" of mind in no way settles its place in the scheme of things as a secondary and inferior fact. But, on the other hand, does its "coming into being" in any way minimise the demand we must make on the scheme of things in which such a "coming into being" takes place?

This question leads at once to the interpretation Prof. Adamson gives of the notion that plays so large a part in his system,—that of development. It is, he contends, a cardinal error committed by "writers more or less of the Hegelian school," and by idealists generally, to represent the essential character of development as the unfolding or manifestation of that which in another aspect is already contained in the ultimate reality. According to this view, nothing arises in the developing nature *de novo* which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning; the process consists in making explicit what is already implicit; there is implied throughout "the idea of the end which is to be realised as somehow existing" (ii., 304). A very Proteus, this conception of End as an efficient idea, impressed on and operative in the structure of that which develops, turns up in infinitely varied forms; now as the Platonic world of ideal perfection, now as the Hegelian absolute, now as the modern naturalist's cosmic order (ii., 83). In Prof. Adamson's judgment, all such theories are utterly devoid of justification. The notion of end is, he contends, a wholly practical category and has no consistent application beyond the limits of the individual's practical experience. Even there, the doctrine that morality is the gradual realisation of a final end, known beforehand, is untenable and altogether barren; what the human agent has before him, at all events in concrete form, is never the absolutely best, but only the relatively better, and that not as in any way already existing, but only as represented in idea. In the phenomena of organic life and of the life of mind there are, however, no grounds for assuming that the sequence of changes is preceded by a representation of the result to come about. The course of development, manifested by the phenomena in question, is, in no sense, so pre-determined that the external conditions play the part only of stimulating occasions calling forth into explicitness what is implicit. The development can never be explained as arising solely from the activity of some inner process, but is in all cases dependent on external circumstances, which may or may not be furnished.

It is worth noticing that in no respect is the difference between

Prof. Adamson's earlier and later position more marked than in regard to this notion of "End". In his Owens College lectures of 1888 he maintained strenuously that the conception of an absolute or final end, of a good-in-itself, was implied in the very idea of a self-conscious being whose life exhibits development. For development in the spiritual life was much more than mere growth; it presupposed that the subject was capable of representing to himself that, the realisation of which would yield complete satisfaction to, or be the perfection of, his nature. It was true that no more than the general characteristics of such final end could ever be presented to himself by the moral agent, at any particular stage of his development, but of these general characteristics he could at least be well assured. It would be an end and not a means, an end requiring unconditionally to be followed, not only final but internal,—a mode of self-conscious activity or existence, prescribed by reason and recognised by a rational being as unconditionally desirable. This good-in-itself had, indeed, significance only when taken in relation to what the concrete subject had been able to determine as good, but to question the validity of the conception on that account would be akin to questioning the possibility of general notions in knowledge because any act of knowing is the particular act of an individual mind. Always in human experience there were the two factors, distinguishable but not separable, the empirical and the ideal. In knowledge, as in action, there was involved, by the same necessity of reason, an ideal conception, the conception of a completed system, insight into which is never realised to the full, and the exact representation of which is from its very nature constantly varying.

The decisive consideration which led to the abandonment of 'final end' as a legitimate conception, either in the sphere of the practical or the theoretical life, appears to have been the impossibility Prof. Adamson felt of freeing the notion from the implication that the realisation of such final end in some way already exists. And it cannot be denied that both in the passage he cites from Hegel and in the writings of Green,<sup>1</sup> that implication is acknowledged in so many words. As against it, Prof. Adamson's reasoning seems to me conclusive. Why should a perfect and absolute mind proceed to institute within itself a laborious process of evolution for the sake of producing that which, with or without such process, in Green's phraseology, "eternally is"? But it may well be doubted whether, on our author's own premisses, the conception of development has been disengaged from all that is specific to the Category of End and that we are left with nothing corresponding to it save "a characteristically distinct combination of empirical features" (ii., 192). "That a new product shows traces of being modified by what is past ought not," he says, "to be interpreted as signifying that the new fact is merely explicit

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., *Prolegomena*, § 187.

manifestation of what is implicit" (ii., 191). The external conditions, that is to say, have been no less instrumental in bringing about the result than the internal. Granted; but then the argument of the present work has been one sustained polemic against the tendency of severing the inner and outer sides of conscious experience as though they were two distinct realms of being. Does it not seem, then, a natural question to ask whether the terms implicit and explicit are equally devoid of significance when applied, not to any particular constituent of reality, but to reality as a whole? Prof. Adamson cannot be taken to imply that the emergence, for example, of psychical life "under certain conditions describable by us as mechanical" is to be regarded as a purely fortuitous or accidental occurrence; such an interpretation would render "the necessity of fact," on which he insists, unintelligible. He cannot mean that mind is an episodic appearance in world, which might conceivably have gone on existing without it; such a view would contradict all he has to say of the life of mind being no less necessary to the completeness of the whole than nature. But if this supposition be ruled out, is there between it and the theory of an ultimate purposiveness in nature any half-way house left in which to escape from the inference which the contention that "throughout our whole experience, nothing is or can be given which is without intelligible connexion" seems to force upon us? Surely there is a possibility of conceiving what Green called "a plan of the world" without imparting into the conception his implication that the said plan is eternally realised in the absolute mind. Indeed, one might go the length of saying that the two things are essentially contradictory. If, in the finite mind, all thinking is idealising (ii., 113), what valid reason is there for refusing to admit the idealising character of thought even where the attribute of finitude no longer attaches to it? In other words, can we not conceive a mind, the contents of whose knowledge stand, so far at least as the cardinal feature of the non-existential character of truth is concerned, in much the same relation to the whole process of reality as the contents of our knowledge stand to that limited portion of the real with which we are in contact? At all events, without a terminus of this description, Prof. Adamson's metaphysical system reaches no logical completion, but leaves us with a characteristic set of problems unsolved. And formerly he used to insist that it was incumbent on us, as one part of the attempt to lay out the theoretical basis of knowledge and morality, to show how reality can be of such a nature as to furnish the field of development for beings capable of forming intellectual and ethical ideals. The ultimate ground of an intelligible and moral order of facts,—an order in which the evolution of human consciousness on its theoretical and practical sides is an integral part,—could not lie, he then urged, in the facts themselves as such; it was to be sought in the meaning and significance the contents of experience come to possess for a thinking mind, and

in the interpretation of which a thinking mind attains its highest exercise and worth.

But whether or no we are able to call halt exactly at the point to which these volumes bring us, there cannot be a moment's question as to the permanent place they will occupy in philosophical literature. They mark a distinctly new stage in the history of English speculation, and will form a basis of profitable discussion for many years to come.



## V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Studies in Logical Theory.* By JOHN DEWEY, with the co-operation of Members and Fellows of the Department of Philosophy. Chicago: the University Press, 1903. Pp. xiii, 388.

THESE *Studies* are one of the ways in which the Chicago philosophers, headed by Prof. Dewey, have been celebrating the tenth anniversary of their aspiring university, and form the eleventh volume of the second series of its "Decennial Publications". So much for the external occasion for the appearance of this goodly volume, concerning which it may also be observed that the heavily clayed paper augurs ill for its permanence and emulates blotting paper in its attitude towards ink. Passing to the contents, it may at once be said that we have here a weighty contribution to current logical controversy, which will probably prove of special interest to the historian of philosophy (whether in Germany or in some supercelestial sphere) as an effort which utilises for the elucidation of our logical procedure the teleological psychology of modern times, and largely (and, until recently, independently) parallels the 'Pragmatism' of William James and his friends. So close indeed is this parallel and so undesigned the coincidence, that no one who fully realises the importance of this movement can fail to be reminded of the double discovery of Natural Selection by Darwin and by Wallace. Not that the *word* Pragmatism so much as occurs in these *Studies*, indeed it is somewhat unfortunate that their terminology is so widely different from that of Prof. James, and by no means self-explaining: but there can be no doubt that the *thing* is there in a fully conscious form. This, *e.g.*, is how Prof. Dewey states it in his Preface (*italics mine*): "*Since the act of knowing is intimately and indissolubly connected with the like yet diverse functions of affection, appreciation, and practice, it only distorts results reached to treat knowing as a self-enclosed and self-explanatory whole—hence the intimate connexions of logical theory with functional psychology; since knowledge appears as a function within experience, and yet passes judgment upon both the processes and contents of other functions, its work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or transformatory; since Reality must be defined in terms of experience, judgment appears accordingly as the medium through which the consciously effected evolution*

of Reality goes on; there is no reasonable standard of truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon the postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, and, in particular, except through reference to the specific offices which knowing is called upon to perform in readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life."

It is plain that this represents an independent attainment of the pragmatist point of view, involving advantages (and difficulties) of its own, even though Prof. Dewey is doubtless fully warranted in acknowledging "a pre-eminent obligation on the part of all of us to William James, for both inspiration and the forging of the tools with which we have worked".

All of this will appear clearly from a sketch of the contents of these *Studies*. In the first four essays, dealing with *Thought and its Subject-matter*, Prof. Dewey sharpens his claws on Lotze's logic, and shows that a logical theory which abstracts from the psychological conditions of actual thinking leads only to abstractions which have no possible reference or bearing (p. 8). Thought in general and reality in general cannot be brought together, bald 'fact' and hypothetical 'idea,' each conceived as ontological fixtures, can never coalesce into a knowable world. Hence Lotze, taking a static sense-experience as furnishing the antecedents of thought, is confronted with a hopeless problem in trying to force rationality into it by thought. For if thought in any way shapes this material, it alters it, and leads further away from reality (p. 36): if it merely accepts it, it becomes nugatory. Nor is it a way out of this quandary to urge with Prof. H. Jones that a reality independent of thought should never have been assumed. The transcendental logic (Hegel, etc.) had tried this way, and found itself involved in the same difficulty, from which Lotze vainly tried to extricate it. For however we insist on the omnipresence of thought, our discursive finite thinking has in every case to start from a factual material of practical social and æsthetic values which it has to interpret into a rational system. If we regard this material as constituted by a prior 'creative' or 'absolute' thought, we abusively strain the meaning of 'thought,' and only add a metaphysical problem to the logical problem we have left unsolved. For "if (p. 46) reflective thought is required because constitutive thought works under externally limiting conditions of sense, then we have some elements, which are, after all, mere existences, events, etc. Or, if they have organisation from some other source, and induce reflective thought, not as bare impressions, but through their place in some whole, then we have admitted the possibility of organic unity in experience, apart from Reason, and the ground for assuming Pure Constitutive Thought is abandoned." Thus Lotze's significance is that his "effort to combine a transcendental view of thought (*i.e.*, of Thought as active in forms of its own, pure in and of themselves) with certain obvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon specific

empirical antecedents, brings to light fundamental defects in both the empiristic and the transcendental logic. We discover a common failure in both: the failure to view logical terms and distinctions with respect to their necessary function in the redintegration of experience" (pp. 47-8). For this reason (p. 83) his "original implication of a separation between an independent thought-material and an independent thought-function and purpose lands us inevitably in the metaphysics of subjective idealism, plus a belief in an unknown reality beyond, which unknowable is yet taken as the ultimate test of the value of our ideas as just subjective".

But (p. 63) "the primary logical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning," in which (p. 70) the "meanings become the tools of thought in interpreting the data," while "the sense-qualities which define the presented situation are the immediate objects to thought" (p. 70). It is the control of this present situation which is the aim of all actual thinking, and the reality of the 'facts' we acknowledge, no less than the 'truth' of the ideas we employ, is relative to this aim. And in such a situation there is no antithesis of thought and fact, truth and reality, but an "uninterrupted free and fluid passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking, from thought to fact, from things to theories and back again" (p. 10).

In a very similar way Miss H. B. Thompson of Mount Holyoke College dissects Prof. Bosanquet's *Theory of Judgment*. She shows that Prof. Bosanquet never succeeds in explaining how it is that in judgment ideas manage to refer to reality. In order to avoid making knowledge merely a relation between our ideas, it was assumed that reality is not constructed, but only reconstructed, in judgment. This however results in the notion of a real world as it is in itself, which has to be related to the real world for any individual, and a subject which is both in and out of the judgment. Similarly the predicate has to be "an accurate representative of reality," and yet is "an idea which is, both in its existence and in its meaning, palpably the outcome of transformations wrought upon given sensory contents by the individual consciousness" (p. 101), and it seems strange to "suppose that by distorting reality we get it in shape to affirm of reality" (p. 102). The final outcome therefore is, that "the more thinking we do, the less we know about the real world" (p. 102). But, Miss Thompson pertinently asks (p. 104), "would it not be possible to drop the presupposed reality outside of the judgment-process . . . and content ourselves with the sort of reality which appears within the judgment-process?" Is not "truth rather some *specific* relation within experience, so that our problem is . . . what are the marks by which we discriminate a true reference from a false one" (p. 105)? Using such a "practical criterion of what as a matter of fact will work," she finds that "what can safely be taken for granted as a basis for further action is regarded as real and true" (p. 106). Judgment then deals only with "the real world as it is to me" in

a definite 'situation' to which the predicate suggests a tentative reaction. After some further suggestive remarks on the relation of judgment and inference, and its alleged timelessness (in which Prof. Bosanquet has probably enshrined a pious memory of Green's 'timeless act'), Miss Thompson concludes by admitting that her solution must represent reality as itself in process of development, but declines to admit that the perfect is necessarily "that which is finished and ended" (p. 126).

The chief defect I should note in Miss Thompson's paper is that it does not adduce sufficient evidence to show that Prof. Bosanquet really holds the doctrine she attributes to him. I believe myself that at bottom he does, but at the same time it would have been only fair, and in the end also more instructive and convincing, to point out the frequent occurrence in him of *aperçus* as to the building up of 'reality' by *our* thinking (not the Absolute's!), as to the impossibility of its 'copying,' and the presence in it of interest, which *sound* like pure pragmatism, and are only prevented from *meaning* it by the dominant prejudices of the intellectualistic school in which he was brought up and from which he has not been able to emancipate himself. In Prof. Bosanquet these features are considerably more marked than in Mr. Bradley, but even the latter supplies quite enough standing ground for a pragmatist reconstruction of the theory of knowledge, and only arrests himself on the path to Voluntarism by an arbitrary fiat of will (*cf. Appear. and Real.*, pp. 153-5).

There follows a shorter paper by Prof. S. F. McLennan of Oberlin, on *Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment*, to prove that "judgment is essentially instrumental," *i.e.*, that ideas are "instruments for transforming and directing experience by way of constructing anticipations, and the conditions appropriate to their realisation. . . . The true idea is reliable, carrying us from anticipation to realisation; the false idea is unreliable, and fails in bringing the promised result" (p. 131). From this point of view the types of judgment, impersonal, demonstrative, universal, disjunctive and intuitive, indicate successive stages of growing control. Knowing, therefore, is never a copying of reality by ideas, but an immanent process "which contains and constructs its criterion within its own specific movement," and so "can verify its constructions" (p. 141).

The next essay, by Dr. M. L. Ashley, considers *the Nature of Hypothesis*, with a view to showing that not only is a hypothesis a predicate, but that any predicate, as a tentative analysis of a 'situation,' is essentially hypothetical. Hence (p. 153) "the hypothesis is just the predicate-function of judgment definitely apprehended and regarded with reference to its nature and adequacy".

Dr. W. C. Gore, Assistant Professor of Psychology at Chicago, examines *the Image and Idea in Logic*. The empiricist and the 'conceptualist' (*i.e.*, intellectualist) have both failed in their

account of the logical use of the image, owing to an incomplete psychological analysis (pp. 192-3). They separated imagery and meaning, between which there is psychologically no break. "The response to an image—or to any stimulus *via* that image—is the meaning of the image" (p. 193), whence "psychical response and logical reference become equivalent terms" (p. 198). "Imagery functions in representing control as ideal, not as fact" (p. 197), but control is what it aims at. Nor is its sensuous content useless (as Bradley alleges), for it "enters into that conscious process of discrimination, comparison and selection of doubt and inquiry which constitutes the evolution of a judgment" (p. 202).

In the *Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy* Prof. W. A. Heidel of Iowa College has chosen a subject which compels him to make bricks without clay out of scattered straws of tradition. It is no wonder therefore that his essay is somewhat loosely connected with the rest, and even with its own title. He sees however clearly that the origin of our principles can only be explained "in terms of will and interest" and that the history of thought points to "the primacy of the practical as yielding the direction of interest that determines the course it shall take" (p. 205).

The next essay, by Dr. H. W. Stuart of the Iowa State University, is the longest of the series. It is entitled *Valuation as a Logical Process*, and its general aim is to show that "judgments of value . . . are essentially objective in import, and are reached through a process of valuation which is essentially of the same logical character as the judgment-process whereby conclusions of physical fact are established—in a word that the valuation-process . . . is constructive of an order of reality in the same sense as . . . is the judgment of sense-perception and science" (p. 227). I have however found Dr. Stuart's proof of this thesis somewhat hard to follow, partly no doubt because instead of starting with an inquiry into the nature of value and its various forms, he assumes that the ethical and economic judgments are the only judgments of valuation, and only attempts to justify this and his exclusion of æsthetic and pleasure values and valuations at the very end, in what seems to me a wholly unconvincing manner. Had he begun at the other end, he would have no difficulty in showing (as I have done in *Humanism*, pp. 54-5, 162-3, 259-60) that since the logical judgment of 'fact' as 'true' and 'false' is just as clearly a valuation as any other, its claim to an exclusive objectivity is absurd. Still no pragmatist need quarrel with Dr. Stuart's conclusion (p. 340) that "the realms of fact and value are both real, but that of value is logically prior, and so 'more real'. The realm of fact as a separate order, complete and absolute in itself, is an abstraction that has forgotten the reason for which it was made."

The final essay, one of the ablest in the volume, is by Assistant Professor A. W. Moore of Chicago. Under the title of *Some Logical Aspects of Purpose* it criticises what may be called the back-

sliding pragmatism of Prof. Royce. Prof. Moore shows, very lucidly, that though Prof. Royce makes a great parade of recognising the purposiveness of the idea, he yet uses it in no less than three discrepant senses as "(1) the purpose, (2) the partial fulfilment of the purpose, and (3) as having a further purpose to correspond to an object in the 'absolute system of ideas'" (p. 349). Of these the first equates the idea with a scientific working hypothesis, and if followed steadily would lead to no difficulty. The second is no longer a purpose, but the fulfilling experience which validates the idea which was our 'plan of action,' and is 'true' when it can convey us to a point where we can 'pause satisfied'. Lastly the third is but "an heirloom from the time of Plato," arbitrarily alleged as the purpose of the ideal interpretation of experience, which not only proceeds without it, but is ruined by its introduction. For by this *coup* the purposive function of the idea is at once reduced to the representative (p. 365). To justify it, it is necessary to assert that an idea which fulfils any finite purpose attains only to fragmentary fulfilment. This, however, reduces all human truth to error, which also is 'a partial failure to fulfil a purpose'. It results that "the idea is left either with two independent purposes—one to reconstruct finite experience, the other to represent and symbolise the absolute system—or one of these purposes is merged in the other. When the attempt is made from the standpoint of the absolute system, the reconstructive purpose is swallowed up in the representative. When, on the other hand, the need for a basis of distinction between truth and error is felt, the representative disappears in the reconstructive function" (p. 372). Royce's difficulty is shown to arise from his uncritical acceptance of the purposive quality of the idea in the abstract, without inquiry into the actual source of the purposiveness. But as the idea is always a plan for coping with a definite situation, the fulfilment which satisfies it must always be relevant to it. The purpose is a means to the reorganisation and reconstruction of experience and the purposive function, the purposive activity advances from one trial and its satisfaction to another, and in so doing constructs the world of reality for man. Thus (p. 382) "in the loving and hoping, desiring and willing, believing and working, shall we find that reality in which and for which both the world as fact and the world as idea have their being".

My fundamental agreement with Prof. Dewey and his associates is such that I have devoted this review mainly to paraphrasing and bringing out the most salient points in their welcome doctrine. Criticism of details would be easy but unprofitable, and I would not maintain that even as a whole these *Studies* were beyond cavil, or that they, any more than anything yet published on the subject, could rank as more than *Vorstudien* to that 'Logic of Pragmatism' which is to regenerate the science. Nevertheless the work is one with which students of logic will have most

carefully to reckon. It suffers no doubt from a certain amount of repetition, and some of the essays would gain by compression and rearrangement. Nor is it an easy book to read, or fascinating in point of style. But in all these respects logicians are accustomed to fare hardly, and so have no right to be fastidious. And even the strictly academic style, and the abundance of technicalities, should commend these *Studies* to many with whom the scientific character of Pragmatism has fallen under the gravest suspicions, mainly because some of its previous exponents have, in the hope of gilding the bitter pill of novelty, unwisely departed from the customary dulness of logical exposition.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

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*Agnosticism.* By ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E., Professor in the University of Edinburgh, etc. London and Edinburgh: Wm. Blackwood & Sons. Pp. xvi, 602.

THE nucleus of this book consists of the Croall Lectures on Agnosticism, given by the author in Edinburgh in 1887-8, and now expanded into an elaborate critical and historical treatise.

The origin of the term "Agnosticism" is well known; it was used by its inventor to signify "impartial, critical truth-seeking, free from every trace of dogmatism". But as Prof. Flint shows, this by no means required the invention of a new term; nor is the term "Agnosticism" etymologically or otherwise appropriate for the purpose. However, the word came to stay; and it marks an attitude of mind familiar throughout the history of thought,—not "truth-search," but Scepticism (in the philosophical sense) more or less complete (10, 12, 21). It is "so vague and variable that to attempt to reason on it in itself, apart from its actual manifestations, must be futile" (78); "agnosticism is, in fact, never self-consistent, and never exactly this or that, but always relatively a more or less" (191). Prof. Flint also points out that it seems essentially impossible for an agnostic and a non-agnostic to agree on a definition of "agnosticism," since to one it is a rejection of merely imaginary knowledge on real grounds, and to the other a rejection of real knowledge on merely imaginary grounds (16, 17). Among the by-products of these first two chapters are a very interesting account of the views of M. de Roberty (59) and a vigorous criticism of Sir Leslie Stephen's *Agnostic's Apology* (67).

Chapters iii. and iv. contain a history of agnosticism; first from the Greeks to the Renaissance (ch. iii.), followed by a full account of the agnosticism of Hume and Kant (ch. iv.). The former is a good popular account, resting on sound knowledge and very wide reading. References are given to authorities and original sources of information. Particularly interesting is the presentation of "the agnosticism of the transition period,"—Montaigne, Charron, Sanchez, Le Vayer, Pascal, Bayle, and a few others. The account



of Hume, too, gives a good view of all sides of the activity of his versatile intellect. The account of Kant is less successful (140-190). Any treatment of Kant which isolates and emphasises only the agnostic elements in his thought cannot be satisfactory. And for a "popular" account certain difficulties are touched on in passing in a way which is of no use to the reader who is not a technical student, and at the same time is too brief to constitute any basis for discussion for the trained student: *e.g.*, the question whether Time ought not to have been ranked "rather among the categories of the understanding than among the forms of sense" (148), and whether "the matter or content of experience" comes to a greater extent from within than from without (157). The discussion is also not free from obscurities: *e.g.*, "a cognition may be either . . . a particular notion or an impure intuition" (145), —alternatives that Kant is stated to overlook. What is a "particular notion"? Again, —the mind knows space "only as independent of itself, as out of itself, as what it and what the objects it knows are in". Is the mind "in space" like an object? Kant's doctrine of the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of space and time, and that space is not a thing-in-itself, is made to mean that "space merely seems real and objective, and is actually ideal and subjective," and this, says Prof. Flint, is "not to repel scepticism but to vindicate it" (148). Why not simply point out that, while the agnostic or "relativistic" strain is certainly to the front in the *Asthetik*, what Kant really means, read in the light of his subsequent writing, is that *space is not an absolute reality*, —a thing depending on nothing beyond itself for its own existence? Prof. Flint's inability to come into touch with Kant's views on this point is probably explained by the fact that he himself regards Time and Space as absolute realities (311). This seems to us necessarily to carry with it the assertion that the mechanical theory of the universe is ultimate truth; which is to surrender all the strongest positions won by philosophical thought since Kant.

Prof. Flint speaks of "the transcendental deduction of the categories, or in simpler terms, the showing that they must apply to objects, and how, or to what extent" (153). The categories do not *apply* to objects but are *partly constitutive* of objects; this is directly implied in Kant's views, and is elsewhere stated by the author himself (158, 161). Other very questionable statements, occurring in the criticism of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, might be mentioned; *e.g.*, that Kant assumes that "even necessary thinking of a being as necessarily existing is no assurance of its existence" (178); or that because Kant "would have us believe that causality only gives order to sensuous impressions but can by no means carry us beyond them," he had no shadow of right to represent causality as even subjectively necessary (180). Surely one may now take it as accepted that what Kant really means is this: by the principle of causality we may regard finite things as causally connected with one another, but we cannot, by means

of that principle, pass from the finite to an Absolute Cause, as Berkeley and Martineau, for instance, endeavour to do.

Passing on to the discussion of actual forms of agnosticism, the author argues that "Complete Agnosticism," *i.e.*, systematic and universal doubt (or disbelief, as the case may be), is self-contradictory. He then raises the question, is *any* limitation of agnosticism consistent, and answers it in the negative. Limited agnosticism is always an inconsistent union of scepticism and dogmatism: this conclusion is illustrated by an examination of Pyrrhonism among the Greeks, and by a criticism of Hume's Essay, *Of the Academic or Sceptical Philosophy*, where Absolute Scepticism is erroneously called Pyrrhonism (by Hume). "Hume had . . . nothing to urge against what he calls an excessive scepticism but an instinct which he alleges can be proved to be irrational, and the evil consequences which would flow from admitting as true what he holds cannot be shown to be false" (253). "The only ascertainable limitations of the mind manifesting itself as Reason—*i.e.*, in the appropriation of knowledge and truth—are those which are inherent in its own constitution . . . and constitutive of intelligence" (300).

In his discussion of the conception of "ultimate objects of knowledge," the author, in a passage to which we have already referred, seems to assert dogmatically that Space and Time are known as infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent, and that such a knowledge "should at least suffice to prevent us from venturing to deny that God can be known as eternal, infinite, and necessarily existent" (311). Surely a most unfortunate comparison, which the author proceeds to work out so as to suggest that he is setting up three Absolutes, Space, Time, and God, the only result being an absolute self-contradiction. Or, if the "eternity," "infinity," and "necessary existence" of Space and Time are not *absolute*, then my knowledge of them gives no more light on my knowledge of God than is given by my knowledge of the table before me.

The remainder of the book is taken up by a consideration of agnosticism with regard to the self, the world, and God (and religious belief in general). The two former are briefly treated. The discussion of the primary and fundamental question of self-knowledge (317 ff.) cannot be considered satisfactory. The author's contribution to the problem appears to be summed up in the statement that "there is nothing of which a man is more certain than that he is; that he is conscious that he is; and that his consciousness that he is, is a knowledge on which he may safely and confidently rely;" but "around each man's little sphere of self-knowledge there stretches immeasurable self-ignorance" (331, 332). We believe that no discussion of this subject is adequate which does not take account of such a criticism of self-consciousness as is contained in Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. "Agnosticism with regard to the world" (335 ff.) is handled in a strangely ineffective manner, and none of the real difficulties concerning Perception are touched. On page 361 reasons are given for believing that "the contents of

the world . . . although the ultimate grounds of them may be spiritual, are real external and material things". But on page 376 it is said, "that all our perceptions are hallucinations and all their objects illusions, is as plausible and credible a doctrine now as ever it was". Prof. Flint is no sceptic; but he has been led into dangerous overstatements in his eagerness to support Mr. A. J. Balfour's contention that "the case against religious science is no stronger than that against other science" (380).

The whole discussion of Agnosticism with regard to Religion is of special interest for the student of religious thought, but does not, except with respect to a few points, call for comment in this place. Part of it, *e.g.*, the criticism of Hamilton, Mansel and Spencer, covers very familiar ground. The author proceeds to sketch a theory of Belief, in its nature and relations to Tradition and Authority; and incidentally he criticises the views on this subject of Bain, of W. James and Wilfrid Ward, and of Sabatier and the Ritschlians. Belief he states to be a primordial fact of consciousness, ultimate and unanalysable; but what is fundamental in it is Judgment (407, 423). If so, the author can hardly be attending to the judgment-aspect of Belief when he maintains that the only opposite to belief is non-belief (the absence of belief) and not "doubt" (422). He proceeds to argue that "belief should be co-extensive with knowledge, coincident with truth," and that "a rightly regulated mind is one in which evidence is the measure of assent" (424, 425). In this connexion he quotes the well-known views of Huxley and Clifford. But he gives their view an explanation which to them would probably have seemed to explain it away: "Nor does the reasonableness of the conformity of belief to evidence imply that belief, and the life of feeling and action founded on belief, should be affected *merely by the strength and clearness of the apprehension of evidence*. They naturally will, and even manifestly ought to, be affected also by *the character of the object or content of belief*. . . . Many true and attainable beliefs are not worth our seeking after, or troubling ourselves as to what evidence there may be for them. Beliefs as to morals have claims upon us which beliefs as to lower concerns have not, and demand from us more anxious inquiry as to whether they are true or false. Belief in God should naturally so affect a man's whole view of the world and history, and so influence his whole life and conduct, and has also such immense significance for societies and nations, that a refusal to study the grounds of it with the utmost care and earnestness can only be regarded as inexcusable" (430).<sup>1</sup> Once let the importance of the belief, as here indicated, enter into and form part of the evidence for its acceptance, and we have inserted in the harness of the traditional "Natural Theology" the thin end of the wedge of "Pragmatism". On this account we turn again to the author's brief criticism of James's *Will to Believe* (397-399). The

<sup>1</sup> The italics are the author's.

main points seem to be as follows: (1) It is psychologically impossible to *will* to believe, *i.e.*, to force ourselves to do so by a mere effort. This is true but irrelevant, for "will" with Prof. James is not, any more than with Schopenhauer, a mere subjective effort. (2) James has not shown that there are any cases where an "option," "genuine," "forced," and "momentous," such as religious belief is admitted to be, must be decided on passionnal grounds *because* it cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. This we believe to be true, though it is not easy to see the point of the objection that James has substituted "options of action" for "options of belief". (3) "The part which willing has in the game (of believing) is this: the mind can either will to follow along the paths on which the light of truth shines, and in which alone therefore right belief can be attained, or will to deviate from them, and so wander into regions of darkness and delusion". It is unfortunate that at this crucial point the author's language should be so metaphorical as to leave his precise meaning uncertain (399). The whole matter seems to us to lie in this question: Can there be any evidence without "will"? Is it not true that in every case of knowledge the "evidence" has to be *made* as much as *found*? "The will cannot force the mind to believe what presents to it no appearance of evidence." No; but it can "force" the mind to *make* the evidence. It is familiar to hear these "momentous" beliefs spoken of as "hypotheses": but a hypothesis which is not amenable to *experiment* is futile, as the elementary text-books tell us. And "experiment" is not limited to the "questions asked of nature" with respect to the causal connexion of physical events. Clifford's statement seems a mere platitude dressed in the garb of moral and intellectual virtue, *until* we have settled the various degrees and kinds of evidence which it is reasonable to expect in different branches of inquiry. Prof. Flint's book contains interesting contributions to this end; but had he investigated much more fully some of the questions which arise out of recent movements of real philosophical importance, he would have done better service even to the theologian.

S. H. MELLONE.

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*Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart.* Acht Vorträge von ALOIS RIEHL. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1903. Pp. ii, 258.

THE *suasorie* which Dr. Riehl now prints under the attractive title of *Philosophie der Gegenwart* were originally addressed to a lay public, with the design in the first place of gaining for philosophy fresh well-wishers among the ranks of those whose vocation and training had lain rather in the direction of positive science. His book therefore offers something of an *irenicon* in the quarrel or misunderstanding between natural science and the philosophy to

which it tended to be antipathetic. To his task of mediation Dr. Riehl adds an endeavour to appraise the living forces in the philosophy of the present which are shaping its outlook on the future.

In view of the short title it is something of a paradox, mitigated a little in the fuller style of the book, that the mission of philosophy in the present is determined to the extent that it is here by a masterful survey of its meaning and achievement in the past. It must however be conceded that Dr. Riehl justifies the extent to which his treatment rests on the unity and continuity of the development of philosophy throughout its history. To appreciate the significance of Dr. Riehl's thesis that while philosophy can only perform its function aright when in close *rapport* with science, it yet has its separate and sufficient work in the field of criticism and in the sphere of values, the public to which he primarily addressed himself needed certain reminders.

Philosophy once included the circle of the sciences. The severance was incomplete even so late as Descartes. The greatness of philosophers even more recent has depended in part upon their competence in *Forschung*. All this should make for reconciliation. On the other hand, modern philosophy has, at least since the dawn of criticism in its technical sense, been definitely confronted with science as something other than itself, and has more and more put the stress upon theory of knowledge and doctrine of values, and more and more, save for certain anachronistic survivals, declined from ontological pretensions running counter to science. This in Dr. Riehl's view should make for clearness in definition of jurisdiction. The relation is that of mother country and emancipated colony. Federation and not conquest is the policy of enlightenment. Prof. Riehl's view may be said to centre upon the significance of Kant for science as for philosophy, and that of Mayer for philosophy as for science.

Before such a public and in such a connexion there was naturally but little to say of ancient philosophy in detail. Dr. Riehl says that little acutely, happily, and according to knowledge. *Naturforschung* once was the whole of philosophy. It seems to follow that it must share the responsibility for the ontology which it now charges upon philosophy, for this is a heritage from the speculations in which philosophy and science were not two, but one. It was not until Socrates 'discovered the practical reason' that the cleavage between philosophy and science, soon to be aggravated by the emergence of theory of knowledge but never completed in the Greek world, took a definite character. The pronouncements of modern physics find happy parallels in the 'false dawn' of pre-Socratic speculation. The illustration of Heraclitus by Helmholtz' *dauernde Bewegungsformen und scheinbare Substanzen* is perhaps the cleverest of Dr. Riehl's 'modern instances'.

Even 'the Copernican change' of the Renaissance, to adopt Kant's phrase literally, was not at first so decisively successful in

opposing philosophy to science and sciences relatively independent from it, that the need of 'a specialist of the general' could reasonably be doubted. We call Copernicus, who 'discovered a new star and set the Earth in the heavens,' a master of science. Good. And we call Bruno, who obtains not now for the first time a sympathetic treatment at Dr. Riehl's hands, specifically a philosopher. Also good. But the essential content of the teaching of the two is the same. So also the Cartesian philosophy meant at the first the physics of Descartes and only subsequently his metaphysics. It is only then with the first critical writers that the residual task of theoretic philosophy as a separate discipline becomes clear. Chimæras bombinant in the void have been extinguished. The sciences are coming less and less to admit of a synthesis and not at all of a 'synthetic philosopher'. But beside *Forschung* in its several departments there arises *Kritik* for which experience itself is the problem. Withal, side by side with the search for valid relations in the world of understanding, there is the shaping of ideals in art and ethics. Validity and the value which we put back of it are the problems of the dual activity of philosophy.

For Dr. Riehl *Aufklärung* and a critical philosophy are not discontinuous. The latter is the development and not the reversal of the former. The spirit of the illumination is embodied in Locke, who despite of anticipatory thoughts in Hobbes, and notwithstanding the fact that Hume is the first definitely to conceive of experience as 'a problem, not its solution,' must still be called 'the first critical philosopher'. Prof. Riehl has no polemic against the individualism and 'psychological view' of the traditional Locke and conventional Hume. He treats these writers as precursors of criticism as it appears in Kant and credits them with the points that they made as the great epistemologists that they are. He finds, *e.g.*, in Locke's account of substance the germ of a development rather than something to be answered. He limits the polemic against innate ideas to its original meaning, and shows that it never excluded the *intellectus ipse* of Leibniz' qualification,—that there are, as the phrase goes, 'intellectual elements' in Locke's theory. Again he finds in Locke's 'things themselves' the literary antecedent of the more famous *Dinge an sich*. All this doubtless belongs in a way to the view of Kant to which Dr. Riehl stands committed, but even if it be held to be onesided, it is an admirable tonic to the English student who knows Locke only through T. H. Green's General Introduction to Hume. It is in the need that there is to eke out Locke's Essay with the Newtonian influence that came too late for it to take account of, and in the fact that Kant took part in *Forschung* as well as produced a theory of knowledge, that Locke's shortcoming as compared with the greater German master is to be found.

So too Hume is a forerunner of Kant, an end only in the sense that he is a new beginning. In part his method of pure experience is a *reductio ad absurdum* of itself. In part it necessarily tran-

scends itself and leaves the last step in the critical development already reached, if still to take. Not that Dr. Riehl slurs differences. The points of Kant's advance on Hume are fully indicated. Of their difference in the way in which they construe the causal relation Dr. Riehl has a happy *instantia crucis*. An observer from a height at some distance sees through his field-glasses a troop at drill. He first sees the execution of the manoeuvre, then hears the word of command. Can Hume explain the control of the subjective sequence of apprehension by the objective sequence of phenomena?

As to Dr. Riehl's general attitude towards Kant a review must appear belated. A simple reminder may serve here. That Kant, himself distinguished in the field of science, gave philosophy a jurisdiction in critique of experience, and founded a 'critical realism' in which the sciences could ground themselves, and that so he left us with specifically post-Kantian problems, constitutes the claim of this great thinker to the highest place in the roll of the mediators of philosophy and science. The derivation from Kant of a purely speculative idealism naturally finds no sympathy from Prof. Riehl. The criticism which must be the prelude to any metaphysic is the only metaphysic; the curtain is the picture.

It follows naturally then that, on the cognitive side as distinct from the practical, the movement since Kant which is of predominant significance has come from the scientist rather than the professed philosopher, though it enables the philosopher to take a step forward. The great discovery which Dr. Riehl attributes to Mayer, and which is a discovery, whether we accept Tait's strictures on this metaphysician or Dr. Riehl's eulogy of this *Forscher*, is the true answer to Hume. *Causa æquat effectum*. Conservation of energy elaborated as an hypothesis of physics and progressively verified in experience is the fact which precipitates critique and natural science into a harmonious whole, still of course exhibiting differences within it, but, for all that, a whole. With Mayer that step is taken in the scientific sphere which Hume left still to be taken in the critical development. By the test of quantitative equivalence of antecedent and consequent, we may, if we discriminate between *Auslösungen* and *Ursachen*, determine the difference between the causal sequence even of a rare type and the casual sequence even of frequent repetition. In 'the other' of philosophy the category which critique had rendered explicit has thus found its vindication in an unexpected way.

Whether the conception of energy can drive out that of matter and reign alone is a question for scientists. If it so far has not yet been solved in the direction of a triumph for Energetic, this fact implies a formal breach in scientific monism. But at least philosophy has been enabled by the principle of conservation of energy to establish, within definite limits and under definite conditions, that formula of Psychophysical Parallelism which con-



stitutes a principle of co-ordination for such modern epistemology as is *en rapport* with scientific naturalism. The formula is vindicated within its limited range against doctrines of interaction by the following reflexions: if Mayer's formula is correct, the system of energy is a closed one. But has consciousness a 'mechanical' equivalent? If it were a form of energy, its activity would draw upon and weaken or exhaust some other form of energy. Its cessation from activity would involve the emergence or augmentation of some other such form. The *experimentum crucis* makes against the conclusion that it is a form of energy, if, as seems to be established, the energy of the chemical brain-change is heightened, and not lowered with the passage from quiescence to activity of consciousness. Psychosis then is no form of energy.

Dr. Riehl is, however, careful to distinguish this result from its hypothetical extension in a *Panpsychismus*, which as he observes is a revival of an idea of Spinoza's, misunderstood and misapplied in severance from Spinoza's system. It is from the former positive formula, not from the latter speculative one, that Dr. Riehl, not perhaps without obligations to Avenarius, makes his last step forward in critical realism. The duality of an order which can only appear to me as psychosis and an order which might appear to an observer *ab extra* as brain-process but by me can only be thought of as such, is transcended in a conclusion to the identity of the real *Vorgang* which underlies the Janus-faced phenomenon. *Die Welt ist nur einmal da.*

In the remaining field of possible philosophic activity, that namely of ideal ends or values, Dr. Riehl is equally post-Kantian in his point of view. To any writer who completes his philosophy of cognition without reference to the philosophy of practice, the dualism between *is* and *ought* is apparently still to bridge. Dr. Riehl grounds history and moral disciplines in natural law, but life is in one sense more than knowledge, and the spiritual values which we live are subject to evolution no less than the physical world which we know. The link is apparently the prophet who transmutes knowledge into ideals, verities into verdicts and values, as well as transforms old values into new. This is apparently the significance of Dr. Riehl's insistence on the literal truth of the Socratic paradox, verified against all gainsaying by the life of Socrates. Knowledge embodied in the life of a *prophetes* is Virtue, and Virtue is that Knowledge. And the problems *solvantur vivendo* under the guidance of the prophet for whose advent at each transitional epoch we must hope patiently. Such a teacher was Socrates, the *pädagogische Genius* in the history of philosophy. It is from this point of view that Nietzsche is so significant. He apparently gave the clue to Dr. Riehl's thought, though he is not the true prophet, in view of the instability of his own ideal and his own fluctuating estimate of successive values. He must be discriminated from Schopenhauer, since at least he taught no pessimism of disillusioned hedonism. But he failed to realise—

this in our view is one of Dr. Riehl's happiest flashes of insight—"that the true *Herrenmoral* of the autonomous will had been already discovered".

It is then in a harking back to Kant and a fresh start from Kant that has been taken by our naturalists rather than our professed philosophers that the prospects for a living philosophy deepening and elaborating critique in sympathetic alliance with positive science have been rendered hopeful. The nineteenth century was one of achievement in philosophy, but we must look for its achievements not among the professors, but to Mayer, to Helmholtz, to Hertz. The divorce of science and philosophy must never occur again. And to experience, construed not as pure experience nor as something subject to the objection that it is mere phenomenalism, there links itself a *Lebensanschauung* grounded in its laws, interpreted for us by the great transformers of values. But we wait for our prophets. Nietzsche in especial must regretfully be held to have failed to satisfy the demands we make upon our prophets. But such in modern times pre-eminently was Goethe.

Dr. Riehl is not afraid to use fine language, and accordingly he expresses his fine thoughts finely.

HERBERT W. BLUNT.

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*The Reform of Moral and Biblical Education on the lines of Herbartianism, Critical Thought, and the Ethical Needs of the Present Day.* By FRANK H. HAYWARD. London: Swan Sonnenschein.

"A RELIGIOUS and moral education," said Victor Cousin, "is the first great want of a people." Substantially this is the plea of Herbart in suggesting the formation of character as the end of education. But Herbart has a method to offer. The method is the formation of character through instruction. Herbart has no doubt as to the close relation of the intellectual to the moral. He holds that the mind as a whole can only mean the whole circle of thought. The will, therefore, can only be said to exercise itself over the materials gathered by the intellect, and can only be developed in connexion with them. The will is the real indication of character, and therefore the moral character is dependent on the whole circle of thought. This circle of thought, as he more than hints, can be built up by instruction. Hence the possibilities of education in such a system appear with a grandeur which is increasingly attractive to educationists.

Herbartianism accepts the position that definite instruction can influence the character, because "action springs out of the circle of thought". Hence the need for moral development by the presentation of "large unbroken masses of thought". Herbartians hold that ideas, much more than feelings, are the essential

prerequisites to the training of the will. It is the business of education to arouse interest by means of ideas. This is to be done by linking new ideas to old ideas—so that the reaction is duly considered and the apperceptive attitude progressive and duly considered. "Large masses of thought" can only be aroused by concentration of objects about some central stem.

Accordingly Dr. Hayward makes it his concern to link moral instruction with biblical stories, at certain stages, and to bring these into comparison with other historical stories. Thus he suggests the history of Joseph is extremely valuable for purposes of instruction, and at certain stages, but it must be viewed under three heads: (a) moral or religious; (b) historical, geographical, archaeological; (c) literary. These different aspects of dealing with the subject, he suggests, afford "priceless opportunities of arousing interest". From the story of Joseph as a main link for concentration, Dr. Hayward passes to the life of David, but in connexion with it he thinks that the history of Alfred the Great should be taught. "There is much similarity between David and Alfred. Each is a nation's national hero. Each was a king. Each was good and great. Each had long struggles. Each was a fugitive and exile. Each had an important place, real or supposed, in literature. Each was a "harpist". Each died at the height of his power. Each ruled over a kingdom about as large as Wales, but with dependencies several times as extensive. Each handed on the kingdom to his son. Hence it is a most obvious thing to teach the history of Alfred in connexion with that of David."

Following this stage, the prophetic period of Hebrew history is to be taken along with the history of England (? down to 1660) with especial reference to biographical and literary matter. But, along with this twofold work, there should be definite lessons on such duties of citizenship as can well be treated, and also on other common duties of life. In the next stage comes the life of Christ, brought into relation with the contemporary conditions of Palestine. History is still to be taught, and ethical lessons are of vast importance.

The principle which especially underlies all this programme is that virtue can be taught. If so, there ought to be a scheme of instruction—and accordingly Dr. Hayward provides his scheme, with a view to embodying the results of the "higher criticism" of biblical contents, and adopting the biblical material for strictly pedagogic ends. There are undoubtedly many interesting suggestions in the course of the book, much that is ingenious, and much that is doubtful both for theory and practice. I do not think Dr. Hayward sufficiently realises in his treatment of the teachableness of virtue that we do not, after all, necessarily mean by "teaching," the giving of formal lessons.

No amount of knowledge of Herbartianism of itself would make a man a teacher. The wise person learns teaching by teaching. So the child acquires virtue by practising virtue. The stories of

Joseph and David, after all, can only be interpreted by the intellectual and moral consciousness of the child. On further inquiry, surely it would appear that *that* has been forming by the moral habits which he has gathered, and especially those actions which he has exercised more especially by his own choice. The Reform of Moral Education mostly comes about not by syllabuses and schemes, though these may be admirable when they are the outcome of the *experiences* of teachers, but reform rather comes from those teachers whose personality readily affects the moral attitude and habits of the children in his class—Arnold makes a moral Rugby and Thring a moral Uppingham, by inducing the environment which is fitting for giving scope to the self-active efforts which, sooner or later, from the individuals find their way into the current of good moral social habits in the school. The method that lies nearest to the personality of the teacher will have most moral effect. It is hopeless to expect every teacher to become a higher critic in theology—so as to give correct views on biblical matters. If every teacher accepted those views, and adopted, say, Dr. Hayward's Scheme of Instruction, it would only become in time the New Orthodoxy. But the passion for truth and for goodness comes not this way. The first thing is for teachers to recognise more than ever before the significance of their task, their possibilities of influence. The second is for public opinion to require from teachers such work, and such work only, as may make it practicable for each to be an effective influence on the individual child. Public opinion ought to condemn huge classes for the individual teacher, as a hindrance to moral teaching and the formation of character in the children. Fancy the moral effect of a teacher attempting to carry through the courses of lessons on the elaborate schemes of Dr. Hayward to huge classes of say sixty children! *Optimi corruptio, pessima.*

Further, I think a teacher should give of his best, and need very rarely indeed withhold the spirit of his best thoughts even from the youngest. Herbart himself says: "The child selects what suits him from what he reads, and judges the writing as well as the writer after his own fashion. The story must have one more characteristic, if its effect is to be lasting and emphatic: it must carry on its face the *strongest and clearest stamp of human greatness.*" It is necessary to protest against the tendency there is to run to excess in teaching *down* to children's capacity. Dr. Hayward, for instance, suggests that the life of Christ, if taught at all, should be taught systematically only in upper classes. "Joseph is intelligible to children, Christ is not." This seems strange pedagogy. It cannot be difficult to understand the Christ "who went about doing good," and in the strenuousness of his task "had not where to lay his head". It is so often urged that Christ had no philosophical system to propose, that it is curious to find that the lover of children, of the fields, the hill-sides, the flowers and of birds is incomprehensible. It is like the Froebelian excess that demands

silly, stupid rhymes, so as to reach the incapacity of childhood. It is necessary to refer the Herbartian to Herbart. "The whole look of a well-trained boy is directed above himself, and when eight years old his entire line of vision extends beyond all histories of children. . . . You will not find the boy's ideal in your own imagination, for that is full of pedagogic ideas, full of your experiences, knowledge and personal affairs."

There is need for Reform in all Education. There is no subject which is taught thoroughly satisfactorily in the elementary school—universally and in accordance with educational principles. But education is a whole, a complex whole. Moral training is not merely the outcome of didactics, but it is due to many influences—home and neighbourhood as well as the school. The methods of reform are a rising consciousness of the responsibility of adults, especially parents, to children. Yet, probably, on the didactic side, there is no education which has been more thorough in many cases than the religious education given by the mothers to their children and the moral education of the home life. The teaching of children in religious material, especially in the history of the noblest spiritual and social developments, will probably with the advance of general education reach deeper into the Church and the Home. The training to accuracy in thought and statement, the intelligent interest in some of the great things of the world, and above all a truer and more sympathetic instruction with regard to the grander personalities and simpler phenomena of our earthly environment, together with a race of teachers trained for their work, more alive to its intrinsic significance, more actively free from traditions (which the professional spirit of inquiry characterising other professions, say, surgical science, can alone give), together with properly considered conditions of effective influence (*e.g.*, numbers in a school class)—these things will make for the Reform of Moral and Religious Education. Reformed Syllabuses in accordance with the most eclectic Higher Criticism will avail little in comparison with what old Samuel Hartlib called "Reformed Schoolmasters". The generation in which these shall arise will above all things need freedom, and in all subjects they will need the most freedom in the moral and religious education. I agree with Dr. Hayward: Virtue can be taught. But the teaching implies well-equipped teachers. And just in proportion to the excellence of their equipment there is the less need for Dr. Hayward's scheme as a general proposal. But without such a high intellectual and moral equipment in the teacher, even the writer's interesting and sometimes happy suggestions are unavailing.

Dr. Hayward's book is written *fortiter in re*, but not *suaviter in modo*. The style, and often lack of style, will irritate; and what is unfortunate may deter some readers from giving the book its due consideration. There is much enthusiasm in it. It is a serious book, though oftentimes it lacks the dignity the subject-matter deserves.

The construction of the book reveals considerable irresolution—as to inclusion and exclusion. It is not clear, at times, whether the writer appeals to the managers of schools, teachers or the general public. He terms his own book “272 pages of arrogant audacity,” although there are only 248 pages including the Index. So the volume gives a feeling of haste and a certain carelessness of production. But it is a real pleasure to add in speaking of Dr. Hayward's book that it embodies deep educational convictions, forcibly stated, well exemplified, and important for consideration.

FOSTER WATSON.

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*L'Étude Expérimentale de l'Intelligence*. Par ALFRED BINET.  
Paris: Schleicher Frères et Cie, 1903. Pp. 309.

THIS work marks, in the opinion of the author, a new departure in the experimental study of mind. Its methods of experiment are indeed those of modern psychophysics, but the emphasis is laid, not so much on the measurement or tabulation of the results obtained, as on the subject's account of how these results are arrived at, drawn out by judicious questioning on the part of the operator. The processes which are studied belong without exception to the higher types of mental functioning,—the mode of ideation, the relation between word and idea, or between image and thought, the nature of abstract thought, the varieties of mental type which are brought out in the description of objects, the construction of phrases, the copying of models, etc., etc. A great variety of tests are employed, and M. Binet is emphatic upon the necessity of co-ordinating many tests in order to determine either the mental type or the degree of development of a given individual. Among these tests are the writing of series of twenty words, as they occur to the subject, the associating of an idea with a word uttered by the experimenter, the forming and modifying of an image or mental picture at the suggestion of the operator, the writing of series of phrases, the description of objects, repetition of numbers, learning verses by heart, appreciating spatial and temporal positions and intervals. In all cases the significance of the results is tested by a careful inquiry into the idea or thought of which the word written or the movement made by the subject is an expression.

In the main the work is a study of two broadly contrasted types of mental character. Binet's older subject, M., is of a practical, matter-of-fact, unreflective nature; the other, A., is imaginative, given to reverie, to thoughts detached from her everyday life. One of the most interesting portions of the work is that which analyses the series of words given by M. and by A. respectively,—with regard to the kind of idea underlying each word. (1) The more imaginative A. has a greater number of words of which she afterwards can

give no account, "unexplained words,"—pointing to a greater mental automatism, inertia, readiness to be distracted. (2) The number of words relating to present objects, or to the subject's own person, is much larger for M. than for A.,—showing a greater tendency in the former to occupy herself with the actual world about her. (3) Similarly, M. has a greater number of words derived from recollections of actual facts or experiences, and while the memories of M. refer almost wholly to recent experiences, those of A. refer to more distant events. M.'s memory-world is simply a prolongation of the actual present world, from which she is unable to cast herself loose. (4) Of *abstractions*, on the other hand, *i.e.*, vague, indistinct ideas, referring to an object, but not to any particular individualised object,—and of *imaginings*, fictitious experiences, A. has by far the greater number. Corresponding to this difference in mental contents is a difference in vocabulary; thus M. gives nothing but substantives, while A. has also a few verbs, adverbs, adjectives: in social value the words of M. are commonplace, ordinary; those of A., in many cases, unfamiliar, far-fetched. Since the environment of the two girls was identically the same, these facts point to the influence of selective thought, even at this early stage of life (the subjects were twelve and fourteen years of age). Where the associations by which the mind passed from one idea to another could be recalled, those of M. were found to be mainly through contiguity in space—external; those of A. through resemblance, or logical connexion—internal. Hence in M. an entire absence of spontaneity or originality, in contrast with A.

The further tests at once confirm and give precision to the first. The imagery of M. is proved to have far greater intensity and liveliness than that of A., showing that the power of creative imagination does not necessarily imply a great intensity of mental images in other domains. In M.'s case the effacement of the images is rigorously a function of the time elapsed since the actual experiences, whereas in A.'s there is much greater irregularity in this respect. Again (ch. ix.) A. proves to have little or no power over her mental imagery,—she cannot represent things "to order". According to her own account, it is chance that dictates what she is to see; whereas M. is able to realise any suggested representation, whether the idea comes from herself or from M. Binet. The succession of images with A. is extremely rapid, varied, disconnected,—like a series of "dissolving views,"—that of M. monotonous: she is able to see what she pleases, but the image does not change, unless she herself wills it to change. The phrases written by M. (ch. x.) have *les pieds par terre*, and represent either very recent memories or reflexions on recent facts, while those of A. are poetical, imaginative, picturesque. In their description of objects, pictures, etc. (ch. xi.), M. belongs to the *descriptive* type: she gives a series of minute observations upon the object before her, without reasoning, selection, imagination or feeling: while A. must be classed here also



as an *imaginative*; she gives fewer details, but these are subordinated to some general idea, by which their selection is determined. In the more technical tests on Attention, Reaction-Time, Memory, A is invariably inferior in accuracy, speed, or both, except when the case is one of *pure memory*: as a plastic force her memory is not more feeble than that of M., what is more feeble is the power of *voluntary, i.e., strained, attention*. Thus she recalls a number of detached words as well, a verse of poetry not nearly so well as M. Her sense of position or length of interval in time is superior to that of M., with whom *per contra* the sense of spatial position is more accurate,—facts pointing again to the predominance in the one of the inward-turning, in the other of the outward-facing life. From this point of view the work is a valuable contribution to individual psychology.

From the standpoint of general psychology there are some interesting suggestions. The fourth chapter contains a curious renunciation from the empirical side of the Association of Ideas: "The existence of themes of thought (as brought out in the experiment of words written at random) is inexplicable by the automatism of associations; . . . that a theme may develop, there must be an appropriation of ideas, a work of choice and rejection which far surpasses the resources of association. The latter is intelligent only when directed; left to itself . . . it can produce only incoherence, as in the words of a maniac or the kaleidoscopic images of reverie". The whole tendency of the work is to lower the value of the *image* in mental life. Thus in chapter vi. it is shown that a precise thought may be formed on hearing a word without any appreciable image, even an image of the mere word, arising. The attempt to form an image often comes after the precise thought itself, and often fails in its end; it would be impossible from the mere images to reconstruct the thought. "The image is only a small part of the phenomenon to which the name of thought is given: the facility with which one may describe the mental image . . . is what has caused illusion as to its importance" (p. 103). It is a curious irony of fate that actual experiment should have led to the distinction—in an empirical school—between an intellectual *act* (understanding, comparing, affirming, denying, etc.) and an *image* or representation. "Thought is an unconscious act of the mind, which has need of words and images to become fully conscious. But, however hard it is to represent to ourselves a thought without the help of words and images, and it is for this reason only that I call it unconscious—it exists none the less, it constitutes, if we would define it by its function, a directive, organising force" (p. 108). In another chapter (ch. viii.) the nature of abstract thought is considered in the light of this new material: where, on a word being given, either an image does not rise at all or does so only to pass immediately out of the mind, we have not 'abstract,' but 'indeterminate' thought, a thought arrested in its development. M.

Binet has grave doubts as to the existence of Huxley's 'composite' or 'generic' image : even of very familiar persons his subjects had merely a succession of quite definite images, which did not fuse together (*cf.* p. 149). Another form of the general idea is where "the image is not precise, and it is its lack of precision which prevents our relating it to an anterior event, or particularising it". Such general *images*, however, do not constitute general *thoughts*. M. Binet would add a new word to the vocabulary of theories of abstraction,—"*Intentionism*". "The thought of the general comes from a direction of thought towards the totality of things, it is, taking the word in its etymological sense, an *intention* of the mind" (p. 154). These views are of course far from unfamiliar to English readers, it is their setting that makes them interesting.

J. LEWIS MCINTYRE.

## VI.—NEW BOOKS.

*Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Culture.* By G. M. STRATTON.  
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1903.

THIS work is an appeal to the general reader in philosophy. Its aim is "to present the character and value of the laboratory psychology, especially as bearing upon our moral and philosophical interests". A brief sketch of the history of the attempt to apply experimental methods to the study of mind is followed by a chapter on the function of experiment in psychology, and one on the possibility of mental measurement. In the later chapters such topics are discussed as—the Unconscious in Mind, Illusions, the Perception of Space and of Time, *Æsthetics* and the Relation of Mind to Body. The conclusions in each case are based upon experiments described, and are such as uncontrolled introspection of itself could not have verified. Perhaps no very striking conclusions or suggestions are reached, but the evidence given is always full, and the questions are discussed fairly and from different sides. Mr. Stratton decides in favour of unconscious factors in mental life on the ground of familiar experiments on discrimination. "If we compare 100 with 102 grammes, we find that they give absolutely indistinguishable intensities of pressure; so too if we compare 102 grammes with 104." But "the first and third weights are under suitable conditions clearly distinguishable. And from this we may assure ourselves that the sensations arising from 100 and 102 grammes are really different, although the difference is imperceptible. For, if they were identical they would behave alike." Neither this nor any other instance given seems able to bear the interpretation put upon it. No sensation has ever an absolute value in itself as this theory supposes. The transition from 100 to 104 conditions a *feeling* which is not present in the other cases, and it is by this feeling that we are guided in our "discrimination". We need not suppose the existence of "dim sensations, subtle variations in the strength and quality of certain constituents, which, minute and imperceptible though they be, are sufficient to destroy the equilibrium and produce a transformation of the whole state". The classification of Illusions in the sixth chapter would perhaps hardly stand the test of logic;—the classes are (1) illusions from spontaneous sensations; (2) illusions from stress of attention; (3) illusions due to fixity of interpretation or "custom". But all alike are ultimately explained as errors of interpretation, *i.e.*, as mental in their origin, differing from perceptions only in their disagreement or want of harmony with the body of our experience as a whole. Even those illusions which we cannot correct in sensuous experience, *e.g.*, the Poggendorf, point to "deep-seated mental habits, lying beyond the control of our will, and even to a large extent beyond the influence of logical evidence" (p. 117). Perhaps here

also too great stress is laid upon the mental factor; but the chapter is interestingly written.

Considering the general tendency of the work, it is surprising to meet statements recalling a much more popular psychology, such as that the mind "receives only indirect reports of what is going on without," as if the mind were somehow shut up within the brain: again wonder is expressed "that we can accurately tell not only the direction but also the ever-changing distance from which sensations come through the rods and cones of the eyes".

The chapters on Space-perception (chapters vii. and viii.) contain an account of various experiments on the blind, and of others on a normal subject who wore lenses which caused the image on the retina to be "upright" instead of "inverted," and the like,—showing (1) that touch and sight alike give a knowledge of space; (2) that the harmony between visual and tactual space is entirely a result of experience; and (3) that what we call the experience of "real" space is "a kind of idealisation or purified experience obtained after sifting out and discarding those perceptions that are practically unreliable". Two chapters on Memory (chapters ix. and x.) suggest a phase through which psychology is passing, that of the decline of the *image*. Stress is no longer laid on the substantial images of memory, so much as on memory as a function, an activity. Mr. Stratton regards "conscious recall" as a relatively unimportant fact in memory; in dating an event, it is rather "a feeling for the intelligibility of the memory-system as a whole—a sense of the impossibility of understanding our past unless its order is thus and so," that determines us,—not the conscious recall of the position of the event in our lives and its accompanying circumstances. Mere persistence of an act or of the underlying disposition is far more important, and it is this persistence that determines development and that is the source of personal continuity. "Instead of our being the slaves of what we recall, our character itself largely determines what shall be remembered and what we shall forget": and at the higher stages of mental life memory is replaced by insight and reason. The whole discussion is valuable. Chapter xi., on Imitation and Suggestion, also reveals in a striking way the author's tendency to enhance the import of individuality, mental activity, selection, as against the mere passive reciprocity of sensations or images (suggestions). The following chapter, on the Enjoyment of Sensations and their primary forms, treads more debatable ground, but here also Mr. Stratton's guidance is pre-eminently safe. Apparently simple explanations, such as that of "muscular sensations," are rightly rejected, and a number of the complex conditions that enter into play are pointed out.

In chapter xiii., while considering the various theories as to the connexion between mind and body, Mr. Stratton rejects parallelism as inconsistent with sense-perception and evolution, and decides for some form of "interaction," without prejudice to the law of Conservation of Energy. "The influence of the mind might be, not to add to the energy of the brain in any way, but simply to redistribute it, to change the form of the energy already there." One may doubt whether this conception will prove satisfactory to the physicist, or whether it is consistent with the main conclusion of the work itself, *viz.*: "The ascendant view (of the soul), and the one that seems to me by far the more convincing, is that sensations and judgments and memories, and all things else in our mental life, are to be conceived, not as self-complete and relatively independent things, but as acts of a living being". "We do not have to choose between persons and law, but personality itself is

the most perfect example of law." The work admirably illustrates the fact that one may be an experimental psychologist and yet hold the most spiritual view of the nature and worth of the soul.

J. LEWIS MCINTYRE.

*A Study in the Psychology of Ethics.* By DAVID IRONS. Edinburgh and London: Wm. Blackwood & Sons, 1903. Pp. xviii, 176.

In this volume Mr. Irons makes a timely and able contribution to his subject. His treatment is thoroughly methodical and workmanlike, and, though at times rather abstract and unattractive in style, has the important virtues of clearness and brevity. The discussion falls into two halves. In the first the author seeks to establish positively and critically a certain view of the nature of Emotion, and analyses the various kinds of emotion, with their conditions and effects. The analysis of the emotions shows that they presuppose certain active principles or tendencies, and from this result he proceeds in the second half of the book to develop in broad outline a view of man's active and moral nature generally.

With Mr. Irons's general view of the nature of Emotion (in which, by the way, he seems to have the support of Prof. Stout's *Manual*) the readers of *MIND* are already familiar. He has here revised and expanded his argument, but although he states his case forcibly from his own point of view, it is not likely that he will produce much conviction among the adversaries, partly because he does not seem to do full justice to their views. His positive contention in chapter i. is summed up as follows: "Emotion is not only introspectively distinct from cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, but has, in addition to its unique character as a conscious fact, definite conditions of its own and other features absolutely peculiar to itself. It is, therefore, unanalysable and irreducible, and must be regarded as an ultimate and primary aspect of mind" (p. 39). But to this conclusion it still seems possible to object, first, that a mental state may have a peculiar character and definite conditions of its own, and yet be complex and capable of analysis; second, that even if it be shown—as Mr. Irons is mainly engaged in showing in chapter i.—that emotion is different from cognition, pleasure-pain, etc., *taken separately*, this does not go very far to prove that the emotional state is not a complex of such elements taken together. Mr. Irons follows up his positive argument with an examination of "Current Theories of Emotion" (chap. ii.). He repeats his criticism of James's theory, but one cannot help feeling that he still fails to do it justice. *E.g.*, he still objects that the identification of emotion proper with organic sensation "reduces emotion to a form of cognition," whereas it is surely evident that the sensations in question are, *as constituents of emotion*, "anoetic". In chapter iii. Mr. Irons analyses in a most careful and painstaking way the various kinds of emotion and the species that may be distinguished within each kind. Naturally there is much in this detailed analysis that might be discussed, but perhaps the most important point to notice is that Mr. Irons seems to confine emotion almost exclusively to the higher levels of mental life, and to make it depend too much on intellectual processes. He had already, in fact, asserted that "every emotion presupposes a judgment by means of which the situation [or object] is brought under a general category" (p. 16). And now we find it stated, *e.g.*, that "while actions of rejection or avoidance may be developed as instincts at a low stage of mental development, the emotion of repugnance depends upon a sense of what is 'natural' and the reverse. An object cannot possibly appear as repulsive, unless it is viewed in its

relation to some system or order, however dimly that may be conceived" (p. 101).

The point is worth emphasising because it is of emotion at these higher levels that Mr. Irons can argue in the second half of the book that it presupposes certain natural impulses or active tendencies from a perceived relation to which the object of the emotion derives its emotional significance, *e.g.*, we are angry when we see some particular activity of self-assertion interfered with. Having shown in chapter iv. that such primary (and non-hedonic) impulses must be assumed, Mr. Irons proceeds in chapter v. to examine them more in detail, and then to argue in his final chapter that the regulation of all these impulses, and therefore of the active life as a whole, depends upon a supreme controlling impulse, *viz.*, the moral impulse to realise an ideal of worth. A fault of this second half of the book, and one which makes criticism difficult, is that the argument is too briefly and rapidly developed. Especially is this true of the last chapter, in which the author touches in a rather inadequate way upon a number of fundamental ethical questions. Consequently it is not easy to know exactly what the final position of the book amounts to either in terms of psychology or of ethics. *E.g.*, the moral impulse seems to be sharply separated from Reason, so sharply indeed that one suspects that the latter notion is interpreted in a rather narrow and external sense (*cf.* the reference to Hume on p. 139). And yet the author's ethical theory seems not to be so very different in its outcome from a Self-realisation theory like Green's, which would take Reason for its watchword. And from a psychological point of view one feels that the author operates too widely and loosely with the notion of natural impulses or active tendencies (like James's "instincts"). So long as he is simply opposing psychological hedonism—and his whole line of argument combats it very effectively—this vagueness is of less consequence. But on the constructive side it is a defect that makes itself felt, although no doubt the special interest in the psychology of emotion with which Mr. Irons entered on his inquiry may justify his method.

H. BARKER.

*History of Philosophy.* By WILLIAM TURNER, S.T.D. Boston and London: Ginn & Co., The Athenæum Press, 1903. Pp. 674.

The clear type of the Athenæum Press answers well to the clearness of thought and arrangement which this work displays. It is a handy volume of reference. The author is apparently a Roman Catholic priest. A history of philosophy cannot be composed except upon some groundwork which the writer himself holds. Dr. Turner evidently has his preferences. He prefers the philosophy of the great schoolmen of the thirteenth century. But a spirit of kindness and fair-dealing pervades the work. No school of thinkers is treated with contempt. There is no bitterness in the book. Hegel is well appreciated, and a kind word is found for Spinoza, for Abelard, for Scotus Erigena. To Hobbes Dr. Turner scarcely does justice, either to the intellectual strength, or to the clearness of thought and style which marks that Titan of English philosophy. Hobbes's use, or rather misuse, of terms comes not from any haziness of conception, as Dr. Turner rather insinuates: his terms are the exact expression of his audacity and originality. But on the whole the good thing about Dr. Turner's book is its scholarly justice and comprehensiveness. Beginning with Egyptian sun-worship, and ending with pragmatism, it recognises the importance of every phase of thought that the human mind has gone through. The author does not believe—

can any one seriously believe?—that the progress of philosophy has been “a triumphal march from victory to victory, through province after province of newly acquired truth, without a single reverse, without ever retreating from territory once fairly won”. A straight line is far too simple an expression for the mazy march of philosophy.

The History of Scholastic Philosophy from Erigena to Aquinas is now an optional subject in the Oxford Final Schools. This work would well serve any one who wished to take up that subject. The account given of Erigena is singularly lucid and interesting. A feature in the book is the “Historical Position” assigned to each great writer, showing his influence in determining the course of speculation. The Historical Position of Erigena is thus described: “He was, without doubt, the most learned man of his century, he was the first of the representatives of the new learning to attempt a system of constructive thought, and he brought to his task a truly Celtic wealth of imagination and a spiritual force which lifted him above the plane of his contemporaries,—mere epitomisers and commentators. His philosophy has all the charm which pantheism always possesses for a certain class of minds. It is subtle, vague, and poetic. When we come to examine its contents and method, we find that it is dominated by the spirit of Neo-Platonism. Through the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus, Erigena made acquaintance with the teachings of Plotinus and Proclus; and when he came to construct his own system of thought, he reproduced the essential traits of Neo-Platonic philosophy,—pantheism, the doctrine of intuition, mysticism, and universal redemption. The work *De Divisione Nature* was condemned in 1225. Its heterodoxy is undeniable; yet we cannot doubt the sincerity of Erigena’s devotion to the truth of Catholic dogma. He was, as Anastasius, the Roman librarian, described him, *Vir per omnia sanctus*. Perhaps his attitude towards dogmatic truth is best described in the words of Gale, who first published the *De Divisione Nature*: *Potuit ergo errare; hæreticus esse noluit.*”

JOSEPH RICKABY.

*Aristotle on Education. Being Extracts from the Ethics and Politics.*  
Translated and Edited by JOHN BURNET, Professor of Greek in the  
United College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews.  
Cambridge: At the University Press.

The passages rendered in this volume are taken from Books I.-III. and X. of the *Ethics*; from Books VII. and VIII. of the *Politics*.

In the Prospectus of the series in which this book appears, we are told that “care will be taken to combine a high standard of excellence with adaptation to the practical needs of those for whom the series is intended”. The series is designed, we are further told, to meet the needs of pupil-teachers and candidates for certificates. As to the needs of pupil-teachers, and the students in the Elementary Teachers’ Training Colleges, such a book as this would be a hard nut to crack. The high standard of excellence however aimed at in the series is undoubtedly more than maintained by this volume. Indeed for the student in training for Secondary School teaching who has already had a fair grounding in Philosophy this work will be excellent. We do not doubt, further, that many philosophical students will find it valuable reading for the useful hints as to the comparison of the main positions of Aristotle and Plato, especially when Prof. Burnet states his views of the essential unity of the two great Greek thinkers on fundamental points. Prof. Burnet has done a great service to the subject of Education by his critical exposition



of Aristotle's educational principles. The service is all the more pronounced, because the mastery of his book will involve some preparatory philosophical training and due application if the student is going to make the most of it. It is precisely this type of work that is wanted to stimulate the would-be teacher, at an advanced period of his training. For the relation of Education to Ethics on the one hand and Politics on the other (if Ethics and Politics are taken in the Aristotelian meaning of the terms) is as much a problem of the present age as it was a problem for Aristotle. The study of a book like this takes us to the root of the matter. Aristotle's treatment is not only important from the mastership in thought which he has exercised over the mediæval and modern philosophers, but also from the significance of his actual answers to the problems raised. Prof. Burnet saves the student from searching through Hatch and Welldon to collect Aristotle's passages on Education. He translates, and where necessary expounds the passages, gives interesting and enlightening notes, and keeps an eye on the comparison with Plato, and he does all this with the keenness and attractiveness of a scholar. Further, he shows that Aristotle has a real and direct meaning for present-day educational ideals. No one can follow the significance of the idea of the highest aim of education as the preparation for the right enjoyment of leisure without recognising, as Prof. Burnet suggests, that the Aristotelian Gospel of Leisure does not ordinarily receive its due attention in the modern reaction from a strenuous Gospel of Work. We fall back on mere excitement and amusement. With a scholar's enthusiasm, he assures us: "It is from the Greeks that we can best learn the cause and cure of these ills". Thus it is not only the teacher who is a classicist who will welcome Prof. Burnet's book. It is simple justice to say that this little book has a message quite as direct and significant to the teacher of science and of technical subjects as to the classicist, if he takes a broad view of Education. Moreover, Prof. Burnet writes in a direct, simple, terse style which draws the attention to the subject-matter, and keeps the sense of effort and labour expended on his translation in the background. It is an excellent subject of study for the senior student in the subject of Education.

FOSTER WATSON.

*Aristotle's Psychology: a Treatise on the Principle of Life. De Anima and Parva Naturalia.* Translated with introduction and notes by W. A. HAMMOND, M.A., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy in Cornell University. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1902. Pp. lxxxviii, 339.

Prof. Hammond's first aim is to supply an accessible version of the treatises known as Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. He adds the *de Anima* that 'English readers' may possess the whole of Aristotle's psychology between two covers. That he quaintly also claims to have served 'research,' and specifically that of the future writer of 'an adequate history of psychology,' in that he has increased the available 'primary sources,' must be set down to the score of amiable delusion.

The prelude to Dr. Hammond's versions has apparently in part seen the light in the shape of magazine articles. It is painstaking enough, and, if we take it as no more than an introduction to a translation, it is on the whole adequate.

The translation is of very variable quality indeed. The English reader who receives, through a medium not always to be styled the diaphanous, the matter without the form of Aristotle's cryptic utterances, will perhaps

be as often edified as puzzled or misled. The latter events are, however, one may venture to think, not rendered sufficiently exceptional. *E.g.*, 426, *b*, 26, where we trust we do not wrong Prof. Hammond in suspecting a gross blunder. Or again, 427, *a*, 8: 'it is not possible for even the forms of experience to undergo these opposites, if sensation and thought be such forms'. Or once more 429, *a*, 20: 'it is the nature of thought to preclude and restrain the element that is foreign and adjacently seen'.

The *de Anima*, however, is so well served with aids, that even the English reader is relatively independent of Prof. Hammond's guidance. There are other crutches after all. What then of the *Parva Naturalia*?

Here too Dr. Hammond is quite often sound and lucid. But he is also far too frequently obscure or unsound. If we look even hurriedly and superficially at the *de Sensu*—one of the treatises for which Dr. Ogle's learning is not available—we may note 440, *a*, 5 *sq.*, 444, *a*, 1 *sq.*, for mistranslation; 446, *b*, 10 *sqq.*, for obscurity to the verge of the unintelligible. In cap. i. alone, there is a confusion of 'animal' and 'living creature' repeated; there is a maltreated *σχεδόν*, 436, *a*, 10; there is a suspicious 'individually,' *ib.*, *b*, 12. In 446, *a*, the more than reiterated 'excessively small' in translating *ὑπεροχῇ* is unhappy. The 'were' of 438, *a*, 28, and the 'how far' of 448, *b*, 7, are also improper, each in its kind.

It would be no difficult task to furnish a like list for other treatises, *e.g.*, for that 'On Dreams'. Now such slips taken singly are—some of them at least—of trifling enough significance. But if cumulatively they drive us with some frequency to the Greek in order to help out the English, what becomes of Dr. Hammond's 'English readers'? Where original and version reciprocate assistance, we have the time-honoured 'crib'.

HERBERT W. BLUNT.

*Heredity and Social Progress.* By S. N. PATTEN. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. vii, 214. Price \$1.25.

The problem of this little book, so far as the reviewer is able to understand it, runs somewhat as follows. There is a constant diminution of natural returns, due to the spread of population, the denuding forces of nature, etc. Even wealth and the products of wealth are impermanent; very little of our material environment has come down from the past. How, then, is progress possible? Only in this way: that the 'social surplus,' the temporary product of conscious effort from year to year, be transformed into permanent mental traits,—in biological language, that acquired characters become natural.

The problem is attacked from four directions. Progress must be regarded as starting, not from a deficit, as current biology and classical economics teach, but from a surplus. Human progress moves, not by addition to the elements of cell life, but by differentiation. Education must be brought to bear upon acquired characters: the one type or sex should be educated along lines on which a mere awakening suffices for the other. Reform should be directed, not towards strengthening the strong, but towards helping the weak.

"The principles here enunciated," says the author, "have not always been clearly seen by me." They will certainly not be clearly seen by the reader. The whole book rests on a crude parallelism of the biological and the sociological, and some of the arguments are fanciful in the extreme. "A brain is thus an enclosed ovary. . . . The enclosed ovary

is of the opposite sex to the exposed ovary, and hence beings manifest mentally the characteristics of the opposite sex from what they are physically." "Idealism is the activity of a disrupted despecialised centre." "Sensation is the utilisation of disused motor organs for the purpose of receiving impressions." "Civilised men are good thinkers, the women of their race have strong wills: and education must give decision to men and clear thought to women."

The author may be doing good service by challenging accepted dogma. But one cannot resist the idea that in many paragraphs he is writing simple nonsense.

E. B. T.

*Existence, Meaning and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology.*

By A. W. MOORE. Chicago: University Press, 1903. Pp. 25.

Though there are many things to admire in Mr. Moore's essay, his mode of presentation is not one of them. He has too much the air of conducting a clever disputation with Locke, Kant and Prof. Royce, a disputation in which all the transitions are slurred, his opponents' replies conveyed by hints and allusions, and the drift of his own argument concealed until half-way on in the essay. Not for the first time do we trace the baleful influence of Mr. George Meredith on philosophical exposition. The main problem of the essay is to be discovered in an unemphatic sentence on page 14: "It would seem that the root of the central difficulty in present logic might be stated as the failure thus far to work out the implications of the thoroughly teleological and functional idea which it has accepted from modern psychology". To this working out the present essay is a very interesting contribution. Its chief conclusions are that reality and truth are not static and immutable, but always have reference to the needs and interests of the subject; and that thought has as its function not so much the representing of reality as the creating of it. Such speculations as these undoubtedly tend in the right direction. The idea of the creativeness of thought, in particular, has a great future. The only danger is lest those who are pushing forward on this path should tend to forget that thought, however creative, cannot create out of nothing; and that objective reality, though not at all static or immutable, sets definite limits to all human creative activity.

H. S.

*Biographic Clinics.* By G. M. GOULD. Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son & Co., 1903. Pp. 223. Price, \$1.00.

The main thesis of this little book is that the chronic ill-health of De Quincey, Carlyle, Darwin, Huxley and Browning, "by whatever name they described their complaint, headache, vertigo, biliousness, dyspepsia, apathy, misery, was closely and inevitably consequent upon use of the eyes in reading and writing, and was relieved by stopping such use," and was further, so far as the recorded symptoms allow us to judge, the direct effect of eye-strain. The reader's first impression is, of course, that the writer is a specialist and is riding his specialist's hobby to death. The 'clinics' are, however, carefully and skilfully worked up; the diagnoses are made cautiously, and always in the light of concurrent evidence from the author's practice; and the reviewer's final verdict may be stated in the author's own language. "This theory is at least a working hypothesis, and as there is admittedly no other scientific aetiology of these

affections worth consideration, and no cure that cures, it behoves the entire profession to test the hypothesis most seriously and vigorously." Whether or not these five men of genius were suffering simply and solely from asymmetrical astigmatism, they undoubtedly showed the organic symptoms that follow from that functional disorder. And the writer's advice that every one who is steadily using his eyes should have them examined periodically, under mydriasis, by an expert refractionist—not by the 'refracting optician,' who sells spectacle lenses—is eminently sane.

E. B. T.

*Ancient European Philosophy.* By D. J. SNIDER, Litt.D. St. Louis: Sigma Publishing Co., 1903. Pp. 730.

Mr. Snider, with whose writings I have no previous acquaintance, but who appears to be a most voluminous and versatile author, treats of Greek Philosophy in this bulky volume much in the spirit—and the rather cryptic style—of Hegel. Readers who care to watch the stretching of historical fact upon the Procrustean bed of the triadic 'dialectical process' will find in this volume the kind of thing they like; for my own part, it seems to me that Mr. Snider fails, in his anxiety to make history confirm his speculative metaphysics of the 'world-process,' to grasp the real significance of Greek Philosophy as a stage in the evolution of reasoned science. He appears, too, very imperfectly informed of the important additions to our knowledge, especially of the earlier Greek schools, which have been made in recent years by such scholars as Diels, Bäumker, Burnet and Tannery. And where, might I ask, did he learn the really astonishing fact that Aristotle identified the "essence of being" with *νοησις νοησεως*?

A. E. TAYLOR.

*Opusculs et Fragments Inédits de Leibniz extraits de la Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre.* Par LOUIS COUTURAT, Chargé de Cours à l'Université de Toulouse. Paris: Alcan, 1903. Pp. xvi, 682.

The present collection of texts is, in the main, supplementary to M. Couturat's *La Logique de Leibniz*, which has already been noticed at length in *MIND* (N.S., No. 46). The importance of the new manuscripts may be gauged by the reconstruction of Leibniz's philosophy to which they have led their editor. The editing, as far as can be judged without seeing the MSS., is unusually careful; the changes and corrections made by Leibniz are noted, from which (as is pointed out in the Preface) it becomes possible to watch the "passionate and almost dramatic" development of his thought. The Preface contains an eloquent appeal to the International Association of Academies, which has undertaken to make a new edition of Leibniz, not to repeat the error of publishing only a selection. In this respect, what M. Couturat says is most weighty, and ought to command the assent of all Leibniz-students. So many of his fragmentary attempts have been found to contain the germs of important subjects, that no editor can lightly assume the responsibility of rejecting anything. Also the very brief notes, which were written down in odd moments (once, at least, on the back of a hotel bill), contain often, as M. Couturat points out, very clear and yet very condensed statements of his views on fundamental points; moreover they are apt to concern real difficulties in his system, and to face these without the tiresome verbiage of piety in which he clothed his public

utterances. Such fragments, therefore, are most specially worthy of publication.

It is also urged in the Preface that no classification except a chronological one should be adopted. Certainly the habit of divorcing Leibniz's mathematics and philosophy is unfortunate—indeed, it would seem, more generally, that the modern practice of separating these two studies is a disaster to both. And in the case of Leibniz it is pointed out that his thoughts were so encyclopædic, and so dominated by the attempt to bring all sciences within one system, as to make all classification by subjects necessarily a mutilation.

The body of the work contains much matter of the highest interest in regard to the grounds of Leibniz's views; and a good deal of what is now published for the first time seems at least equal, in philosophical importance, to anything in previous editions. This applies especially to the work called *Generales Inquisitiones de Analyti Notionum et Veritatum*, written at the same time as the *Discours de Métaphysique*. This work oscillates between Philosophy and Symbolic Logic, making the interconnexion of the two quite remarkably visible. Also one sees Leibniz apparently thinking of some of his main ideas for the first time, trying and testing them. Notably the theory of contingency as infinite complexity results very naturally from the purely logical test of the true as that in whose analysis there are no contradictory ingredients (p. 370 ff.); where analysis can be continued indefinitely, the test becomes inapplicable unless by a mind which can complete an infinite process. The notion of the individual developed in the correspondence with Arnauld seems also to have its origin in Symbolic Logic (cf. p. 375 ff.).

The book ends with the "Pacidius Philalethi" in full, of which fragments were published by Gerhardt. This is an important dialogue on motion and change, written in 1676, deducing from Zeno-esque arguments such conclusions as that space is not composed of points and that motion is a kind of transcreation, and ending with something very like occasionalism. The difficulties in the notion of change are admirably stated.

It is quite impossible to do justice to the many important matters contained in this collection; on Symbolic Logic and on the indefinables of philosophy, especially, much new light is thrown by M. Couturat's labours. But his own work on Leibniz's Logic has so admirably pounded the conclusions which follow from the texts, that there is no need for the reviewer to dwell upon this subject further than to say that, in my opinion, the new material compels the acceptance of many of M. Couturat's most startling conclusions, and enables us (what was impossible before) to form a fairly clear idea of the Encyclopædia, the *Scientia Generalis*, and the Formal Logic which Leibniz all his life endeavoured to create.

B. RUSSELL.

*Essai Philosophique sur les Géométries non-Euclidiennes.* Par L. J. DELAPORTE, Docteur en Philosophie de l'Université de Fribourg (Suisse), Licencié ès Sciences Mathématiques. Paris: C. Naud, 1903. Pp. 139.

This work contains a more or less popular account and criticism of non-Euclidean Geometry; the authors chiefly defended or combated are Renouvier, Delboeuf, Lechalas and Calinon. Besides an introduction and a conclusion, there are five chapters, on history (slight, but good), on mathematical considerations, on geometrical space, on the definition

of the straight line, and on the fourth dimension. There is a useful appendix, setting forth side by side the elementary points of agreement and difference between Euclid, Lobatchewsky and Riemann; there is also a bibliography, in which, however, no mention is made of the Italians (notably Peano and Pieri). The book suffers from an undue neglect of projective considerations, and from a certain contempt for the analysis of complex notions (such as surface or volume) which the ignorant (whom philosophers deify as Common Sense) are inclined to regard as simple. The author rather rashly identifies a great circle in a Euclidean space with a straight line in a spherical space—an identification which, if made at all, requires a far greater abandonment of "intuition" than he is prepared for. Also he errs in attributing "curvature" to non-Euclidean straight lines; and it would seem a pity to object to non-Euclid on the ground of lack of intuitiveness, without discussing what intuition is, or endeavouring to appreciate the reasons which have led mathematicians more and more to care only for logical rigour. The old error that Helmholtz's flatland and sphereland were intended (in spite of his explicit denial) to suggest a fourth dimension, not merely other three-dimensional spaces, is repeated once more in this book. But in spite of these errors, the book will be found instructive, in regard to the older phases of non-Euclidean Geometry, by those who have no previous knowledge of the subject.

B. RUSSELL.

*Die Willensfreiheit. Eine neue Antwort auf eine alte Frage.* Dr. ADOLF BOLLIGER. Berlin: Reimer, 1903. Pp. viii, 125.

Prof. Bolliger's essay was submitted two years ago to the Hague Society for the defence of the Christian religion, where it won distinction, if not the prize. The thesis for the competition was a wordy one, as to whether Indeterminism, as defined in Kant's transcendental freedom of will, was borne out by the testimony of subjective experience (*Seelenleben*), and by recent science. The author, who writes throughout genially and with the style of an interesting preacher, first rejects Kant as a true representative of Indeterminism. He then argues for the real existence of will as a potency which can, often in opposition to feeling, act for *deferred* ends. In this connexion between will and time he finds justification for exalting time from a falsely called *Vorstellung* into the greatest of all realities, namely the Deity. "God is almighty time . . . and man, . . . as will, is his reflexion (*Abglanz*)."

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

*La Volontà, secondo i recenti progressi della biologia e della filosofia.* Dr. ACHILLE MARUCCI. Roma: E. Loescher & Co., 1903. Pp. v, 115.

This essay proposes, within its modest bulk, to serve as "an inquiry, genetic, physiological and psychological, into the will" along positive, anti-metaphysical lines. The existence of difficult complications is admitted, but not that of any insoluble mysteries whatever of a super-phenomenal order. With a youthful buoyancy the author denounces the sterility of yesterday's 'ideological' theories of volition, and the stubbornness of "the residuum of impenitent verbalists" who uphold them to-day in the face of scientific progress. Speaking with detachment of materialists as of idealists, he declares that the last word in the explanation of will is to be said by biology. A brief but able out-

line of the effect of recent science on philosophic concepts brings him to the preliminary definition of will as no self-determining faculty, but "a collective name for particular acts determined by natural causes". He then inquires into the nature of those acts and those causes, giving us a biological discursus on purposive movements in reaction to stimuli, from amœba to man, and on the histology of nerve—apparently a more thorough piece of work than we should look for in the psychologist who is not also, and first, a physiologist. Carrying forward certain psycho-physical results, he passes to the psychology of desire or want, motive, inhibition and choice. The last term lands him finally in a passage of arms with Indeterminism.

There is room here, as in Italy, for fresh work like this on the psychophysics of conation. If we are not always to have an 'unrepentant residuum' with us, there should be no remission of effort among psychologists to get adequate analyses of the physical concomitants of that which we know in subjective experience as volition, and an adequate psycho-physical terminology generally. Without the latter there are apt to come hitches in treatment. Terms of objective and subjective science are confused together, values are distorted and metaphors are thrown in with a false semblance of insight. For instance, 'idea,' in terms of movement, becomes as such "most feeble, partial and imperfect"—obviously an inadequate estimate. Again, "a more crystalline substance than sensation" gives little help. Dr. Marucci, however, keeps as a rule to paths of clearness and consistency.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

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RECEIVED also:—

- F. C. Schiller, *Humanism—Philosophical Essays*.  
 Marcus Dods, M.A., B.A., *Forerunners of Dante*.  
 Frederick R. Farmer, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., *A Scheme of Brain Storage, with some new theories connected with the Environment*.  
*The Metaphysical Magazine*, July-September, 1903.  
 Alfred Binet, *L'Année Psychologique* (neuvième année).  
 Rudolf Goldschild, *Zur Ethik des Gesamtwillens*.  
 Anton Leitz, Dr. theol. et phil., *Willensfreiheit und moderner psychologischer Determinismus*.  
 Dr. Albert Lang, *Nietzsche und die deutsche Kultur* (zweite, vermehrte Auflage).  
 Paul Stern, *Grundprobleme der Philosophie: I. Das Problem der Gegebenheit*.  
 R. Schweitzer, *Die Energie und Entropie der Naturkräfte*.  
 Dr. Albert Lang, *Maine de Biran und die neuere Philosophie, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Kausalproblems*.  
 Dr. Emil Arleth, *Die metaphysischen Grundlagen der Aristotelischen Ethik*.  
 Giorgio del Vecchio, *Il Sentimento Giuridico*.



## VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xii, No. 3. **J. R. Angell.** 'The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy.' [The biological idea of structure extends in psychological application "only to the implication of a specific kind of complexity: beyond that it is irrelevant and inapplicable". The biological idea of function is, without any question, "applicable in a general way to the life of consciousness". As regards the relation of the two aspects of mind, we note (1) that many psychological processes, ordinarily regarded as functional, not only involve structural elements of the accepted sort, but also themselves possess unique structural attributes; (2) that, in any given case, structure and function turn out to represent simply two phases of a single fact; so that our present psychology needs "a further development of both branches of the inquiry, based upon the distinction and a clearer recognition of the real relation of the two"; and (3) that the alleged superiority of structural psychology merely indicates that mental science has developed as science at large has developed,—static and structural phases of the cosmos being known earlier than its dynamic and functional features. It follows that "psychology cannot succeed in its effort to determine what consciousness is . . . without a determination of what consciousness does," *i.e.*, that it must inquire into the how and why of conscious operations. "Start from the psychological standpoint, and we insist that you cannot avoid certain functional statements. Once enter upon statements of function and you cannot . . . stop short of a logic, an ethics and an æsthetics. Furthermore, in the same movement which carries you into logic, you will inevitably find yourself drawn back into epistemology. . . . The attitude is one and the same throughout, the attitude of really understanding the structure and function of consciousness."] **E. B. McGilvary.** 'Altruism in Hume's *Treatise*.' ["The relation of the *Treatise* to the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* is much closer than recent critics would admit. . . . The former work attempted to elaborate an explanation of the passions by the principle of association, and to apply the explanation to some of the passions—not by any means to all. The latter work, accepting the existence of exactly the same passions, did not attempt to enter upon that problem," partly because Hume now doubted whether any solution could be reached, partly because he now knew that abstruse speculations were not popular. But "Hume did not modify in the least his view of the relative preponderance of fundamentally altruistic over fundamentally egoistic principles in human conduct. In both works he admitted the presence of both kinds of springs of action, and in the earlier as well as in the later he found that it is 'rare to meet with one, in whom the kind affections, taken together, do not overbalance all the selfish'." These conclusions are based (1) upon a consideration of the general drift of Hume's psychological theory as presented in the *Treatise*, and (2) upon an

analysis of the passages in which he applies this theory in detail to love, sympathy and benevolence.] **H. H. Bawden.** 'The Functional Theory of Parallelism.' [(1) *Function.* "The essential idea in function lies in the use, value, or utility of the structure for some end. Function and functioning, ultimately, are not material processes, but ideal significances or meanings. . . . Instead of saying that the psychical is the functioning of the physical, it would be truer to say that the psychical and the physical are constituent and correlative functions within experience. . . . The ontological distinction of mind and matter doubtless served a useful purpose at one time in the history of reflective thought." But these concepts now "stand simply for a functional division of labour in the building-up of our actual experience as a systematic whole". (2) *Mental Activity.* "Mental activity is not a special sort of activity. . . . Mind is not a different mode of energy from matter. . . . Mental life is a continual synthetic construction. It is simply a name for the orderly, continuous functioning of an organism under conditions of tension in adaptation. . . . The sole difference" between mental acts and other acts in the world "consists in their being tensional or conscious acts instead of habitual or stable acts". (3) "Nothing can be in the mind of which the mind is unconscious. . . . The unconscious background of the conscious is not mental but neural. The subconscious is the mechanised background of the conscious," *i.e.*, is 'physical'. (4) In the light of these discussions, we may say that "this problem of mind and matter is, in reality, only a phase of the larger problem which modern psychology has transformed from its abstract statement, as the problem of the many and the one, into the more intelligible statement as the relation of means to end".] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW.** Vol. x., No. 1. **J. R. Angell.** 'A Preliminary Study of the Significance of Partial Tones in the Localisation of Sound.' [Experiments out of doors with a specially constructed sound-cage, by means of tuning-fork, stopped pipe, reed pipe, bell, telegraphic sander. Intensive differences alone are sufficient for confident and accurate assignment even of pure tones to the median vertical plane and to the lateral hemisphere from which they chance to come, as well as for less confident and accurate reference to the transverse vertical plane of the head. But "accuracy of localisation as regards altitude in this transverse plane, and accuracy in the several regions between this plane and the median plane" are "apparently dependent upon tonal complexity and the modifications in timbre which complex sounds undergo through the changes in the intensity of their partials, when heard from different directions". Localisation within the median vertical plane is inaccurate with all sounds, but most inaccurate with pure tones.] **R. Macdougall.** 'The Affective Quality of Auditory Rhythm in its Relation to Objective Forms.' [The affective psychology of auditory rhythm must include (a) a determination of the modes of feeling which rhythm produces; (b) a study of the relation of these modes of feeling to types of physical change in the bodily organism, characteristic of the expression of rhythm; and (c) an examination of the external conditions of rhythmical feeling, *i.e.*, of the elements and relations of the objective rhythm-forms which give rise to æsthetic satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The author distinguishes eleven sub-headings in the last problem. Discussion and Apparatus. **R. E. Marsden.** 'A Study of the Early Colour Sense.' [Tests, beginning at the fourth month, upon a boy: (a) *eye method*: cards are shown in pairs, and the one followed by the eye noted; (b) *grasping method*: coloured balls are offered in pairs, and the one grasped noted; (c) *reaching method*: cards are laid out, at certain

distances, and the child's reaction to the stimulus noted. The summarised results are especially valuable from their indication of sources of error.] **J. H. Hyslop.** 'Experiments in the Perception of the Third Dimension.' [Changes in localisation of reflected images, seen in the windows of railway carriages during motion, with variations of convergence (binocular and monocular vision). Explanation in terms of a 'motor' theory—'motor' meaning, however, 'movement-conscious,' *i.e.*, in reality 'sensory,' as distinct from 'unconscious'.] **J. M. Baldwin.** 'Dr. Bosanquet on Imitation and Selective Thinking.' [Answer to the criticism that the theory of selective thinking neglects reasoning ('analytic,' 'teleological' or 'constitutional' elements in our knowledge). Distinction of the problems of social and individual thought organisation. Analogy, in individual thought, of the constitutional rudiment or *Anlage* of the biologists. Necessity of a genetic theory: the hypothesis of race-experience and of variation; 'consciousness of unity' as a motor process. "A whole of thought which illustrates and accomplishes a mental end is not only not exempt from the requirement of being psychophysical and phenomenal, but its only possible realisation in experience is through such processes, through traceable genetic processes."] **C. E. Seashore.** 'A Sound Perimeter.' [A sound cage for research work.] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. x., No. 2. **E. C. Sanford.** 'Psychology and Physics.' [President's Address before the American Psychological Association, December, 1902. (1) Psychological theory is influenced to a large, even to an embarrassing, extent by points of view and forms of expression derived from physics. This is referable not so much to physics as to man's general commerce with the outside world. Now from an exclusively psychological standpoint, physics is merely a most elaborate development of one aspect of the psychology of the cutaneous and kinaesthetic senses, a study of fixed associative groups of a limited sensory origin. The difference between the two sciences is a difference (a) of attitude, (b) of variety of experience covered, and (c) of relative simplicity of contents. On the other hand, psychology itself is conscious of gaps in its empirical series, and tends to fill these gaps by appeal to the outside world and to unconscious cerebral processes. No harm is done, if we remember that the physical series called in is itself "based upon the physical group of sensations, and has been elaborated according to the usual psychical processes of perception, association, abstraction and generalisation". But this implies that we are to utilise the physical series to the best psychological advantage; and this, in turn, leads to an interaction theory of the relation of mind to body. (2) In spite of physical influences, psychology is, and probably must remain, an anthropomorphic science.] **F. G. Bonser.** 'A Study of the Relations between Mental Activity and the Circulation of the Blood.' [A sphygmographic and plethysmographic study. Emotion and intellectual activity are accompanied by change in heart-rate and blood-pressure, and generally by peripheral vasomotor changes. The only constant variation for agreeable and disagreeable stimuli is that the vasomotor level is more quickly recovered in the former case. Prolonged intellectual activity lessens the pulse curve, increases blood-pressure, and lessens the acuteness of the dirotic notch. It has three distinct vasomotor effects: progressive constriction, no progressive change, and progressive constriction for a time, followed by a steady level of constriction or a slight dilatation. The Traube-Hering waves correspond to fluctuations of visual and auditory attention, the greatest acuity occurring just after the maximum of vasoconstriction.] **G. T. Ladd.** 'Direct Control of the Retinal Field: Report on Three Cases.'

[Statement of observations, with the conclusion that "consciousness must from the very first, and in all its varied forms of manifestation, be considered as an active, discriminating, selective and directive force". As the author cites his *Colour Illusion* of 1898, he has probably not seen McClure's paper in *Am. Journ.*, xii., 178.] **L. Farrand.** 'Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., 30th and 31st December, 1902; 1st January, 1903.'

**M. E. Alling.** 'An Example of an Association through a Forgotten Idea.' [Chimes aroused image of building, familiar ten years before, and identified from the writer's description by his mother.] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. x., No. 3. **J. M. Baldwin.** 'Mind and Body from the Genetic Point of View.' [An examination of the alleged primacy of subjective over objective, in the light of the genesis of the distinction between body and mind. (1) The three stages of growth, formulated as: (a) the projective progression, "projective experience becomes personal-projects and thing-projects"; (b) the subjective progression, "personal projects become subject-self and object-self"; and (c) the ejective progression, "object-self becomes mind and body". (2) In the later stage mind and body have strictly correlative meanings. The question is that of the relation of presented mind, considered as the object of reflexion, and presented body, likewise considered as the object of reflexion. Materialism takes the spontaneous standpoint for body, the reflective for mind; subjectivism takes the spontaneous standpoint for mind, the reflective for body: both alike, therefore, miss the issue. (3) The distinction between mind and body requires the use of two categories of construction. Physics interprets the agenetic; its formula for cause and effect is an equation. Psychology and ethics interpret the genetic (as subjective); their formula is that of progressive organisation; the equation is replaced by the progression. If we attack the problem of the relation of mind to body in terms of one category only, we either make mind a form of energy (materialism) or deny that antecedent brain-state fully determines subsequent (subjectivism): either form of interactionism is erroneous. (4) The conditions are fully satisfied by psychophysical parallelism. The further question arises: "How can we satisfy the mental demand for a type of change which shall . . . both exhibit the form of 'progression' . . . and also be liable to interpretation in terms of the equations of agenetic science?" Its answer is found in æsthetic experience and in the philosophy of æsthetic idealism.]

**J. R. Angell.** 'Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago.'—I. **C. R. Squire.** 'Fatigue: Suggestions for a New Method of Investigation'. [An attempt to observe the rise and trace the course of fatigue of attention, with elimination of muscular fatigue and peripheral distractions. The method is that of tapping a pattern of digits, under ergographic control. The work yielded good introspective results, and made possible a distinction between general and special fatigue. Suggestions are given for various extensions of the method.]—II. **K. Gordon.** 'Meaning in Memory and Attention.' [Complex series (syllables complicated by space and colour variations) are learned more easily than simple; both complications contribute to the result. Attention is directed preferably to and held longer upon the more complex of two presented geometrical figures. "On the structural side, meaning is contiguity often repeated; on the functional side, it is attention or interest. Repetition is the means of acquirement of significance, and the fact of internal interest in a content stands for the significance acquired in the past." ]—III. **M. L. Ashley.** 'An Investigation of the Process of Judgment as Involved in Estimating Distances.'

[With observers of either pronounced visual or motor type, the corresponding mental factor tends in judgments of this kind to be emphasised to the neglect of the other in case they are combined. Judgment may be the product of habits or tendencies which we not only do not ordinarily recognise, but which we cannot correctly evaluate when conflict brings them to our notice. We may be predominantly influenced by factors of which we are clearly conscious, and which we definitely suppose ourselves to be disregarding.] Discussion and Reports. **J. H. Hyslop.** 'After-images and Allied Phenomena.' [In cases of mental preoccupation and abstraction, there is a tendency to the occurrence of after-images, and to a narrowing of the field of vision.] **R. E. Marsden.** 'The Early Colour Sense: Further Experiments.' [Comparative experiments with greys and colours, to test the colour sense in young children. But the greys and colours were matched in different objective illuminations!] **W. Lay.** 'Mental Imagery.' [Critique of Slaughter's paper in *Amer. Journ.*, xiii., 1902, 526 ff.] **A. Allin.** 'On Laughter.' [Critique of Sully. Notes on ticklishness; laughing as a therapeutic agency; humour and wit as the result of vasomotor and nervous changes; self-illusion as an æsthetic theory, etc.] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xiv., No. 1. **J. Gaule.** 'What is Life?' [(1) The machine converts combustible materials directly into energy; the organism first makes the food a part of the body, while the tissues of the body in their turn decompose energy thus developing into simpler combinations. (2) The individual cell does not enjoy an independent existence, taking its nourishment from the common store according to need; all cells are dependent upon substances produced by other cells for their building material. (3) The organism is in a state of ceaseless change, quite independently of the experiments one makes upon it. (4) The living being is in a constant state of re-formation for adaptation to its environment. Illustration from the presence of nucleated red blood-corpuscles at high altitudes (balloon ascents).] **H. C. Stevens.** 'The Plethysmographic Evidence for the Tridimensional Theory of Feeling.' [Careful examination of the plethysmograms in Lehmann's Atlas, in the light of the interpretation put upon them by Wundt in *Phil. Stud.*, xv., and in the *Völkerpsychologie*. Wundt's appeal to the curves, on behalf of his tridimensional theory of feeling, is unsuccessful on all its five counts.] **G. S. Hall and T. L. Smith.** 'Reactions to Light and Darkness.' [Questionary returns. Dawn; the sun as making an effort; the dualism of light and darkness; the sun's rays as tangible, as hard and sharp, as connexions between heaven and earth, as fairies, as water drawers; omens; sunset feelings; twilight fancies; effects of artificial light; effect of changes of dark and light, of clouds, of sun on new snow, of dark days, on children and adults. The questionary answers are set in interesting discussions of mythology.] **E. B. Titchener.** 'A Plea for Summaries and Indexes.' **G. S. Hall.** 'Note on Moon Fancies.' [Childish and present ideas and feelings about the moon, from 184 girls between eighteen and twenty-two years of age.] **I. M. Bentley.** 'The Simplicity of Colour Tones.' [The arguments both from the four visual types and from the twofold resemblance of the intermediate colours are insufficient to prove the complexity of visual qualities. The criterion of psychological elementariness: "one analyses introspectively so long as one can think a quality or a group of qualities as existing apart from its context; when the element is reached, the object of attention refuses to be thought further as object and context". Again, "comparison is essential to classification, but classification and analysis are quite different processes and yield wholly unlike results".]

We thus find ample ground for the belief that, psychologically, one colour-tone is as simple and as ultimate as another. "It would be difficult to find a more illuminating instance of the essential difference between psychophysical and psychological problems, and of the necessity for distinguishing mental analysis from the objective simplification of physical and physiological factors." **G. S. Hall.** 'Child Study at Clark University: an Impending New Step.' [Programme of future work, on the basis especially of a grant from the Carnegie Institution. List of Syllabi so far issued; books and articles based upon them; sample bibliography.] **G. M. Whipple.** 'A Compressed Air Device for Acoustic and General Laboratory Work.' [An instrument, of the type of the double gasometer, for furnishing a steady air current, sufficient to actuate a small organ pipe or Stern bottle for about two and a half minutes.] **I. M. Bentley.** 'Professor Calkins on Mental Arrangement.' [Reply to criticism in *Philos. Rev.*, xi., 1902, 553.] Literature.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. 3<sup>e</sup> Année, No. 4. 1<sup>er</sup> Juin, 1903. 'Esquisse d'une éducation de la mémoire.' **J. J. van Biervleit.** The poor results of 'lesson by heart' at school are experimentally shown. Hence the desirability of new methods. The sensibility of the several senses and the duration of their various impressions vary in various individuals. Children should learn to remember by aid of as many senses as possible. For literature, only true ornaments of memory should be committed to memory. Vain repetitions should be avoided. Better to go over the passage once slowly, with attention to each syllable, and repeat the exercise after an interval. There are proposed exercises in remembering things seen and heard. The article deserves the attention of pedagogists. 'L'illusion de fausse reconnaissance.' **Emile Laurent.** The sudden impression of having 'seen all that before,' even when one is for the first time in a strange locality, is attributed to the influence of dreams. Readers are invited to communicate their personal experiences of this phenomenon to the editor. 'Les problèmes métaphysiques du Mixte.' **A. Charousset.** When oxygen and hydrogen are combined to form water, do the component substances still exist in the water, or do they disappear to form the one substance of water? The problem in its general shape is as old as Aristotle, and received much attention from the schoolmen. According to the author, every mineral compound body, be it either chemical combination or mechanical mixture, is a simple aggregate of substances, more or less altered, more or less unified in their sensible properties, but keeping always their respective individualities. He insists on the discovery of Sainte-Claire-Deville that there is no chemical *modus operandi* distinct from physical *modus operandi*, and that chemistry and physics henceforth make but one science. He promises to return to the metaphysical consideration of this question. 'Quelques arguments philosophiques en faveur de la liberté d'enseignement.' **S. Jankalevitch.** The author rejects the theory which bases the liberty of teaching on the rights of parents: he considers that it assigns to the family an independence which would be destructive of the State. At the same time he is on his guard against too close an application of biology to politics; he does not admit that the family is to the State exactly as the cell to the body. He holds the State to be an expansion of the individual rather than of the family. He points out how, when power was wrenched from the minority composed of the privileged classes, the liberalism of *laissez-faire*, restricting the State's functions to those of police, led to the grinding down of the weaker individual by the stronger, and threatened to result in the disruption of society. Thereupon a new liberalism, or rather socialism, undertook to protect the

weak, and in doing so has armed the State with such powers that individual liberty has come to be once more in jeopardy. Such has been the effect of the teaching of Rousseau, and, after him, of Comte and Karl Marx. The modern State claims to mould the individual by a State-directed education. Finding what seemed to be a common ground for all modern minds in Science, the State has wished to make of Science the staple of its education. It has wished to make Science supreme and sole, to the exclusion of other educational forces which appeal more to the heart and conscience of the individual. The author argues that Science is not an instrument fit to do all the work that the State expects of it. He considers that the State may well insist upon Science for all: but should leave to individuals the liberty of their own teaching in religion and metaphysics. In that domain individuals should be emancipated from State control, the State only interfering to prevent their impeding the liberty of one another. 'Thèses de Doctorat de M. Ribery à la Sorbonne.' **M. Ribery's** Latin thesis is 'De infinito apud Pascaliū'. He draws an analogy between Pascal and Kant, turning on their respective employment of the terms Infinite and Absolute, Appearance and Phenomenon, Heart and Reason. A French thesis follows, 'Essai de Classification Naturelle des Caractères'. M. Ribery considers that intellect is no part of character. By 'character' then he means 'temperament,' and distinguishes eight temperaments, maintaining that temperament is given by nature, not by education, and that it is impossible to pass from one temperament to another. On both theses there is an interesting discussion reported between M. Ribery and his Examiners.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Bd. xxxi., Heft 3. **H. Piper.** 'Ueber Dunkeladaptation.' [Report of an elaborate experimental investigation of the temporal course and the quantitative relations of adaptation, i.e., of the increased retinal sensitivity induced by the removal of light stimuli. The author confirms Tschermak's discovery of two types of adaptation, the one characterised by quick rise, with very marked increase of sensitivity, the other by a slow course, with a much lower maximum. Tschermak had brought these two types into close relation with Hering's typical differences of normal colour vision and of colour blindness: quick adaptation going with relative yellow-sightedness of normal colour vision and with 'green blindness,' slow adaptation with relative blue-sightedness and with 'red blindness'. Piper is unable to support this correlation. He concludes (1) that the mechanism of adaptation is, within wide limits, independent of and separate from the mechanism of brightness and colour vision; and (2) that the union of the fields of vision, in adaptation to dark and light respectively, obeys essentially different laws. In binocular vision with dark-adapted eyes there is an addition or summation of the liminal stimuli of the two organs; in vision with bright-adapted eyes this is not the case. He therefore infers that in dark-adaptation central nerve structures are involved, whose function in face of light stimuli is different from that of the structures involved in bright-adaptation.] **T. Ziehen.** 'Eine Hypothese über den sogenannten "gefühlserzeugenden Prozess".' [The physiological substrate of the affective process must be looked for in the cortical cells (cf. loss of feeling-tone in dementia paralytica). It is a concomitant of the physiological process underlying the content of sensation and idea, but is so far independent that it can be transferred by irradiation or reflexion from an idea to associated ideas and their basal sensations. Its relation to stimulus is much more variable than is that of the process



underlying intensity and quality of sensation. If it underlies 'positive' feeling-tones, it accelerates, if it underlies 'negative,' it inhibits, the association of ideas and of movements: this action being, on the whole, teleological. All these requirements of fact are met by the hypothesis that "die Gefühlskomponente des psychophysiologischen Prozesses mit der Entladungsbereitschaft der kortikalen Zellen identisch ist".] Literaturbericht. Bd. xxxi., Heft 4. **M. Meyer.** 'Zur Theorie der Geräuschempfindungen.' [Critique of Stumpf's discussion in the *Tonpsychologie*. The second definition of noise rejected by Stumpf ("Geräusche sind sehr zahlreiche, sehr schnell aufeinanderfolgende Töne verschiedener Höhe") can be accepted, if we remember that 'tones' here mean 'subjective tones,' and that the same effect can be produced "durch einen entsprechenden Wechsel objektiver Töne oder durch eine Anzahl gleichzeitiger Töne in Intervallen, die beträchtliche Unregelmässigkeiten des Klanges bedingen". Except on the resonance hypothesis (which is untenable), the cochlea presents itself as the organ of noise sensation. Brücke's theory of single-wave noises must be given up: it ignores the existence of waves of reflexion. The 'pitch' of noises is not pitch at all, but noise-tint, akin to the tone-tint ascribed by Stumpf to simple tones.] **C. L. Franklin** and **A. Guttmann.** 'Ueber das Sehen durch Schleier.' [If the eye is accommodated for a distant object, and a veil drawn over the face, there is but little interference with vision (ladies' veils). If the veil is drawn over the object, we get, if the meshes are distinct, a concealment of contours and a darkening by shadow (face seen through veil); if the meshes are not distinguished, either a general darkening of the object (dark veil) or a loss of details and of differences in light and shade (light veil, such as is used for clouds in theatrical scenes: cf. the admission of light to the ground-glass plate of the camera). Intermediate positions of the veil give more complicated conditions. The authors experimented with optotypes, between which and the observing eye veils of gauze or wire were interposed at varying distances; in certain experiments the eye was treated with homatropin. They found that, in spite of individual differences, and of differences in the function of accommodation, the material of the veil, the character of the meshes, etc., "alle Kurven denselben typischen Verlauf zeigen, nämlich: Absinken der Sehleistung bis zu einem relativen Minimum (varying from 30 to 90 cm.) und dann nach einiger Zeit ein Ansteigen der Sehleistung" (beginning at 40 to 90 cm.).] **A. Iwanoff.** 'Ein Beitrag zur Lehre über die Knochenleitung.' [Confirmation of Frey's results as regards long bones ("die Schalleitung ist desto besser, je fester, kompakter der Knochen ist") and skull (conduction is best to diametrically opposite points). Discussion of the laws of conduction in a wooden ball. Experiments on the cadaver show that the dura mater is a better conductor than the bony substance of the skull. Sound waves may be conducted to the labyrinth directly, and not merely by way of the tympanic membrane.] Literaturbericht.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Tome i., Fasc. 3. **E. Murisier.** 'La psychologie du peuple anglais et l'éthologie politique.' [Review and critique of Boutmy's *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 1901. General laws, such as the statement that the northern peoples are given to introspection and reflexion, the southern to a life of externals, or that the English people are naturally individualistic, do not hold water. Consideration of family life, of political and practical *vs.* social and theoretical freedom, etc. A political ethology should begin with a monograph on cant for England, on the sense of the ridiculous for France.] **E. Abramowski.** 'De la loi de corrélation

psycho-physiologique au point de vue de la théorie de la connaissance. [The nature of mental phenomena; the function of introspection in psychological investigations; the difference between outer and inner experience; mental phenomena and the law of conservation of energy; the concept of correlation and its distinguishing attributes. The two factors in the correlation (mental process and physiological correlate) are not causally connected; they coexist simultaneously; variation in the one necessarily brings with it variation in the other.] **E. Claparède.** 'L'obsession de la rougeur, à propos d'un cas d'éreutrophobie.' [Careful analysis of the psychology of the blushing mania, with clinical notes, and suggestions for treatment.] **E. Claparède.** 'Essai d'une nouvelle classification des associations d'idées.' [Reprinted in the author's work *L'association des idées*, 1903.] Notes et Documents. Notices bibliographiques. Tome i., Fasc. 4. **A. Lemaitre.** 'Hallucinations autoscopiques et automatismes divers chez les écoliers.' [Report of five cases, with discussion.] **M. Millioud.** 'Le problème de la personnalité.' [(1) *Methods and solutions*. We may rule out the question of a soul-substance as metaphysical. We then find three psychological schools, appealing respectively to the unity of the physical organism, to association, and to volition or synthetic activity. The right method is, to go to consciousness for facts; and then to attack the biological and metaphysical problems of individuality. (2) *The consciousness of self and the sense of unity*. "L'unité du sujet sentant est une donnée certaine de l'expérience. . . . L'unité que nous sentons est l'unité d'une fonction, et nous sentons juste, car cette fonction est une, bien qu'elle résulte du concours de plusieurs agents." (3) *The sense of identity and processes of simplification*. Memory is at the root of our sense of personal identity. We simplify its work by a 'totalisation des souvenirs,' a sort of automatic classification; by recourse to an image of the self; or by dispensing with the dissociation of subject and object in the remembered situation. "Notre sentiment d'identité, c'est l'unification de tous nos états par le mécanisme de l'opposition. . . . C'est par division que tout se lie et s'organise dans la vie de l'esprit." ] **K. Fairbanks.** 'Le cas spirite de Dickens.' [Examination of the spiritualistic conclusion of *Edwin Drood*, with negative conclusion.] Notices bibliographiques. Tome ii., Fasc. 1. **M. Thury.** 'Observations sur les mœurs de l'hirondelle domestique.' [Swallows are lively birds, quick, independent, susceptible and proud, sociable.] **A. Binet.** 'Note sur l'appréciation du temps.' [If one wishes the time to pass quickly, it goes slowly, and conversely: illustration from a case of insomnia.] **E. Claparède.** 'L'illusion de poids chez les anormaux et le signe de Demoor.' [Demoor found in 1898 that the size-weight illusion did not hold for certain abnormal children. The author thinks that this fact (Demoor's symptom) is of importance for the diagnosis of abnormalities; the illusion itself is due to a persistence of instinct, the reversed illusion in abnormal cases to a dissociation of instinct. Tests upon insane subjects gave varying results.] **T. Flournoy.** 'Les principes de la psychologie religieuse.' [Current psychology of religion is based upon two principles: that of the exclusion of transcendence, and that of biological interpretation. The former is negative and defensive, ruling out any judgment of the objective value of the beliefs investigated; the latter is positive and heuristic, regarding religious phenomena as manifestations of a vital process whose character, genesis, laws, etc., may be determined.] Recueil de faits: documents et discussions. **J. de Pury.** 'Observations de paramnésie.' **E. Claparède.** 'A propos de la rougeur.' Bibliographie. Notes diverses. Tome ii., Fasc. 2. **A. Naville.** 'Linéa-

ments de psychologie esthétique.' [Remarks on the direct (pleasures of sight and hearing) and indirect (pleasures of imagination) factors in aesthetics. No attempt is made to analyse psychologically the æsthetic sentiment.] **A. Lemaitre.** 'Jenny-Azaëla: histoire d'une somnambule genevoise au siècle dernier d'après des documents inédits.' [Case of double personality, extending over forty-nine years.] **E. Claparède.** 'La faculté d'orientation lointaine (sens de direction, sens du retour): essai de mise au point d'après quelques travaux récents.' [A review of theories and observations concerning the "homing instinct" of ants, bees, pigeons, etc. The current theories of topographical memory and of reversal of route are neither of them adequate to all the facts; probably the animal avails itself of all available data. What we now need, however, is not so much theory as careful and extended observations. The paper ends with a bibliography of seventy-three titles.] *Recueil de faits: documents et discussions.* **H. Zbinden.** 'La crainte de l'insomnie.' **M. Thury.** 'L'appréciation du temps.' *Bibliographie. Publications reques. Notes diverses.*

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE DE LA SUISSE ROMANDE. Tome i., No. 1. **T. Flournoy.** 'Le cas de Charles Bonnet: hallucinations visuelles chez un vieillard opéré de la cataracte.' ['Bonnet's case' is familiar to students of psychology, if only from its mention in Höfding's *Outlines*. The author has obtained and here publishes the subject's own account of his case: "Visions de M. l'ancien Syndic Lullin, Seigneur de Confignon". The text is followed by a commentary. "Les visions de Lullin sont bien des hallucinations proprement dites, non des hallucinations dites psychiques, ou pseudo-hallucinations, n'affectant que l'œil intérieur et dépourvues du caractère d'objectivité propre aux perceptions."] **A. Lemaitre.** 'Deux cas de personifications.' [Two studies of synæsthesia, involving personification. In the one case "les personifications ont pris naissance dans le besoin instinctif d'associer un sens à des mots entendus mais encore incompris; le son de ces mots, frappants par leur étrangeté, s'est alors adapté à des objets ou à de menus détails bien localisés, qui tombaient sous les yeux" of the subject "à la maison ou à la promenade"; in the other, "c'est la vue et non l'oreille qui la première a dû engendrer les personifications des lettres majuscules imprimées de l'alphabet."] **A. M. Boubier.** 'Les jeux de l'enfant pendant la classe.' [Schoolroom plays of children from nine to thirteen years of age: talking, epidemic interests, reading, pictures, barter, drawing, correspondence, carving, music, muscular activities, kaleidoscopic devices, etc. The theories of superfluous energy and of recuperation, and the principle of imitation, are insufficient to explain the phenomena, which must be looked on rather as 'preparatory exercise' or 'preliminary activity' (Vorübung, Einübung). From this point of view it is inadvisable to attempt the total suppression of the play-forms.] **E. Claparède.** 'Expériences sur la vitesse du soulèvement des poids de volumes différents.' [When objects have the same weight but different volume, they are lifted the more quickly the greater their volume. There are two moments in the lifting: the latent time, and the lift proper. In general, the former is shorter the quicker the lift; but in some cases one moment only is the determining factor in the impression of weight, and then it is rather the rate of lift than the duration of the latent time. At times, again, there is compensation or over-compensation of the two moments: a very slow lift will follow a very short latent time. These moments are not, as such, psychological factors that enter into the illusion; they are mechanical conditions of the variation of tendinous and muscular tension, which is itself the sole factor upon which the specific

sensation of weight depends. The weight illusion is, therefore, not a psychological illusion in the regular sense, but a consequence of the persistency of instinct. Since the motor impulse is greater for greater volumes, and the greater volume is perceived as lighter, there is no sense of innervation. The reason for the direct objectification of the peripheral data is the insufficiency of acquired associations existing among the various elements (tension, speed, etc.) of the complex.] **K. Fairbanks.** 'Note sur un phénomène de prévision immédiate.' [Case of anticipation of spoken words in the class room, without the illusion of paramnesia. Explanation in terms of cerebral automatism, induced by fatigue and bad air.] Notices bibliographiques. Tome i., No. 2. **T. Flournoy.** 'Nouvelles observations sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie.' [Reviewed by F. C. S. Schiller, *MIND*, April, 1902, N. S., xi., 262 f.] Notices bibliographiques.

**PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN.** Bd. xix. **F. Angell.** 'Discrimination of Shades of Grey for Different Intervals of Time.' [Repetition and extension of Lehmann's experiments on the recognition of greys by naming. Lehmann's results are confirmed: the observers form a scale of values, and the judgments are free judgments or judgments by verbal association resulting from the formation of this scale.] **P. Barth.** 'Zur Psychologie der gebundenen und der freien Wortstellung.' [In almost all languages the position of words in the sentence is subject to definite rules: this is true even of vulgar Latin. The European languages are originally free in this regard; but the freedom is limited, especially by association through similarity of feeling. Illustrations from German, although the Germanic languages as a rule have great freedom. Significance of this fact for racial psychology.] **B. Bourdon.** 'Contribution à l'étude de l'individualité dans les associations verbales.' [The same words are submitted for association to a large number of persons, and the most frequent associations and the number of these most frequent associations for each person noted. The results throw light upon mental constitution.] **J. McK. Cattell.** 'The Time of Perception as a Measure of Differences of Intensity.' [Experiments with greys, resumed from 1888. "When the differences were made smaller the times became longer, and the probable errors and the agreement between the two observers prove the validity of the method."] **J. Cohn.** 'Die Hauptformen des Rationalismus.' [Rationalism may be defined as "any philosophy that finds in pure thought the ground of the certainty of all or at any rate of all truly valuable knowledge". It passed from an unconscious (the Ionians) to a conscious stage (Socrates, Plato). From Plato to Leibniz it was ontologistic; in the hands of the post-Kantians and Hegel it became idealistic, metaphysical; in the speculations of modern science it is simply methodological.] **O. Dittrich.** 'Die sprachwissenschaftliche Definition der Begriffe "Satz" und "Syntax".' ["Ein Satz ist eine modularisch abgeschlossene Lautung, wodurch der Hörende veranlasst wird, eine vom Sprechenden als richtig anerkennbare relativ abgeschlossene apperceptive (beziehende) Gliederung eines Bedeutungsthatbestandes zu versuchen." Syntax will then include a *Flexionslehre* and a *Lehre von den Formwörtern* or better *Beziehungswörtern*.] **O. Fischer.** 'Ueber die Bedingungen und den Beginn der Ablösung der Fersen vom Boden.' **E. Fluegel.** 'Roger Bacon's Stellung in der Geschichte der Philologie.' [Bacon did not allow to philology an independent place among the sciences; had no special interest in it; gave no original suggestions; paid no serious attention to living languages. Nevertheless he is an acute critic of grammatical traditions; he has a clear insight into

etymological principles ; he advocates a wider and more thorough knowledge of language ; he wrote the first independent Greek grammar of the Middle Ages.] **W. Hellpach.** 'Psychologie und Nervenheilkunde.' [An elaborate study of the relation of psychology at large to the treatment of nervous disorders (hysteria, neurasthenia, etc.), with special reference to the conflicting claims of popular psychology on the one hand, and modern intellectualistic or voluntaristic psychology on the other. Critique of the views of Flehsig, Ziehen, Moebius, Kraepelin, etc. The author declares himself a voluntarist, in the Wundtian sense, and believes that "die durch Wundt uns vermittelten psychologischen Erkenntnisse heute allein im Stande sind, der Vulgärpsychologie in allen ihren Verhüllungen den Boden innerhalb der Nervenheilkunde abzugraaben".] **C. H. Judd.** 'An Experimental Study of Writing Movements.' [Investigates a phase of the relation between finger movement and hand and arm movement, in developed adult writing, by aid of a writing point attached to the fifth metacarpal bone, just behind the little finger. The apparatus fails, of course, to record up and down movements, and movements of supination and pronation ; but its simplicity offsets these disadvantages in a preliminary study. The fine formative movements are executed by hand or arm ; the pauses between letter-groups are used for long forward arm-movements and for hand-movements which ensure an easy-working position. The control of writing is visual, not kinæsthetic.] **F. Kiesow.** 'Ueber Vertheilung und Empfindlichkeit der Tastpunkte.' [Record of the distribution (to the sq. cm.) and liminal values (in gr./mm.) of pressure points on wrist, forearm, elbow, upper arm, instep, shin and calf, knee-cap, anterior surface of thigh, chest and back.] **A. Kirschmann.** 'Die Dimensionen des Raumes.' [The thesis of this paper is that the accepted tridimensionality of space is merely conventional, and that the various metageometries are the mathematical outcome of wholly unjustifiable speculations. As the article has since been published in book form, and will be reviewed later, we do not here enter upon its arguments.] **E. Koenig.** 'Ueber Naturzwecke.' ["Die Naturwissenschaft hat es mit der objectiv-realen Erscheinungswelt zu thun, welche die Anwendung des Zweckbegriffes nirgends herausfordert, ja sie überhaupt nicht einmal zulässt ; die Metaphysik ist genöthigt, eine transcendente Bestimmung nach Zwecken als Grundlage des empirisch gegebenen Geschehens vorauszusetzen, wenn die gleichzeitige Gültigkeit der causalen und der teleologischen Deutung der bewussten individuellen Willenshandlungen begreiflich sein soll."] **E. Kraepelin.** 'Die Arbeitscurve.' [An attempt to analyse a curve of 90 min. uniform work, recorded in 5 min. sections, into its components of practice, fatigue, warming-up, habituation, and tension of will. The author confesses that, after more than a decade of work, he is able to offer only a provisional and crude analysis, but thinks that "eine sorgfältige Erforschung der Arbeitscurve in allen ihren Einzelheiten" is the only path to "ein Massverfahren, welches durch zweckmässige Vertheilung von Arbeit und Ruhe uns mit den wesentlichsten Eigenschaften der Versuchspersonen, ihrer Uebungsfähigkeit und ihrer Ermüdbarkeit vertraut machen soll".] **O. Kuelpe.** 'Ueber die Objectivirung und Subjectivirung von Sinneseindrücken.' [If our experience is originally unitary, neither subjective nor objective, it must be possible experimentally to produce wrong (or at least doubtful) objectification and subjectification, and to prove the conditioning of judgment upon factors extraneous to the experience itself. Experiments made in the spheres of visual and cutaneous sensation showed that both of these hypotheses are correct. The motives of objectification and subjectification are worked out in detail, and the

psychological and epistemological significance of the results discussed.]

**P. Rostosky.** 'Ueber binaurale Schwebungen.' [Slow diotic beats are always accompanied by repeated changes of localisation, occurring at the same rate. The direction of localisation is determined in every case by the intensive ratio of the diotic excitations. These facts are explicable on the assumption that the two stimuli, conducted separately, interfere at two points, whose excitation intensities are of determining influence upon sensation, and that the movement processes resulting from the interferences do not run synchronously. If this assumption be granted, the theory that binaural beats are due to transmission of vibrations from ear to ear by the bones of the skull receives important support.]

**E. W. Scripture.** 'Studies of Melody in English Speech.' [Study of records by a Rousselot apparatus. "In speech, as contrasted with song, the voice is constantly and continuously changing in pitch. The changes are so gradual and so complicated that any attempt to represent the melody of speech by musical notation is thoroughly misleading. The changes in pitch are not very great."] Bd. xx.

**L. Lange.** 'Das Inertialsystem vor dem Forum der Naturforschung: Kritisches und Antikritisches.' [Review of literature on the law of inertia since 1885, with special reference to MacGregor's 1893 paper in the *Phil. Magazine*. "Wer in dem Trägheitssatz einen tieferen Sinn als den einer partiellen Convention sucht, verlässt eben damit meiner Meinung nach das Gebiet der strengen Wissenschaft."] **A. Lehmann.**

'Ueber die Helligkeitsvariationen der Farben.' [Experimental test, by aid of a universal optical apparatus, and on the ground of formulæ set up in the writer's *Die physischen Aequivalente der Bewusstseinserscheinungen*, of the hypothesis that equally intensive colour sensations possess the same brightness. The formulæ are found correct; it also appears that equally bright colours of different wave length have approximately the same periodic constants. The variation of colours in brightness is a simple consequence of the fact that the retina is differently sensitive to light of different wave-lengths. A component theory of colour vision is thus rendered less probable than such a periodicity theory as has been proposed by Wundt.]

**G. F. Lipps.** 'Einleitung in die allgemeine Theorie der Mannigfaltigkeiten von Bewusstseinsinhalten.' [The author distinguishes a science of thought, whose fundamental principle is that "Jede Denkform besitzt ihren gegenständlichen Träger, an dem sie zur Ausgestaltung kommt," from a science of objects, with the principle "Alles gegenständlich Bestehende findet durch das Denken seine Bestimmung". Thought itself is either comprehensive (*erfassend*) or relational (*beziehend*). The distinction is important both on the side of the science of thought (*e.g.*, in mathematics) and on that of the science of objects, where it founds the further distinction of a science of conscious contents and a science of substances. The former of these has two objects of investigation: the "relations founded in the nature of the conscious contents," and the "uniformities of connexion, in which conscious contents are experienced". The author, dealing here with the first only, characterises conscious contents by intensity ("Inanspruchnahme des erfassenden Denkens") and quality ("Weise des Erfassens"), and reaches the notion of a conscious element which, though not empirically perceptible and not given in any act of comprehensive thought, may yet be used as if it were conscious content for the purposes of his problem.] **E. Meumann.** 'Die Entstehung der ersten Wortbedeutungen beim Kinde.' [An important paper, to be included presently in a book on the language of children.] **E. Mosch.** 'Ueber den Zusammenhang zwischen der Methode der Minimaländerungen und der Methode der richtigen und



falschen Fälle.' [The difference limen of minimal changes is exclusively dependent neither upon the measure of precision nor upon the limen of right and wrong cases, but is influenced by both. Approximative formulæ are given for liminal values.] **E. A. Pace.** 'Fluctuations of Attention and After-images.' [Experiments with visual stimuli. The stimulus fatigues the retina, and the impression disappears. Its disappearance affects the central mechanism of attention. This change of attention influences the process of accommodation. This, in turn, affects the operation of the stimulus upon the retina. Reappearance is accordingly a function both of recuperation and of accommodation. The writer thus combines the peripheral (sense-organ) and central (attention) theories of the fluctuation of minimal stimulus differences.] **R. Richter.** 'Die erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen des griechischen Skepticismus.' [The paper works out in detail, with constant historical reference, the position taken up as regards ancient scepticism by Wundt in his *Einführung*. The author extends and confirms Wundt's criticism by reference to the ethics of Pyrrhonism.] **B. Schmid.** 'Der Wille in der Natur.' [A discussion of Wundt's natural philosophy, and especially of his employment of the concepts of will and purpose, on the basis of a comparison with the views of Schopenhauer and Darwin.] **G. Stoerring.** 'Zur Lehre von den Allgemeinbegriffen.' [The scientific definition of the general idea presupposes, besides judgments of inherence and equality or similarity ('these and these characteristics of the complex ideational content or idea-object appear also in a whole series of other ideational contents or idea-objects'), the negative judgment that 'these and these characteristics and no others appear in this series'. Classification of general ideas.] **G. M. Stratton.** 'Eye-movements and the Æsthetics of Visual Form.' [The eye moves far less accurately over an outline than has commonly been supposed; it takes a course which is but a rough approximation of the form which we perceive. We thus have evidence of a striking introspective illusion, due to confusion of point of attention with point of ocular fixation; and we must give up the theory that the preference for curves over straight lines is explicable by ease of eye-movement. "The form we enjoy is not a simple sensuous impression, . . . either muscular or retinal. . . . It seems to be due to nothing short of an elaborate mental act of selection and recomposition of the data furnished by the eye."] **K. Thieme.** 'Philosophie der Theologie.' [Methodological considerations, based on the position which Wundt assigns to the philosophy of theology or philosophy of religion in the system of the sciences. "A true science of religion is, on the one hand, a history of religions," and accordingly rests upon the historical disciplines (especially mythology and ethnology) and philology. On the other hand, it "attempts, by help of anthropology and individual and social psychology, to give systematic knowledge of the religious life". Since, however, the religious elements of the mental life satisfy the deepest needs of man's affective and conative nature, "so gebührt der Religionswissenschaft eine einzigartige philosophische Bedeutung im Kreise der Einzelwissenschaften".] **E. B. Titchener.** 'Ein Versuch die Methode der paarweisen Vergleichung auf die verschiedenen Gefühlsrichtungen anzuwenden.' [Concludes, on the basis of experiments with harmonium tones and time intervals by Cohn's method of paired comparisons, that excitement and depression, tension and relaxation, are not simple affective processes, like pleasantness and unpleasantness, but complex feelings.] **A. Vierkandt.** 'Die Gründe für die Erhaltung der Cultur.' [Enumeration of the formal and material grounds, with discussion. If we group together the formal and the secondary material grounds as 'subjective,



the primary material as 'objective,' we may say that removal of the former gives us the civilisation of the Illumination, removal of the latter that of a thorough-going Relativism. The true path lies between these extremes. At the same time, "der wahre Sachverhalt liegt dem conventionalistischen Extrem näher als dem idealistischen. Der Eindruck, den wir von den Grundlagen der Cultur und deren gesamntem Charakter durch unsere Betrachtung erhalten haben, ist ein vorwiegend pessimistischer." **W. Weygandt.** 'Beiträge zur Psychologie des Traumes.' [Deals especially with the alienation of consciousness at the oncoming of sleep. In drowsiness, certain somatic and other continuous weak sensations, not the object of attention in the waking life, come to the front; at the moment of falling asleep, these presomnic sensations pass over into dream ideas.] **W. Wirth.** 'Zur Theorie des Bewusstseinsumfanges und seiner Messung.' [A paper of nearly 200 pages—naturally without summary! The author reviews the previous work, historically and critically; makes valuable contributions to the methodology of the subject; and briefly reports experiments of his own with an improved tachistoscope.] **J. Zeitler.** 'Taine und die Culturgeschichte.' [Taine's method and ideals in the writing of history: his theory of the influence of environment, psychological analysis of historical sources, historical objectivity, criticisms of other historians, etc. "Er hat den Weg zu einer historischen Typenlehre gezeigt. . . . Er war einer der erster Forscher, der eine unbedingte Causalität von der Geschichte forderte. . . . Er war nicht nur ein Geschichtsforscher: . . . er war auch eine schöpferische Individualität, . . . ein Genie der historischen Apperception."]

PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Bd. xvi, Heft 1. **Jos. Klein.** 'Ueber die Wichtigkeit der Psychologie für die Naturwissenschaften.' [Follows Aristotle's *De Anima*, dealing first with the vegetative soul, and then with the sensitive. In connexion with this last he points out a 'gross fallacy' fallen into by J. Müller the physiologist, Dubois, Helmholtz, Fick and Aubert, asserting that what we cognise in sight has no similarity with the thing seen. On the contrary, it is the thing seen.] **E. Rolf.** 'Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele nach . . . Plato und Aristoteles.' [Here the writer indicates Aristotle's proof of the immateriality of the soul: the thinking act is essentially different from matter, and argues an existence which is not matter, and which therefore can exist separately after death.] **C. Th. Isenkrahe.** 'Ueber die Zeit.' [The writer defends his theory—*viz.*, that time is not founded in movement or change, but in the fact that things which exist in time are creatures—against several objections; and he concludes by admitting that, in his theory, the *ævum* or duration of spiritual substances would have no place.] **E. Hartmann.** 'Die sinnliche Wahrnehmung nach Pierre d'Ailly.' [This paper, which is the first of two articles, deals with the general Scholastic Theory of Cognition as expounded by Pierre d'Ailly (the Magister Sententiarum) whom Aquinas followed closely; and enters into a detailed explanation of what was meant by the 'species impressa' and the 'species expressa,' and how these are supposed to act in the theory.] **A. Müller.** 'Zur Analysis des Raumes.' [This (also the first of two articles) is an extremely bold attempt to demonstrate that space is a being existing independently of extended bodies, and a *substance*. Bd. xvi, Heft 2. **A. Straub.** 'Die Aseität Gottes.' [This is the first of a series of articles. The author, starting from the idea of Aseity—the Not-being-from-any-other—of God, who is the cause of all that needs a cause, and Himself needs none, attempts to show that it is the basis both of God's existence and of His attributes, not as a cause but analogically to a cause, in that we infer

them therefrom.] **C. Gutberlet.** 'Die natürliche Erkenntnis der seligen.' [This, the first of two papers, examines the question of the double cognition of the blessed; one which proceeds from the *visio Dei*, and the other from their natural powers. Now the natural faculties of cognition in this life cease with death, and the soul has no power to know itself by itself; since, therefore, the soul is immortal it is necessary and natural that certain species or intelligible perceptions should be infused into it at the moment of death, else it would be annihilated. This cognition, without the aid of any extended mental image, is not natural, nor is it contrary to nature; but it is preternatural.] **E. Hartmann.** 'Die scimliche Wahrnehmung nach Pierre d'Ailly' (Peter Lombard). [The most important point in this concluding article is the statement that the cognition of sensible things, although it takes place by means of an image, or resemblance, of the thing cognised, is not *that* image, which is never known directly, only by inference.] **St. Schindele.** 'Die aristotelische Ethik.' [Aristotle's idea of virtue is a mean between two contrary extremes; a mean which is geometrical, not arithmetical, and appreciable in reference to the subject. Scholastics had to part company with Aristotle in many points, or make him say what he did not. Evil is to him the mere struggle between the intelligence and the senses, not the depravity of the will. He to some extent sacrifices the individual to the State. He makes a virtue of magnanimity and a vice of humility. He blames suicide only as an injustice to the State. And his political conceptions are too narrow, too Greek.] **P. Beda Adloch.** 'Glossen zur neuesten Wertung des Anselmischen Gottesbeweis.' [This is a defence of St. Anselm's argument for God's existence against Graf de Vorges. His dilemma was: If God is the being than which none greater is conceivable, do I conceive this being, or no? If I do, there is something greater: if I do not, how can I know it to exist really?]

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA. Anno v., Vol. vi., Fasc. iii. May-June, 1903.  
**G. Chiapelli.** 'Il valore teoretico della storia della filosofia.' [The history of philosophy should be studied as part of the general history of civilisation. We must avoid the mistake of regarding past systems as stages in the evolution of some one system whose finality is assumed. But there is a progress in thought; and even when the same problems recur their apprehension becomes widened and deepened in course of time.] **A. Zuccante.** 'La donna nella dottrina di Platone.' [Shows how Plato in some ways departed from and in others developed the Socratic view of women.] **A. Faggi.** 'Filosofia, storia, arte.' [Suggests various means for reviving the interest, now lamentably deficient, of the Italian public in philosophy, and especially in native philosophy.] **O. Bottero.** 'L'Octavius di M. Minucio Felice.' [Shows the dependence of Minucius Felix on Cicero and Seneca.] Rassegna Bibliografica, etc.

## VIII.—NOTES.

### PROFESSOR BAIN.

BORN in Aberdeen on the 11th June, 1818, Professor Alexander Bain was in the eighty-sixth year of his age when he died, at Ferryhill Lodge, in his native city, on the 18th September, 1903. The length of his life was a marvel to those who knew him in earlier days; for he was then fragile and delicate in health, and few who were acquainted with him when he returned to Aberdeen in 1860 to occupy the Chair of Logic at the University would have predicted for him a life of more than a few years' duration. The secret of it was his indomitable spirit and his deliberate acceptance of a strict regimen, not to be interfered with save for the most cogent reasons and on the rarest occasions. His daily life, at any rate from the beginning of his professorial days, was portioned out in the most methodical manner. There was a time for work and a time for exercise, a time for diet and a time for rest, to which he adhered, not only when he lived at home, but when he travelled abroad and when he visited friends. A pure holiday, in the sense of absolute cessation for the meantime from the usual task, was unknown to him; and the fulness of his life was conditioned by the regularity and simplicity of his habits.

In boyhood he had a hard struggle. His father, who had been a soldier, was a handloom weaver, and the son, when he got beyond the message-boy stage, had to help him in his occupation. This continued even during Bain's student days at the University; and people still living remember the eager intellectual youth, after returning from Marischal College, doffing the red academic gown, throwing it on the loom, and proceeding with the manual duty, albeit having a book open before him. It is the story of genius asserting itself. When attending Gilcomston School as a boy, he attracted the notice of one of the Marischal College professors (Dr. Cruickshank), who was surprised, on examining him, to find the extent and accuracy of his knowledge. The result was that, somewhat later on, he was taken by the hand by Dr. Cruickshank, through whose encouragement and that of several other cultured Aberdonians young Bain was able to enter Marischal College at the age of eighteen, in 1836. Previously to this, however, he had given proof of his mental faculty to a band of aspiring youths with whom he associated, and who all recognised in him a leading spirit. The result was that, when a political dinner was given to James Adam, editor of the *Aberdeen Herald* (the local Liberal paper of the time), young Bain's reputation for able speaking was such that, although he had only just entered his first year at Marischal College (or, in northern academic phraseology, had become a "bajan"), he was selected to return thanks for the toast of "Principal Dewar and Marischal College," and did so in a speech (a

report of which is still extant) that gave no uncertain indication of the psychological and dialectical power that he was yet to display.

His University course was a brilliant one; and he graduated M.A. with highest honours, having carried off, in the previous year, the blue ribbon of the Gray mathematical bursary of £30, tenable for two years. Perhaps, however, the main significance of his student days lay here, that he came under the influence of two very strong men—Dr. Cruickshank, Professor of Mathematics, and Professor Thomas Clark, the Chemist,—to whom he often referred in after-life with much appreciation, and to whom he was not slow to acknowledge his indebtedness; and he derived also a lasting stimulus from Dr. William Knight, Professor of Natural Philosophy, in whose subject he excelled. He was, further, the first man of his time in the class of Moral Philosophy, under Dr. Glennie—for whom he was presently to act as substitute during four years of the Professor's illness. It was this combination of mathematical and scientific knowledge with philosophical acquirements that early laid the foundation of that ready faculty of illustrating logical principles and psychological processes from the departments of science that was to characterise his writings later on.

There is no need for me to pursue the narrative in detail. It was during his University course also that by a criticism of Sir John Herschell he was first brought into contact with J. S. Mill, through John Robertson, a fellow-Aberdonian, then joint-editor of the *London and Westminster Review*; and thus began an acquaintanceship which ripened into a close friendship that ceased only with death.

After various annual summer visits to London, Bain settled there for a time, having received an appointment under the Board of Health, where his chief was his intimate friend, Edwin Chadwick. He soon came into close contact with the leaders of thought, including George Grote and George Henry Lewes. He was now fully on the way to intellectual eminence. His first work—*The Senses and the Intellect*—appeared in 1855, and marked what may almost be designated an epoch in British psychology. Those who know what psychology was before the appearance of this treatise and what it by-and-by became, in great measure through this presentation of a new standpoint and the application of a new method, are aware of the immense debt that psychology owes to Bain. It was not only that he improved the subject—he revolutionised it. And when, four years later, *The Emotions and the Will* appeared, psychological workers in our country felt they had now got a real advance in a department of investigation whose methods had lain under the imputation of being loose and non-scientific. The effect was soon apparent. The principles enunciated were taken up and applied in many directions; and the abiding tribute to the worth of the treatises lies in this, that what is best in them has been assimilated by more recent psychologists, and that, even when the debt is unacknowledged, no psychologist at the present moment can free himself from the influence of them—he works, of necessity, in the atmosphere that they created.

But it is a mistake to suppose that Bain's psychology is confined to his two great psychological treatises. His educational volumes too are permeated by his psychological views. Not a few teachers have complained that his *Education as a Science* is dry and hard to master, and so have set themselves to decry it. They could scarcely have been expected to do otherwise. Only one of two courses was open to them—either to submit themselves to be taught scientifically on psychological lines or else to oppose. But the value of the book is not to be estimated by counting heads. The educational work has yet to be written that sur-

passes it in clear insight into the psychological principles that underlie education and in the masterly application of these principles to the case in hand. In like manner, psychology permeates his *Rhetoric*—more especially in the latest two-volumed edition. The analysis of the intellectual and of the emotional qualities of style is psychological to a degree; the very figures of speech are grouped under the two psychological headings of Similarity and Contiguity; and, if a full and adequate idea is to be obtained of Bain's handling of the Emotions, it is to be got only by adding to the presentation in *The Emotions and the Will* the analysis and treatment in this latest form of the *Rhetoric*.

Nor is Bain's psychology to be estimated solely by the earlier presentment of it. In some of the notices that have appeared since his death, his doctrines have been criticised on the basis of the first or the second edition of his writings; and some have even expressed their surprise that he had so little appreciation of the doctrine of Evolution. The best answer to any such criticism is to refer the critic to the third edition of *The Emotions and the Will*, and to the fourth edition of *The Senses and the Intellect* and the *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics* (mainly reprints from *MIND*). It is there that Bain's fullest and maturest views are to be found; and it is by these that his teaching should be judged.

As a logician, Bain followed J. S. Mill; but not without many emendations, restrictions, and additions. His early intimacy with the writings of Comte led him to place stress on the classification of the sciences; and so he introduced a section in his *Logic* on this very subject. In like manner, his scientific knowledge and his wide scientific interest constrained him to view Causation in the light of the Conservation of Energy, and made possible the detailed handling of the logical aspects of the Sciences that we find in Book V. of the *Logic*. His dissent, on the other hand, from the claim that Mill's theory of reasoning had bridged the chasm between induction and deduction led him to expound his own views of the function and value of the syllogism.

But the logician comes out also in other of his writings than those devoted specially to logic. In particular, it is conspicuous in his treatises on Grammar. Indeed, his *English Grammar* has recently been designated "the only logical grammar in the English language". That certainly is its merit, though it will be regarded as its defect by those who maintain that logic has nothing to do with grammar. Logic has to do with every department of knowledge, according to Bain; and he revelled in the practical applications of logical doctrines. He was a master of method in the best sense of the term—not only preaching the theory but amply exemplifying the practice.

It was thus that he was able to revolutionise the teaching of English in the Northern Counties of Scotland—which he did in the "sixties" partly by his published writings and partly by his prelections in the Chair of Logic (for, in those days, English was taught, in Aberdeen University, by the Professor of Logic). Lennie and the contemporary authorities had to be superseded, and the wooden method of dinning into the pupil a number of rules to be learned by rote without perception of their real meaning, had to be replaced by the method of awakening in the pupil intelligent appreciation of the principles involved and of creating, through practice, a ready and accurate use of them. The plan and the procedure were distinctively logical, and they had their limitations; but testimony to their value is borne by the fact that hundreds of Aberdeen graduates scattered throughout the world, many of them occupying high educational positions, are forward to acknowledge their indebtedness to the English teaching that they received from Dr. Bain in their University days.

As a teacher in the class, Bain occupied a unique position. He was a strict disciplinarian (an inheritance, no doubt, from Professors Cruickshank and Knight); but his own personality commanded respect and obedience. His gestures, as well as his voice, were very significant, and told with effect upon his audience; and, as his expositions were always lucid and methodical and aided by unlimited supply of appropriate illustrations drawn from all the provinces of literature and science, the interest of the student was secured, and his attention easily maintained. Moreover, the impression that he made upon his pupils was that of a master of his subject. He was no mere follower even in his mode of lecturing: everything he did had a touch of individuality, and his examination papers (especially in English) were drawn up in a manner different from that of everybody else.

In University affairs, he was always in the van of reform. He had a keen appreciation of defects, and a definite perception of how they might be remedied. Nor could he rest satisfied till some attempt were made to remedy. Hence, he advocated strenuously in the *Senatus* and in the General Council (and, later, in the University Court), and at first almost alone, the necessity for a Royal Commission, which should legislate for the widening of the curriculum, making provision for certain options, and giving science and modern languages their due place (as against the practical monopoly enjoyed by the classics) in a University education. For years, he was a voice crying in the wilderness; but undaunted he went on, and, when the change actually came in 1890, on the lines that he had advocated, he had the satisfaction of feeling that he had all along been on the side of progress.

But his educational energy was not confined to matters academic. In his early days, when as a lad he was educating himself, he had found immense help in the Mechanics' Institute of Aberdeen, where lectures were given to youths struggling to improve their minds and eager to acquire some knowledge of science and its advance. To this Institution he attached himself and took active and practical interest in its welfare to the very last. Similarly, he was a moving spirit in the matter of Free Public Libraries, and continued a member of Committee of the Aberdeen Public Library from its beginning till advancing years rendered his attendance at evening meetings impossible. So also he was an active member of the first School Board of Aberdeen, on which was laid the task of starting the new system on right lines. The same educational zeal led him, not unfrequently, to deliver lectures to scholastic bodies—sometimes in England, sometimes in Scotland—usually with the view of initiating discussion, but also for the purpose of imparting guidance. In this way, his influence came to be felt in many directions and in diverse quarters. Often he discoursed on educational topics to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (the successor of that which Thomas Reid originated in the eighteenth century), of which he was for many years president, and to which some of his earliest scientific contributions were made—going back to the year 1843.

Untiring energy was his characteristic. Possessed of original ideas, he lost no time in formulating them and spared himself no pains in spreading a knowledge of them and, if need were, in defending them. He had also a living interest in the ideas of others, and wished to have them duly discussed. Hence his noble act of originating this journal (*MIND*) and of remaining its sole proprietor during the first sixteen years of its existence. He was a born controversialist, and delighted in discussion. He was not seen at his best till he had an opponent directly to meet. It was then that the keen logical intellect showed its full strength and manifested a power of dialectic worthy of Aristotle.

But the usually unimpassioned nature had a fount of emotion in it. This was known only to a select few. It certainly could hardly be gathered from his writings. His was a manly nature, which scorned to do mean things; but it was also a generous nature, and a nature interested in the welfare and thoughtful even for the comforts of others. The few favourite pupils who came to have intimate relations with him know how untiring he was in promoting their interests, and how unselfish he was in helping them in their work to whatever extent they might draw upon him. Their success gave him unbounded satisfaction. But to his friends in general (always a limited number) he had an open heart. He entered alike into their joys and into their sorrows; and, though not demonstrative, his sympathy was always sincere.

In Dr. Bain's death, psychology has sustained a great loss; but so too has education and practical reform. It is rare to find a philosopher who combines philosophical with educational and practical interests, and who is also an active force in the community in which he dwells. Such a combination was here. Let us not fail to appreciate it.

WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.

The above brief sketch will be followed in the next number of *MIND* by an article containing a full appreciation of Dr. Bain's pre-eminent services to Psychology and Philosophy, and a further reference to his "noble act of originating this Journal and of remaining its sole proprietor during the first sixteen years of its existence".

ED.—G. F. S.



## MIND ASSOCIATION.

THE Annual General Meeting of the Association was held on 31st October last in University College, London. It was resolved that the general meeting next year be in Oxford in June; and that members of the Association should, on application to the Treasurer, have the privilege of purchasing at half the published price all the back numbers of *MIND* that are the property of the Association, *i.e.*, the New Series. The following is the full list of the officers and members of the Association :—

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## NEWS AND CORRESPONDENCE.

## DEATH OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER.

THE death of Prof. Bain has been quickly followed by that of his great contemporary, Mr. Herbert Spencer. Mr. Spencer died on the 8th of December, 1903, at the age of 83. An Obituary Notice will appear in the April number of *MIND*.

## WILDE READERSHIP.

Mr. W. McDougall has been appointed to the Wilde Readership in the University of Oxford.

## GENERAL INDEX TO "MIND".

A general Index to *MIND*, N.S. (1892-1903 inclusive), is in preparation and will be on sale in a few days.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editor regrets that owing to a mistake the following note did not appear in the July number:—

Dr. Bain regrets that Mr. Bradley's paper, "Is there such a thing as Pure Malevolence," the copyright of which belongs to Mr. Bradley, should have been, through an inadvertence, printed *in extenso* without his permission, as part of a discussion in Dr. Bain's book: *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics*, pp. 84-88. The paper was published in *MIND* some twenty years ago, and Mr. Bradley does not wish it to be considered as being now a wholly adequate statement of his views.